Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1982

Power, Politics and Public Policy: Bureaucratic Power in the Policy
Process
Donald L. Schultz
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Schultz, Donald L., "Power, Politics and Public Policy: Bureaucratic Power in the Policy Process" (1982).
Master's Theses. 3309.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/3309

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1982 Donald L. Schultz

f'

o(

POWER, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY:
BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN THE POLICY PROCESS

by
OONALD L. SCHULTZ

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola Univerr;;ity of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
February

1982

A

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Professor
Melvin Dubnick of the University of Kansas, whose constant probing, encouragement and insight into the workings of the policy process made this
study both possible and enriching.

The author is also appreciative of

the services of Dr. Barbara. Bardes for her most able assistance in coordinating the final submission of the manuscript, for her direction of
his Thesis Committee and for her encouragement throughout the length of
this project.

A special note of appreciation also goes out to Professors

Alan Gitelson, John Williams and Paul Glover for seeing this project
through to its completion, and to the whole of the Department of Political
Science at Loyola University whose commitment to teaching and academic
scholarship have made graduate studies a most rewarding experience.
Above all, no course of study would be possible without the encouragement, understanding and personal sacrifices of one's family - for the
efforts and compassion of my parents and special support of my wife I
am most grateful.

ii

VITA
The author, Donald L. Schultz, is the son of Lloyd Schultz and
Geraldine (Ryan) Schultz.
Illinois.

He was born November 17, 19..52, in Chicago,

He was married October 1, 1977, and is the father of two

children
His elementary education was obtained in the public schools of
suburban Chicago, Illinois, and secondary education at Argo Community
High School, Sunnni t, Illinois, where he graduated in 1970 as a member
of the National Honor Society and as recipient of the John F. Kennedy
Award, issued in recognition of scholastic and athletic achievements.
In September, 1973, he entered Carthage College, Kenosha, Wisconsin, and in May, 1976, received the Degree of Bachelor of Arts with a
major in History and Political Science.

His Bachelor's Degree was ob-

tained Summa Cum Laude with Honors in Political Science.
a member of National Blue Key and Phi Alpha Theta in 1976.

He was elected
While at-

tending Carthage College, he served as Vice-President of the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Law Society, Assistant Editor of the College Newspaper,
and served on numerous Student-Faculty Committees.
In September, 1976, he was granted an assistantship in the Department of Political Science at Loyola University of Chicago.
a member of Alpha Sigma Nu in 1978.

He was elected

While attending Loyola University,

he served as a Lecturer in Political Science in the Community College
System and as an Adminis tra ti ve Manager with a Chicago-based manufacturer

(1977-1981).
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
LIFE

•

. ......

........
...

..

..

ii
iii

CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1

II.

THE CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF
STATE AND COMMUNITY POLICIES: THE INSTABILITY AND
UNRELIABILITY OF PRESENT METHODOLOGIES • • • • • •

10

III.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY

IV.

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLICY

PERFORMANCE
V.

64

• . • • . . . • • . . • •

FROM POLICY OBJECTIVES TO POLICY PERFORMANCE:
BUREAUCRATS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS •

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

iv

108
128
168

CHAP'lER I
INTRODUCTION
Examina. tion of contemporary analyses of the American Political
System reveals an almost radical shift in the major emphasis of political research, in general, and in the methodological designs'of political scientists, in particular.

Historically, political scientists have

concerned themselves with the institutions and structures of government,
with describing the functions and arrangements of formal governmental
bodies, and with detailing evident behaviors and processes of political
activity.

Analyses of this nature have concentrated on specific consti-

tutional aspects of the political system - federalism, separation of
powers, judicial review, delegations of authority, intergovernmental
relations; on the institutional arrangements and detailed powers and
functions of Congress, the President, and courts; on the duties, configuration and operations of major executive, legislative and judicial
agencies; and on the structure and powers of relevant political actors.
Inunersed in analyses of this na. ture were also attempts to offer a philosophical justification of government, concentrating on the philosophical,
ideological and ethical principles of democratic regimes.
Through the development of methodological designs more closely
aligned with principles of scientific research and through efforts to
concentrate on explicit activity rather than institutions, the traditional,
descriptive-institutional framework slowly gave way to a more demanding,
albeit often sterile, analysis of specific processes and behaviors associated
1

2

with governmental activity.

Foremost have been studies of the sociological

and psychological foundations of individual and group political behavior.
Herein researchers have given attention to the deteminants of electoral
voting and participation; to the behavior of individuals operating within
executive, legislative, and judicial arenas; to the attitudes, opinions,
and behavior of relevant political actors; and to emergent group properties which may not be reducible to the mere sum of individual behavioral
patterns.
Recently, however, political scientists have come to shift their
energies from the study of institutions and political behavior to the
examination of public policy - to the processes, causes, and consequences
of government activity.

Thus, rather than focusing on specific institutions

and behavioral patterns of groups and individual political actors, contemporary policy analysis seeks to diagnose the actual workings of governments by concentrating on specific policy areas and program specifications.
Policy analysis has thus come to focus on four key issues: (1) what governments do; (2) who decides what governments do; (3) why they do it; and

(4) what difference government activity makes.
Since governments are called upon to act throughout the whole of the
social system - in areas of health, education, foreign relations, national
defense, environmental protection, housing, welfare, transportation, urban
development, social security, police and fire protection, communications,
and so on, it is enough simply to be able to specify what governments do
in so many diverse fields.

When the analysis is expanded to include exam-

ination of why governments do what they do in each area, to specify the
relevant political actors in each activity, and to delineate the consequences
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of diverse activities for society, policy analysis begins to take on a
most serious challenge which, when attempted, often results in research
lacking in theoretical significance and reliability.

And, though social

scientists and policy planners have long recognized the myriad problems
besetting governments - functional and geographic fragmentation, decentralizations of power and authority, competing agencies and jurisdictions,
the relative inability and/or unwillingness of most citizens to influence
the policy process, and uncertain task environments, to name but a few,
the ver.y breadth of the task and the inadequacies of present methodological
designs have prevented political scientists from fostering a common focal
:point of analysis and in developing an integrated and comprehensive theory
of the policy process.
An examination of current literature on the subject reveals that
political scientists have instead moved without a real sense of direction
between the product and process of governments, drawing attention to the
particularity of each and the relationship between the two.

When focusing

on the product of politics the emphasis has been on discerning what factors,
if any, influence the ultimate policy choices of governmental bodies.

Public

policies are themselves posited as "dependent variables" which can be explained by reference to various "independent variables" - :political, social,
economic or technological forces in society hypothesized to be determinants of public policy.

Relative disparities between various state and com-

munity policies are then seen as a direct consequence of some social,
economic, political or technological characteristic of the policy environment hypothesized to be of detennining significance.

On the other hand,

when focusing on processes of policy fomulation, overriding consideration
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has been given to the ways in which particular problems become public
problems in the process of issue identification and problem definition
and how such problems receive attention via the formulation of specific
policies.

In so doing, many policy analysts have focused on the inter-

actions between the actors and institutions engaged in the formulation
phase of the policy process.

When the two distinct approaches are com-

bined it can be suggested that the major emphasis in present-day policy
analysis has been to delineate the hypothesized determinants of specific
government activity (policies) and to specify the location, source and
configura. tion of political power in the policy process.
Although the present analysis makes note of the limitations of such
efforts in acquiring a full understanding of politics and public policy,
it cannot be denied that both areas of inquiry represent legitimate concerns of political scientists.

The analysis of policy dete:rminants evolved

from the awareness that there exists a general disparity between the policies pursued by different state and community governments and that such
differences must be attributable to some social, economic, political or
technological factor determining the availability and feasibility of specific
policy choices.

Research of this nature is founded on the fact that

policy choices are not completely free choices.

The existence of limited

resources and incomplete information prevent policy-makers from addressing
each and every societal problem.

A choice must thus be made between com-

peting problems demanding attention, and oftentimes the selection of one
problem precludes focusing attention on others.

Secondly, a choice must

be made from among a1 terna ti ve policy responses.

And if the expenditure

of resources are demanded, then decisions must be made regarding levels of
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appropriation and allocation.

Even further choices must then be made from

among alternative means perceived capable of satisfying policy objectives,
including the selection of the implementing body.

Each phase of this

process is beset by opportunity costs: resources expended for the alleviation of one problem cannot be used for the solution of others.

By focusing

on those factors hypothetically viewed as determining what problems are
addressed and the very nature of the policies, themselves, determinants
analysis assumes that policy-makers are constrained from as well as encouraged to follow one policy position over that of others by some environmental characteristic.

Now, although such research has enhanced our

general understanding of the underlying reasons for the variance in policies
among states and communities, its narrowly confined methodological focus
on expenditures and revenue variables and its noteworthy exclusion of important organizational and political variables has detracted from an analysis of the actors involved in the formulation and implementation of the
policies of American governmental bodies.

Not only has it underscored

the importance of politics on things political but has completely ignored
bureaucratic variables which may have an indirect, if not independent,
effect on the policy process.
In addressing the question of influence and power in the policy
process a body of research has developed which seeks to define the configura. tio n of community power structures.

Traditionally this has taken

root in analyses of variations in formal and legal structures and, more
recently and in greater detail, in defining the power relationships that
really affect what transpires in the political decision-making process.
Whereas some have focused on those individuals holding major formal positions
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of responsibility, others have concentrated on how individuals perceive
the power structure in their individual communities, and still others have
analyzed how decisions are made and have thus focused on the parties directly
engaged in fonnulating policy responses to perceived societal problems.
Thus, of the totality of elements comprising the policy pmcess, primary
attention has been devoted to the steps necessary for the initial formulation of public policy.
It is this writer's contention that the overriding emphasis on how
the environment affects the policy choices of ·decision-makers and on
specifying the precise location of political power in society have led
political scientists to focus almost exclusively on that phase of the policy
process concerned with the initial

dete~nation

of policy choices and

with the actors involved in the preliminary formulation of public policy.
Although these concerns have added much to our general understanding of
the policy process, they tell us litUe about the actual application or
implementation of public policy.

They thus fail to clearly delineate the

crucial link between policy and perfonnance.

Thus lacking is a true under-

standing of how the political system succeeds or fails in

transfo~ng

policy goals, objectives, and intentions into specific and meaningful
public services, or how well policy outcomes confonn to policy objectives.
However, rather than ask why so much attention has been given to the
methods and manner of policy fonnula tion, we should instead question the
conspicuous and unfortunate absence of a viable theory of implementation.
It has been suggested that this neglect is due in part to the "implicit
assumption in most models that once a policy has been 'made' by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy
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will be near those expected by the policy-makers. ,l

The implementation

process is thus seen as consisting of a series of rather mundane decisions
and interactions, whereby the party or parties assigned major responsibility for applying a given policy to the task environment carry out
activities substantively and procedurally consistent with the policy objectives of elected public officials.

This rather naive

co~ption

of

the politics of implementation fails to capture the great gulf which
often exists between what elected decision-makers say the policy is and
what ultimately transpires once the policy is administered and thus delivered.

This present analysis, on the other hand, contends that policy

is ordinarily modified, i f not actually made, in the process of implementation.

This being so, it is further held that program administrators and

bureaucrats wield an aspect of political power heretofore underestimated,
if not ignored, by the political science community, and that bureaucratic
and organizational factors have a significant and independent effect on
the policy process which is relatively unexplored in current determinants
research.
This analysis further maintains that the public bureaucracy not only
determines the operational content of public policies but is indeed active
in each phase of the policy process, and that implementation analysis provides yet another means of locating the source and variety of power configurations in society.

1

Tb this end, this analysis seeks to show both

Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process," 4 Policy
Sciences (1973), 197-209, at p. 197-198; Also, see DonaldS. Van Meter
and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual
Framewo:tK," 6 Administration and Society, No.4 (Feb., 1975), 445-488.

8

where we have been and where future energies need to be expended so as to
facilitate a viable conceptualization of the whole of the policy process.
Thus, by critically reexamining, first, that portion of the litemture devoted to an analysis of the detenninants of public policy, and, secondly,
that which is concerned with the location of political power in society,
the objective will be to demonstmte how present analyses are Vtethodologically and ideologically oriented toward a single stage analysis of those
elements common to the initial formulation of public policy.

Throughout

this analysis it will be argued that single stage analyses of the determinants of policies formula ted by elected officials and of the actors deemed
influential in the formulation and adoption of specific policies has led
to a mdical underestimation of the power resources and the potentiaJ.
policy-making authority of administmtors and bureaucmts, thereby creating
an incomplete conceptualization of the policy process.
What we are proposing is the development of a positive theory of
policy formation - one amenable to the study of the whole of the policy
process - from issue identification and problem definition, to the
mobilization of resources, to the formulation of specific public policies,
to the politics of implementation, through to the ultimate performance of
government activity.

Since governments are ultimately judged on the basis

of what they actually do mther than by what they promise, policy analysis
will need to consider how extensive delegations of authority to administrative agencies have created a situation in which bureaucracies (1)
structure policy agendas, (2) define the alternatives for elected officials,
(3)

exercise significant degrees of discretion in the initial interpreta-

tion and ultimate application of statutory objectives, and (4) wield

CHAPTER II
CONTEMPORARY ANALYSES OF THE DETERMI:NANTS
OF STATE AND COMMUNITY POUCIES:
THE INSTABIUTY AND UNREUABIUTY OF PRESENT METHOOOLOGIES

If one accepts the premise that "poll tical science is concerned with
how various formal and informal institutions; economic, social, philosophical, and geographic conditions influence the adoption and implementation
of policy,"

1

the recent proliferation of scholarly attention to the determ.-

inants of state and conununi ty policy outputs is well founded.

2

Within the

past twenty years the study of public policy, both domestic and foreign,
has received an unparalled proportion of the political scientist's attention, especially students of the American political system as well as those
eager to compare the services of pluralist, democratic government with
those of other forms of governance.

This has produced several studies

not only specifically focused upon the American policy system but a number

1

Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition,
Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," 25 Journal of Politics (May, 1963), 265-289; at p. 265.
2

Public policy, policy outputs, policy outcomes, and policy irtacts
have been different~ally conceptualized in the ii terature. The inab~i ty
to arrive at a common definition has created a wealth of confusion in
inter- and intra-disciplinary communication. So as to provide greater
clarity to what follows, we contend that public policy represents patterns
of activity designed to produce either tangible or symbolic effects on
the environment; policy outputs represent the service levels effected by
these activities - the most evident manifestation of which are e:x:pendi tures;
policy outcomes represent the ultimate performance of the policy; and
policy impacts represent the effect such activities have on an environment.
10

11

of cross-national surveys as well.J

Unfortunately, even with a

prolife~

a tion of scholarly interest, "no clear theory or methodology for the
study has evolved."

4 This is so even though primary attention has been

given to those factors viewed as essential considerations inherent in the
formulation phase of the policy process.
When reviewing the policy literature we find that within the past
two decades determinants analysis has emergeq as the principal device
employed b,y political scientists for developing a theory of the policy
process and for gauging the importance of political system variables on
the policy choices of elected decision-makers.

This concern evolved as

an alternative to the exploration and description of the operation of
governmental institutions that characterized traditional political science,
and was both an attempt to document the explanatory power of political
system variables in accounting for variations in policy choices among
states and communities and a reaction to earlier studies by economists
which purportedly documented the direct influence of economic factors on
policy outputs.5

Embarldng upon non-experimental, multivariate comparative

3
For Example, see T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process
(Santa Barbara, Califomia: Clio Press, Inc., 1975).

4
Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy(New York: BobbsMerrill, 1975), p. 24.
5
For Example, see Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the U.S. Since 1930 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1950); Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary .Analysis," National Tax Journal, 14 (Sept 1961), 349355; G. W. Fisher, "Interstate Variat~on in State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 17 (March 1964), 57-74; Seymour Sachs and
Robert Harris, 11 'l'he Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures
and Intergovernmental Flows of Funds," National Tax Journal (March 1964),
75-85; Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and
Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal, 18 (March 1965), 50-67.
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research, political scientists have sought to demonstrate both the importance of political system characteristics, processes, and structures as
detexminants of public policy, and the salience of democratic pluralist
structures and values on the content of state and local policies.

How-

ever, in so doing, political scientists have suffered from what Thomas
Dye has termed "professional and ideological myopia." 6 That is, in seeking
to document the direct influence of

politi~

factors on the policy proc-

ess, the discipline has limited its attention to governmental institutions
and political processes.

In so doing, political scientists have asserted

the determining impact of political system characteristics without fully
considering the range of economic, social, cultural, historical, and technological forces shaping public poliey. 7 In addition, the ideological
commitment to democratic "pluralism" has predisposed the discipline to
transform cherished political values (e.g., participation, electoral processes and behaviors, interest group activity, and party competition) into
determinants of the causes and consequences of public policy. 8
However, even when the prevailing professional and ideological predisposition of political scientists is taken into consideration, the
greater proportion of studies of the linkages between enviromnental conditions, political system characteristics, and public policies has testified that much of the variation in state and community policy outputs is
explained by socio-economic factors, rather than by characteristics of

Thomas R. Dye, Policy .Analysis( University ,Ala: University of
Alabama Press, 1976), especiallY pp. 22-24.
7

s

~·'

pp. 22-23.

Ibid., p. 23.
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the political system. 9

The continuing search for more precise indicators

of the variables in question and measurement techniques amenable to the
study of the relationship between various environmental factors and the
policy outputs of governmental units, as well as the formulation and inclusion of multiple measures of policy outputs, assures us tha.t the debate
is far from over.

It also assures us tha.t the discipline will not im-

mediately recognize the narrow confines and limited utility of single
stage analyses of the policy process.

It is our contention that deter-

minants analysis, as presently employed, ( 1) neglects to consider the
factors which may have a determining effect on multiple stages of the
policy process; (2) fails to distinguish between factors effecting the
initial decision-making process from those bearing upon a policy's performance; and (3) ignores the effect bureaucratic and organizational
variables have on what actually transpires within the policy environment.
I

Even the most cursory review of the

lite~ture

would indicate that

what has most captivated the policy literature have been comparative and
systematic analyses of. those factors assumed to be related to federal,
state, and local provisions of goods and/or services.

The dominant ques-

tion has been, "what determines the specific policy outputs of states
and communi ties and can therefore explain variations in governmental activity?"

For example, "what relationship, if any, exists between the

9 A brief yet comprehensive summary of this literature is presented below.
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economic character of a state or community and the provision of educational assistance?"

10

"What relationship exists between the structure of

urban government and its taxing and spending policies?"ll

"What influence

does inter-party competition have on expenditures for education, health
care services, welfare benefits, and highway improvements?"

12

"What dif-

ference does it make whether a state's inhabitants are primarily urban or
rural, educated or uneducated, ·situated near.the poverty line or the upper socioeconomic strata, relatively transient or settled in tenns of
policy expenditures?"l3

"Does party identification have a significant

10 e.g., Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activi
United States Since 19 30; Glenn W. FJ.s er,
tel"'IIJ.nan s of tate and
cal Government Expenditures: A Preliminary .Analysis;" Glenn W. Fisher,
"Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditures; 11 Roy
Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Government Expenditures;" Otto A. Davis and George H. Haines, 11 A Poll tical
Approach to a Theory of Public Expenditures: The Case of Muni.cipali ties;"
Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the
American States( Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkanslcy', "Economic
and Poll tical Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," 11 Midwest Journal of Political Science (May
1967), 173-192; Ira Sharkanslcy', "Environment, Polley, OUtput and Impact:
Problems of Theory and Method in the .Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira
Sharkanslcy' ( ed.), Policy .Analysis in Poll tical Science (Chicago: Markham
Publishing Company, 1970), 61-79.
11
e.g., Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and
Public Policies in American Cities," 61 .American Poll tical Science Review
(September, 1967), 701-716.
12

e.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States,"
25 Journal of Politics (May, 1963), 265-89; Charles F. Cnudde and Donald
J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States,"
63 American Political Science Review (September, 1969), 858-866; Ira
Sharkanslcy' and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Poll tics, Economics, and Public Policy," 63 American Poll tical Science Review ( September, 1969), 867-879.
13
e.g., Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local
Government Expenditures • "

15
impact on the fonnulation of public policies?"

14

"Is there a regional

variation in policy outputs?"l5 "To what extent can differences in political culture explain observed variations in state and local policies?"16
These and similar questions have long been of interest to social
scientists in general and political scientists in particular.

They also

reflect the tendency to treat public policy, as formulated py elected officials, as the major dependent variable of interest to political scientists.

The role of political science has thus come to be one of finding

and explaining the independent and intervening variables which account
for policy differences.

Readily apparent is a predominant interest in ex-

plaining the relationship between various environmental factors (economic,
social, cultural, political, and geographic), the objectives of policymakers (as delineated within the formulation phase of the policy process),
and the ultimate policy choices of the goveming body.

Equally apparent

is the failure of such efforts to account for the eventual outcomes of
government activity.
This is not to suggest that policy research has been totally confined to the types of interests noted above.

In fact, when reviewing the

public policy literature we are confronted with a number of distinctions
within the perspectives regarding the specifics of. policy.

The once

14
E.g., Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States."
15 E.g., Ira Sharltansky, "Regionalism, Economic Status, and the
Public Policies of American States," Social Science Quarterly (June,
1968), 9-26.
16 E.g., Daniel J. Elazar, "Marltetplace and Commonwealth and the
Three Political Cultures," in Sharltansky (ed.), policy Anal;ysjs jn Poljtical Science, pp. 171-185.

16
predominant school of thought urged the expansion of our understanding
of how policies are formulated, how policies surface, and how various
institutional arrangements are brought· into play in the several stages
of conflict resolution.

This "process approach ••• tends to focus on

political processes within political institutions, emphasizing political
realities more than political fonmalities and concentrating,on the behavior of the participants in the process." 17 Policy decisions are seen
as products of a specific process, as the output of a particular system
18
or subsystem.
It can be suggested that the traditional concern for process evolved
from and is maintained by a desire to develop a "positive theory" of the
American political system. 19 It is assumed that a better understanding
of how policies are fomulated will improve the output of the system.
However, there is no single blueprint formula depicting how all policies
are made, and there does not exist any individual procedure which is
systematically employed in cranking out all policy decisions.

Process

l7 Charles o. Jones, An Introduction to the Stud of Public Folic
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970 , p. 2.
18
James C. Charlesworth notes this development when he suggests
that "political science ••• is concerned not with the potentially infinite
content of all public decisions, but with the process by which these decisions are reached." See, Charlesworth ( ed.), A Design for Political
Science: Scope, Objectives, and Methods(Phil, Pa: Amer1can Academy of Political and Social Sc1ence, 1966), p. 31. For specific descriptions of the
policy process, see: Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke, A Strategy
of Decision(New York: The Free Press, 1963): Lindblom, The Pol1cy-Mak1ng
Process(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968); Lewis
A. Froman, The Congressional Process (Boston: Lit Ue, Brown, and Company,
1967).
19 For a description of the nature of positive theory, see Milton
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics(Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953), p. 4.

17
analyses have consequently uncovered what often appears to be a muddled
mass of confusion, with many demands being placed on many different aspects of governmental machinery, with many political actors vying for the
acceptance of particular policy orientations, with the interrelated activities of numerous institutions, interest groups, and a highly complicated bureaucratic structure, with distinct policy goals, proposed courses
of action, and desired outcomes.
Due to repeated discoveries of rather dissimilar processes of policy
formulation working in different substantive areas, an alternative approach to the study of policy has been to focus on the particular pro blems perceived to be in need of a specific response b,y the political community.

It has been noted that most studies of policy fom.ulation have

usually given but scant attention to the nature of public problems; they
are ordinarily taken as given, and policy analysis proceeds from there. 20
This approach is unfortunate, however, because in many respects the way
in which policy-makers approach decision-making and the very structure of
the policy process itself often depends upon the nature of the issue confronting the policy environment.

In other words, this second perspective

holds that the particular issues under examination determine the type of
process employed in the making of policy.

Viewed in this manner policy

issues function as independent variables and process as the dependent
factor.

Thus, whereas a process orientation views the "tangible manifesta-

tion" of policy (the policy output) as dependent upon particular processes

20

James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making, 2nd Ed (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1975), p.~:5~:5-.----~--

18
of formulation, a policy issue perspective asserts that the type of process employed is detennined by the issue being addressed.

The underlying

basis of this perspective can be seen in Lewis Froman's observation that
the United States does not have a single process that systematically turns
out all policies, but several different processes, each of which operates
. a pa. rt•J.C ul ar arena. 21
J.n
Although this may seem a rather trite point, it must be understood
that there is an important distinction between the substantive area of
policy decisions and particular policy issues.

The substantive policy

area refers to a particular aspect of the total environment.

Policy is-

sues, on the other

ha~d,

refer to perceived problems in that particular

substantive area.

For example, energy resources, transportation, educa-

tion, taxation, foreign governments or ideologies are substantive areas
for policy decisions.

In and of themselves substantive policy areas do

not constitute policy issues.

Policy issues corresponding to the above

named substantive areas may refer to "shortages of oil," "overcrowded
highways," "inefficient educational facilities," "inequitable tax payment
schedules," "spread of communism and foreign aggression," respectively.
In other words, policy issues are problems in need of relief, primarily
through the activity of public officials.
We can therefore suggest that a focus on policy issues involves a
somewhat independent concentration on the types of public problems perceived as requiring government attention.
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One of the by-products of this

Lewis Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in
Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 41-52.
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specialized concentr-ation has been the construction of several distir.. ct
policy categories, each generating its own set of theoretical propositions.22

For example, Theodore J. Lowi, although not explicitly concerned

with individual policy issues per se, has offered a typology which has
served as the foundation for a variety of policy ~ategorizations23

The

premise advanced by Lowi is that the anticipated outcome of 'particular
problems (issues) greatly determines the pattern of conflict ir.. policy
formulation from its inception until resolved by some specific policy
decision.

¥.'hen considered in this manner there are principally thi'ee

types of policies -

distributh~e,

redistributive, and regulative, each

tending to generate its own arenas of power with special sets of a.ctoTs,
conflict resolution points, political structures, political processes,
elites, and 5Toup relations. 24
Underlying Lowi 's schema are three interrelated proposi tiona: "( 1)
The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by
their expectations - by what they hope to achieve or get from relating

22

Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies,
and Poll tical Theory," 16 World Poll tics (July, 1965), 677-715; Robert H.
Salisbury, "The Analysis of Public Polley: The Search for Theories and
Roles," in Austin Ranney ( ed.), Political Science and Public Policy ( Chgo:
Markham, 1968), 151-178; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Ail AiiaiYsis of Public
Policies in Cities," 29 Journal of Politics (February, 1967), 94-108;
Heinz Eula.u and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy
Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," 62 American Poll tical Science Heview (March, 1968), 124-143; T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy
PrOCess (California.: Clio :t-ress, Inc., 1975); David Braybrooke and Charles
Lindblom, A Strate~ of Decision (New York: The F'ree Press, 1963); Charles
0. Jones, "Speculat~ ve Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution PolicyMaking," 36 Journal of Politics, No. 2 (May, 1974), 438-464.
23
Theodore J. Lowi, ".American Business, Public Policy, Case
Studies, and Poll tical Theory."
24
Ibid., pp. 689-690.
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to others.

(2)

In politics, expectations are dete:rm.ined by govermnental

outputs or policies.

(3)

Therefore, a political relationship is deter-

mined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy
there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship." 25
Lowi thus defines policies in terms of their "impact or expected impact
on society."

And "when policies are defined this way, there. are only a

limited number of types; when aJ.l is said and done, there are only a
limited number of functions that gove:rrunents ~an perfo:rm.. " 26 In effect,
due to the ephemeral nature of individual issues, single issues are in
fact resolved on the basis of established expectations and a history of
prior policy decisions of the same type. 27 This categorization does not
suggest that ever,y related issue always brings about an identical policy
response, but rather that specific poliey types are dependent upon the
particular societal impact policy-makers hope to achieve.
Whereas Lowi has categorized policies in terms of expectations and
clientele, T. Alexander Smith prefers to distinguish between policies in
terms of the degree of conflict attending the discussion and resolution
28
of public problems.
Policies can be divided into four primary groupsdistributive, sectorally fragmented, emotive symbolic, and redistributive differing in terms of conflict intensity, institutional responsibility,
and group relations. 2 9

2

5 Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, " p. 688.
26
Ibid., p. 689.
27 Ibid.
28
T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, passim.
29 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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(1) Distributive policies display little, if any, conflict and are
settled qu~etly ~n executive and/or legislative committees. Party
discipline is unaffected.
(2) Sectorally fra~ented policies display moderate conflict among
interests represent~ng primarily economic sectors and are resolved
on the legislative floor b,y coalitions of legislators barg.aining
with ministers or other bureaucrats who oversee the particular sectors. Party discipline remains relatively strong in most cases.
(3) Emotive symbolic policies display wide conflicts ,of deep intensity over "way-of-life" issues in which gove:rnments refuse to stake
out positions and in which individual legislators reject leadership
controls over their actions. Party discipline is virtually nonexistent.
(4) Redistributive policies display wide conflicts of deep intensity between classes and are settled b,y "peak" associations of labor
and management negotiating with presidents and prime ministers
(legislatures are relatively quiescent). Party discipline is relatively high.JO
Although Smith credits Lowi for inspiring many of the positions advanced in his policy categories,3l we can note a marked variance in focus
among their approaches.

On

the one hand, Lowi suggests that there is a

great variety of issues confronting policy-makers, all of which cannot be
resolved b,y the same set of political actors, group relations, institutions, and political processes.

And, further, what determines the partie-

ular process employed in formulating public policies is not the peculiar
issue confronting policy-makers but, rather, the expected impact they hope
to make on society.

Since there exists a multiplicity of issues and a

number of varying ways in which single issues may be perceived, we cannot

30 T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, pp. 7-8.
31 "In developing my own perspective, I should say at the outset
that I owe a profound intellectual debt to Professor Theodore J. Lowi
of Cornell University. His work in the American policy field provided
inspiration for many of the positions adopted in this book." See, Smith,
p. v.
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state with any degree of certainty that all educational issues, transportation issues, communication issues, taxation issues, or any other political, economic, or social problem will be resolved according to one
established policy-making process.

However, since policy-makers ordi-

narily pursue public problems with certain objectives in mind, Lowi suggests that policies be differentiated on the basis of the impact policy
makers hope to achieve thzough proposed courses of government action.
T. Alexander Smith, on the other hand, suggests that the nature of
the policy-making process (the involvement of particular political actors,
institutions, and group relations) is detezmined b,y the scope and intensity of the conflict attending the resolution of policy issues.

Different

conflict relationships and not policy issues, per se, determine the nature
of the process b,y which policy decisions are formulated.

Thus, whereas

Lowi's proposed typology concentrates on the objectives of decisionmakers, Smith's schema differentiates between policy types in terms of
the degree of conflict attending particular public problems.

Although

concerned with different elements of an issue concentration, both policy
classification schemes seek to improve our general understanding of the
inner workings of the policy process.
An

important contribution of Smith's classification to the study of

public policy is its emphasis on the manner in which processes of issue
identification and problem definition influences the policy-making process.
This logic is founded upon a number of prior studies in which policies
had been categorized according to one's understanding of the problem environment.

For example, David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom had pre-

viously created a four-tier public policy typology, with each element

23
corresponding to a particular relationship between two variables (understanding of the problem and the degree of desire for change) , each dichot2
omized into "high" and "low" categories.J

Four specific processes are

thus discernible: "rational," "administrative," "disjointed incrementalism, .. JJ and "speculative augmentation ... J4
For example, when policy-makers have achieved a high level of understanding of the problem, enabling them to assess the "costs and benefits"
of each alternative policy and to select that which promises the greatest
"net value achievement," and when the desire for change is so great that
the public will consciously scrutinize the details of government activity,
processes of policy fo mula tion will follow a :ra. tional design.

On the

other hand, authority to fomulate policies affecting small or incremental
changes on the basis of a high level of comprehension of the problem are
ordinarily delegated to administrative agencies.

Such agencies are nor-

mally perceived as expert in their area of concern and thus better able to
satisfy policy demands than "generalist" public officials.

When policy-

makers confnont a particular issue in which there exists both a low level
of understanding of the specifics of the problem and a relatively low desire for change, such issues are addressed and resolved in a piece-meal
fashion.

Ultimate policy decisions are thus approached incrementally.

And, finally, when policy-makers have a relatively inadequate (i.e., low)
)

32 David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision,
pp. 66-79.
JJ Ibid.
4J Charles 0. Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution Policy-Making," pp. 4)8-464.
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understanding of the issues but the desire for change is high, the process
by which policy is fo:rmulated is characteristic of what Charles 0. Jones

has te:rmed "speculative augmenta.tion."J5 Federal air pollution policymaking is representative of this policy type.

For example, although there

is a great desire for change (as measured by the scope and intensity of
demands placed on public officials to alleviate air pollution), there is
lacking a clear understanding of the problem and of the ways in which
cleaner air can be achieved.

Under such conditions agencies ma.y be es-

ta.blished (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency) to satisfy public
demands for government action.

However, when all is said and done, there

is but token recognition of the problem and the government's attempt to
set up agencies authorized to make policy is merely one method of giving
the impression that an effective government response has been initiated.
Once again we note an instance where issues become a basis for establishing
a typology for increasing our understanding of the policy-making process.
In addition to the categories thus far considered, Lewis A. Froman
has suggested that we distinguish between "areal" and "segmental" policies
on the basis of the soope of the issue being addressed.J

6 Areal policies

are those which evolve in response to problems encompassing entire populations (e.g., pollution and, as suggested by Froman, municipal annexation).

Segmental policies, on the other hand, evolve in response to prob-

lems peculiar to particular segments of society (e.g., urban renewaJ.).

35 Jones, "Speculative Augmentation in Federal Air Pollution PolicyMaking," pp. 4)8-464.
36 Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities,"
94-108.

25
Froman thus suggests that there are certain problems peculiar to particular populations and others affecting entire settings.
ever, such neat boundaries are not so easily drawn.

In practice, howIn fact, as Ira

Sha:tkansky has so aptly noted, Froman's categories are not "mutually exelusive and discrete."

Whereas Froman suggests that municipal annexation

and inter-municipal cooperation are "areal" in affecting the entire population of a city, and urban renewal is "segmental" in affecting a portion
of the population, the opposite may very well hold true.

That is, "it

appears likely that an annexation may affect only the neighbomood that
is made part of the city, while an urban renewal project may affect a
whole city through its impact on expenditures, taxes, and political controversy ... 37
As is all too well apparent, the categories noted above do not attempt to present descriptions of individual issues, per se, but instead
a Classification of how different issue characteristics determine different processes of policy fomulation.

This is not to suggest that there

have not been attempts to categorize policy types according to some other
scheme.

Thomas Dye and Ira Sha:tkansky, for example, have attempted to

group policies in terms of traditional nominal (substantive) categories education, welfare, agriculture, highways, health, natural resources, and
8
public safety.3

Although such categorizations may increase our under-

standing of individual substantive areas, they contribute little to the

37 Ira Sha:rXansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Pro blems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," in Ira
Sha:rXansky, op. cit., 61-79; at p. 62.

38 Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and Public Policy in the
American States; and Ira Sha:rXansky, ~ cit.
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~evelopment

of more encompassing theoretical

conce~tualizatians.

Much

more useful are those studies which seek to discern the relationship between issue characteristics arLd policy types.

Unfortunately, however,

very little has been done in the way c.f testing
specific data.

mos~

categorizations with

It has thus been suggested that pclicies be grouped in

terms of their mutual covariance, discovered in a comparati v.e context. 39
\Vhat is indeed otvious is that no single policy category has yet been developed to determine the impact different issues have on the policy

~roc-

ess. · Although the literature abounds with various classifications, there
is lacking true empirical verification of varying theories.

The fact

that most policies evolve in response to a number of issues makes it extremely difficult to state with any degree of reliability the specific
issue the policy is intended to resolve.

An alternative strategy

t.a.E:

thus been to concer.trate on the policy's impact on the environment. 40
Briefly stated, impact analysis refers to the analysis and evaluation of policy outcomes.

In contrast with an examination of the specific

activities of political actors, impact analysis focuses on the consequences of policy on the overall political system, on the economic and
social environment, on political actors and institutions, and even on the

39

Richard I. Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy, p. 266.

40
The first coLerent body of impact research was developed in the
field of public law to assess the impact of Supreme Court decisions. This
research is summarized in two excellent studies: Theodore L. Becker ( ed.),
The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions (NY: Oxford, 1969); and Stephen L.
Wasby, The Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court (Homewood, Ill: Dorsey, 1970).
Impact analysis in substantive areas: urban renewal - Martin Anderson, The
Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964); public housing - Leonard
Freedman, Public Housing (NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1969); welfareGilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare (Wash., D.C.: Brookings, 1971);
selective service - James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little
GPoups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System (Chicago: Markham, 1968).
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policy process itself.

When focusing on the consequences of govermnent

actions, researchers seek to measure a policy's impact on the target situation or group, on situations or groups other than the target, and· on
future as well as immediate conditions.

In addition, a conscious effort

is made to assess both direct (in te:rms of resources devoted to the program) and indirect (including loss of opportunities to do other things)
costs of the policy.

41

It may be suggested that the task of assessing policy impact would
be relatively simple if all government activity brought
consequences.

f~rth

However, this is rarely, i f ever, possible.

intended

Such an ideal

assumes that the issue in need of government attention is clear and singular in fo:rm, that it has been perceived and defined in accordance with
"real world" conditions, that policy-makers specify objectives in an unambiguous and coherent fashion, that the means chosen are appropriate and
designed to satisfy policy objectives with little or no spillover effects,
and that we possess the ability to state with precision the actual impact
of the policy.

However, several factors pose as serious constraints in

formulating policies in accordance with societal demands, as well as direct
limitations on the overall effectiveness of policies in resolving societal
demands.

Thomas R. Dye has summarized these as follows:

1. Some societal problems are incapable of solution because of the
way in which the problems are defined. If problems are defined in
relative rather than absolute te:rms, they may never be resolved by
public policy.

2.

Expectations may always outrace the capabilities of government.

41 Thomas

R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 3rd Ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prent1ce-Rail, Inc., 1978), p. 312.
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). Policies which solve the problems of one gmup in s6ciety may
create "problems" for other groups.

4.

It is quite possible that some societal forces cannot be harnessed by governments, even if it is desirable to do so.

5. People adapt themselves to public policies frequently in ways
which render the policies useless.
6.

Societal problems may have multiple causes, and a specific
policy may not be able to eradicate the problem.

7. The solution to some problems may require policies which are
more costly than the pm blem.
8.

The political system is not structured for completely rational
decision-making.42
Impact analysis, we can reasonably argue, cannot be undertaken com-

pletely isolated from alternative perspectives on public policy.

To a

great extent the impact of a particular policy may be dependent upon the
other phases of the policy process.

How the precipitating issue is ini-

tially defined significantly determines what, if any, government activity
develops.

If the issue is defined as some particular pm blem in need of

attention, there should then develop a purposive course of action specifically geared toward alleviating the problem.

Certain resources will

then be committed which are perceived to be best suited to the problem
at hand.

The result of such activity is a particular policy output, a

particular government action.

The output of this process is intended to

bring about certain consequences, namely, to achieve a certain objective,
to affect a certain group, situation, or aspect of the environment.

The

effectiveness of the policy is then measured in tenn.s of its impact on
society (i.e., what are the specific outcomes?).

42

Did the policy alleviate

Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, Jrd Ed., p. JJl-JJ2.
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the problem?

Did it create new problems?

the environment?
realized?

Did it affect other sectors of

Was it more costJ.y than the problem.

Can the consequences be measured?

Was the objective

These are questions that

must be addressed following a particular policy output, a.nd the answers
of which determine the relative success of the policy.

Thus, the assess-

ment of policy impact is not an isolated examination but, rather, the
final stage of the policy process.

Viewed as such, we can see that there

is (1) a precipitating problem, (2) a particular process by which a governm.entaJ. response is fo.mulated in the form of policy, (3) a.n appropriation and allocation of resources for resolving the problem, (4) a particular governm.en taJ. action or pattem of activity congruent with the
policy objectives, and (5) a particular consequence of government activity
(i.e., an impact on society).

Each step is interrelated and interdepend-

ent, existing as part of the overaJ.l policy framework.
FinaJ.ly, when we set out to measure the impact of a particular policy we may find that we are oftentimes trying to measure the immeasurable,
which is, of course, another way of saying that not all consequences are
subject to quantification.

It is especially difficult, if not impossible,

to give weights to individual values, attitudes, and perceptions.

And,

at a minimum, policy evaluation requires that we know what we want
to accomplish with a given policy (policy objectives), how we are
going to do it (programs), and what, if anything, we have accomplished toward attainment of the objectives (impact or outcomes,
and the relation of policy thereto). And, in measuring accomplishment, we need to determine that not only some change in real-life
conditions has occurred, such as a reduction in the unemployment
rate, but that it was due to policy action~ and not to other factors, such as private economic conditions. 3

43 James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Ma.kini, p. 134-135.

30
Now, although policy :planners and analysts have sought to analyze
the specific outcomes of governmental policies and thereby gauge both the
intended and unintended consequences of public policies, it is important

to bear in mind that there exists a substantial body of literature which,
although considered a special form of impact analysis, operates at the opposite end of the policy framework.

This second type of impact analysis,

temed "determinants analysis," seeks to uncover the impact of various environmental factors on the u1 timate policy decisions of those entrusted
with policy-making authority.

The objective of such research endeavors

has been to explain state and community variations in policy outputs in
tems of various social, economic, political, demographic, institutional,
or historical characteristic of the environment hypothetically perceived
to have a determining impact on policy decisions.
It should first be noted that the exa.mina tion of policy outputs received its impetus from a myriad of studies conducted on the state level.
Setting the framework for this literature was V. 0. Key's Southern Politics
in State and Nation.

44 Herein Key proposed that state variations in poli-

cies addressing such issues as welfare, taxation, education, health and
medical care, among others, were due to the varying political characteristics of the states.

Whereas mul tifactional one-party systems with lit-

tle continuity of competition tended to pursue policies benefitting upper
socioeconomic classes, states with bifactional one-party competition tend

4

to formulate policies biased toward the "have-nots." 5

Similarly, in 1959

44

(New York: Knopf, 19..51); also, see V. o. Key, Jr., American State
Politics: An Introduction (New York: Knopf, 1956).

45 V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 298-314.
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Duane Lockard, focusing on the New England community, found tha.t twoparty states pursue more libel.'al policies than one-party states.

46

Though neither study emPloyed systematic analyses of the effects of
other potentia.lly significant variables (such a.s socioeconomic development), both implied a. cause and effect relationship between inter-party
competition and state policy outputs.

Also noteworthy is that each neg-

lected to account for the contrary opinion that public policies are closely
related to the economic resources available to decision-makers.

For

example, in his 19..50 study of the Trend of G9vernment Activity in the
United States

Sine~

4
1900, 7 Solomon Fabricant found that over 70 percent

of the variation in total spending among states can be explained by three
socioeconomic characteristics: per capita. income, population density, and
urbanization.

48

And, when broken down by functional area (e.g., highways,

education), these socioeconomic variables continued to explain from 29
to

85 percent of the interstate variance. Fabricant concluded that, over-

all, income was the principal deteminant, even though urba.niza tion proved
to be most important in the areas of fire prevention, sanitation, and
welfa.re.49 Unfortunately, however, Fabricant neglected to elaborate upon
the varying aggregate explanatory power of his three variables.

There was

thus no attempt to explore the possible imPlications of the findings.
Reflecting the research interests of his predecessors, Robert T.

46 New England State Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press,

47
48
49

1959).

(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 19..50).
Ibid., p. 123.
Ibid.

I

p. 130.
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Golembiewski, in

19_58, presented what may be considered the first system-

atic analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic conditions and
state political processes.

Examination of his data shows significant re-

lationships between various indicators of socioeconomic development (per
capita income, urbanization, and industrialization) and the degree of
inter-party competition. 5J

He thus concluded that (1) the greater the

degree of socioeconomic development (and most notably urbanization), the
greater the degree of inter-party competition, and that (2) the greater
the degree of inter-party competition, the greater the likelihood that
policies will be oriented toward the "have-nots ... 51
'Ihough such scholars as V. 0. Key and Robert Golembiewski documented
statistically significant relationships between various indicators of socioeconomic development and the degree of inter-party competition, they
failed to analyze whether inter-party competition independently affects
the activities policy-makers pursue, or whether both inter-party competition and policy outputs are affected by socioeconomic conditions.

They

thus failed to test whether inter-party competition acts as an intervening
variable between socioeconomic conditions and policy outputs.
Equally perplexing is the manner in which a number of economists
sought to extend Solomon Fabricant's research throughout the early sixties
and which appeared in a series of articles in the National. Tax JournaJ. • .52

5J "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political. Party Strength," ~
Western Political Ouarterly, 11 (1958), 494-513.
51 Ibid., p. 510 •

.52 Glenn W. Fisher, "Deteminants of State and Local. Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis;" Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State
and Local. Government Expenditures;" Sachs and Harris, op. cit; Bahl and
Saunders, op. cit.; and Otto A. Davis and George H. Ha~nes, "A Political
Approach toA '!'l'm'o:cy of Public Expenditures: The Case of MunicipaJ.i ties,"
National Tax Journal, 19 (September, 1966), 259-275.
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Although a number of new explanatory variables were added to the list and
a1 though greater emphasis was placed on isolating various categories of
expenditures, the highlight of this research was the discovery that the
explanatory power of the three independent variables examined by Fabricant
decreased over time to account for only
per capita expenditures in

1957.53
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percent of the variance in total

Unfortunately, however, •all such ef-

forts were overwhelmingly atheoretical and unguided by any model of the
policy-making process.

Perhaps this shortcoming somewhat accounts for how

researchers were able to note the decreasing explanatory power of Fabricant's variables without simultaneously hypothesizing that some kind of
"threshold" effect might be occurring.

That is, perhaps after a certain

level of socioeconomic development has been reached, incremental increases
in such areas as urbanization and industrialization are relatively unimportant in terms of policy outputs. 54
Although this economic research of the early sixties discredited
the singular importance of various socioeconomic variables in explaining
variations in state policy outputs over time, it did add greater credence
to Fabricant's observation that environmental variables have a differential impact across expenditure categories.
attempted to discern why this is

so.55

Once again, however, no one

It can be suggested that, for the

most part, economists have been disposed to examine the singular impact

53

Fisher

(1961),

p.

352.

54 George W. Downs, Jr. Bureauc:racy, Innovation, and Public Policy
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. ).

55 For example, see: Glenn W. Fisher, "Detenninants of State and
Local Government Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," p. 3.52; and Roy
Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Government Expenditures, " p • 53.
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of socioeconomic variables on policy outputs with little or no thought
given to their theoretical significance.

During the early stages of de-

te:rminants analysis researchers were not interested in constructing a
theory of policy-making or in formulating basic strategies of social
change.

Political scientists, during this period, however, appear to

have lacked the technical sophistication to confront the findings of the
early economic research and, at the same time, were relatively predisposed to concentrate solely on process characteristics.

The isolation

of the two disciplines ended in 196), however, with an iniportant publication by Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson. :P
D3.wson and Robinson's "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables,
and Welfare Policies in the American States" represents the first in a
series of articles designed to test the Key-Lockard hypothesis that increased interparty competition leads to a higher level of welfare expenditures and that, in general, there exists a relationship between state
and community political characteristics and policy outputs.

It was their

contention that multiple indicators of political characteristics (e.g.,
the degree of interparty competition, voter participation, Democratic and
Republican control of seats in government, and the degree of malapportionment) may not be as important in shaping policy outputs as once predicted.
Having examined the relationship between socioeconomic conditions (income,
degree of urbanization, and industrialization), the degree of interparty
competition, and nine welfare policies, their initial finding was that
policy variables are related to socioeconomic develGpment variables, and

56 "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies
in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (1963), 265-289.
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that policies are in turn correlated with socioeconomic factors.

And,

holding system variables constant, it was found that socioeconomic factors influence the political process, and that process variables influence the adoption of public policy choices along with socioeconomic conditions.

Finally, by holding wealth constant, they concluded that the

effect of interparty competition on policy outputs greatly declined.

It

was thus discovered that:
High levels of interparty competition are highly interrelated both
to socioeconomic factors and to social welfare legislation, but the
degree of inte:rparty competition does not seem to possess the important intervening influence between socioeconomic factors and liberal welfare pro~s that our originaJ. hypothesis and theoretical
schemes suggested.
Unlike the earlier research endeavors of economists, Dawson and
Robinson's study was, first of all, guided by theoretical considerations.
The Key-Lockard hypothesis was tested, and the substantial implications
of the negative findings raised "serious doubts about the relevance of
many variables that most political scientists had valued for their ability
to explain public policy •.. 58

And, secondly, their explora.tion was guided

by a model of the policy-making process which many believed would put an
end to research involving "the undirected statistical manipulation of any
variables at hand." 59
Continuing this research, Thomas R. Dye, in 1965, sought to test
the widely shared belief that malapportionment seriously affects the policy

51 ~·, p. 289.
58 Richard I. Hofferbert,

"State and Community Policy Studies," in
James A. Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual, 3 (1972), 1-72, at p. 6.

59 George W. Downs, Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public Policy
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. 5.

choices of state legislatures.

60

Past literature suggested that there is

substantial variation between urban and rural constituencies and that malapportionment, by over-representing ru.ra.1 interests, grants rurally situated interests a real advantage in policy-making.

Although such scholars

as Duane Lockard and Herbert Jacob expressed a noticeable degree of skepticism on this point, many others took it to be an evident fact.

61

Con-

trolling for the effect of urba.niza tion, industrialization, .income, and
education, Dye concluded that "on the whole, the policy choices of malapportioned legislatures are not noticeably different from the policy
choices of well apportioned legislatures.

Most of the policy differences

which do occur turn out to be a product of socioeconomic differences
among the states rather than a direct product of apportionment practices. "

62

Again, socioeconomic conditions were found to be more significant than
political characteristics in shaping public policies.
In this same year Phillips Cutright, embarking upon a cross-national
correlational analysis, found that the degree of social security coverage
of a nation's population is highly correlated with its level of economic
6
development. 3

In a similar vein, Hazold L. Wilensky's 1975 analysis of

The Welfare State and Inequality suggested that economic development is
the fundamental dete:rminant of welfare services, and that economic resources

60

Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policies in the
States," Journal of Politics, 27 (February, 1965), _:a6-60l.
61
See, Duane Lockard, The Politics of State and Local Government
(New York: MacMillan, 1963), p. 319; and Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences
of Malapportionment," Social Forces, 43 (December, 1964), 256-261.
62
Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States,"

p. 599.
63 "Political Structure, Economic Development, and National Social
Security Programs," American Journal of Sociology, 70(March 1965), 537-50.
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83 percent of the variance among nations in the proportion of GNP
64 Political factors were thus hardly noticedevoted to welfare programs.

explain

able in both cross national analyses.

They also suggest that political

factors are more important for their symbolic meaning than for actually
influencing government activity.

65

Three additional wo:t:Ks surfaced in
impetus to policy

dete~ination

1966 which not only gave greater

research, but seem to have added even

greater confusion to the already befuddled state of the literature.

In

"The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental
Variables in the American States, "

66 Richard

I. Hofferbert posed the ques-

tions: "What is the relationship between certain major structural aspects
of state governments and the content of policies adopted in the states?
Do socioeconomic environments of the states relate significantly to polit-

6

ical structures or the type of policies enacted?" 7 Following the research
activity of Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert argued that socioeconomic factors have more influence on public policies than do political process vari-

ables.

Drawing almost exclusively f:rom the measures utilized by Dawson

and Robinson, Hofferbert added to their list of political process variables
two of his own: the degree of malapportionment in state legislative districts and the extent of divided control of state governments (e.g., where
the houses and govexnorship are controlled

qy opposing parties). After

having found insignificant relationships between these two variables and

64 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1975).
65 Ibid., p. 47.
66 American Political Science Review, 60 (March, 1966), 73-82.
67 Ibid., p. 73.

between each of the two and welfare orientation, Hofferbert concluded:
The line of investigation suggested here seems to justify the recent
concentration of scholarly efforts seeking to discover the impact of
environmental factors on the shape and operation of state politics.
Structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan variables a separate berth, the nature of the party system and its operation do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of policies produced in the states.68
The year 1966 also witnessed the publication of Thomas R. Dye's Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States, 69
which finnly established quantitative policy analysis in the mainstream of
political science.

Utilizing a theoretical fra.mewo:rK similar to that of

Dawson and Robinson, Dye used correlation techniques to analyze the relationship between four indicators of socioeconomic development (levels of
urbanization, industrialization, income, and education), four political
system variables (Deqtocratic or Republican control of state government,
the degree of interparty competition, the level of voter turnout, and the
extent of malapportionment), and fifty-four easily quantifiable policy outputs (principally expenditure levels), encompassing education, health,
welfare, highways, corrections, taxation, and public regulation, using as
the varying factor the role of state governments in spending with respect
to each.
Using simple, partial, and multiple correlation analysis, Dye found
the effect of political system characteristics on policy outputs less significant than that of environmental conditions.

A1 though he noted in-

stances in which political system characteristics did have an effect on
policy, he found the association to

be

a product of the fact that economic

68 Ibid., p. 82.
69

(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).
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factors influence both policy outputs and poll tical configurations.

The

long honored association between political system characteristics and
policy outputs, he thus argued, was based an a spurious relationship •
.And, consistent with the findings of Dawson and Robinson, Dye observed
that:
Economic development shapes both poll tical systems and policy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system
characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of
states with different types of poll tical systems turn out to be
largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a
direct product of poll tical variables. Levels of urbanization,
industrialization, income, and education appear to be more influential in shaping policy outcomes than political system characteristics.70
Thus, pictorially, Dye observed the following relationships.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

---~~~~--~~~------~--~-----C-~-RI
__S_T-IC_S____'~~~
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONDITIONS
>I-

l.

P-0-LI_C_Y_O_U_T-PU~T=s"""j

Dye's more elaborate technique and the very multiplicity of his
measures served to give further credence to the earlier work of Dawson
and Robinson and to that of Hofferbert.

He believed it was thus con-

clusi ve that "economic development variables are more influential than
71
political system characteristics in shaping public policy in the states."
Although Dye's pronouncements opened a serious debate within the
political science community regarding the insignificance of political system characteristics on matters "political," it must be understood that his

7o
Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, p. 293.
71
~.,

p. 296.
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results are somewhat more ambiguous than his rhetoric would have us believe.

Indeed, in a number of areas political variables appear to have

an independent impact worthy of further exploration.

And, further, his

research suffers from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings,
a large part of which may be a result of his using "outputs" and "outcomes" interchangeably. 72

In analyzing the impact of various economic

and political variables on public policy, the dependent variable becomes
the particular activities of governmental bodies.

That is, the focus is

on the relationship between environmental factors and what governments do
(i.e., policy outputs).

Policy outcomes, on the other hand, refer to the

consequences of government activity and not to the activity itself.

Now,

the environmental factors which hypothetically influence policy-makers in
their selection of issues to address and in the specification of expenditure levels may or may not have a significant bearing on the final outcome of policy actions.

Much more important in understanding the out-

comes of government activity are the manner and processes of implementation, not solely formulation.
Although such objections as those raised above can and have been
offered, 73 and even considering the fact that environmental factors (though
important) still left an average of almost two-thirds of the variation in

72 For an example of the confusing shift from outputs

to outcomes,
with no attempt to differentiate the nature of the two, the reader is referred to Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, Chapter 1,
"A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes, 11 pp. 1-19; esp., pp. 23-24.

73 For example, see: Ira Sha:rkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output
and Impact: Problems of Theory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy, 11
in Ira Sharkansky (ed.), Policy Analysis in Political Science (Chicago:
Markham Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 21-38.
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·outputs unexplained, 74

Dy~'s

findings were most disturbing to those polit-

ical scientists who continued to hold that the subject matter of their
discipline is extremely important in understanding how policy decisions
are made.

For example, in the same year as Dye's wo:rlt, John H. Fenton

published a report indicating a significant relationship between interparty competition and policy outputs independent of socioeconpmic conditions. 7 .5
In each case (Dawson and Robinson, Hofferbert, Dye, and Fenton)
varying techniques and indicators of specified variables were employed.
And, a1 though Fenton • s study expressed findings contrary to other reports
which noted the relative insignificance of a few prominent political variables, it would appear that by 1966 findings were undisputably balanced
in favor of "economic deteminists." Many members of the political science
community were, to put it mildly, reluctant to refuse waving the banner
of the importance of political factors on matters political.

For example,

writing in 1967, Ira Sha.J:Xa.nsky suggested that:
Studies by economists have paid little attention to political variables that might influence govermnent spending. A finding common
to several studies employing economic and political variables is
that economic characteristics of a jurisdiction outweigh characteristics of the political system in their influence upon expenditures.
Yet it is likely that research techniques are responsible for these
findings. Authors who make such findings typically use few poli tical variables among their measures of po tentiaJ. influences upon
expenditures, and they combine state and local government spending
as their dependent variable. It is legitimate to combine state and
local government expenditures for the purpose of studying the influences upon the state-local political system. However, the findings

74 Richard

I. Hofferbert, "State and Community Policy Studies," p.

39.

75 "Two-Party Competition and Goverrnnental Expenditures," in Fenton,
People and Parties in Politics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1966).
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of such research may differ from findings about the influences
upon the expenditures of state governments, per se.
The present study introduces new measuresOI' political characteristics, it focuses on the expenditures of state governments,
and it finds political variables to be more img>rtant than economic
variables with respect to state expenditures. 7
What were these neglected political variables that Sha:tKa.nsky found

to be associated with the level of spending?

Cryptically stated, eight

such variables were addressed: (a) previous expenditures, (b) federal. aid,
(c) tax effort, (d) revenue allocated to the £tate, (e) revenue from nonlocal sources, (f) state employees per 10,000 population, (g) per capita
personal income, and (h) population size.

Further, by means of step-wise

regression, Sha:r:kansky found that "contrary to the findings of previous
research, there is little positive association between measures of economic
development and state expenditures per capita ... 77

There are, however,

several questions which need to be addressed concerning Sharkansky's study.
Although Sharkansky specifies that variables

~-f

measure several

features of state politics previously ignored in professional journals,
one is hard pressed to accept his interpretation and conceptualization of
variables

~-~

as political system or even "political" variables.

All ex-

cept "the number of state employees per 10,000 population" are, by no real
stretch of the imagination, considered as measures of economic development,
or at least as the quantity and source of government resources.

By in-

eluding these measures in his analysis and by labelling them "political
factors," Sha:rkansky has (inadvertently) presented evidence of the greater

76

Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State
Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," Midwest
Journal of Political Science, 11 (1967), 173-192; at p. 174.
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Tbjd,, p. 178.

importance of economic conditions in explaining variations in government
spending. 7S
Especially confusing is the manner in which some scholars (such as
Sharkansky) conceptualize "outside money" (such as federal aid) as a poli tical variable which offsets the effect of economic resources on state
policy.

Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that such economic :re-

sources as federal aid are dependent upon a number of political decisions
made at the federal level, thereby leading some to categorize such funding
programs as "political variables."

Or, perhaps it exemplifies the profes-

sional and ideological predisposition of political scientists to preempt
the effect of economic :resources on state policies.

James C. Strouse and

Phillip Jones have suggested that political scientists have seen fit to
label federal aid as a "political variable" rather than an "economic resource" so as to demonstra. te the increasing importance of politics in explaining variations in state policy.79

However, as Thomas Dye so aptly

reasoned, "the importance of economic resources, whether derived from
within the state or from the federal government, in shaping state policy
cannot be altered by conceptual relabeling of packages. ,.SO
Now, it has already been noted that the explanatory power of three
principal environmental variables - income, population density, and urbanization - declined from 72 percent in 1942 to slightly over 50 percent in

8
7
It should also be noted that variable "a," previous expenditures,
could also have been environmentally detennined, and would in any case account for a large proportion of the variance.
79 James C. Strouse and Phillip Jones, "Federal Aid: The Forgotten
Variable in State Policy Research," Journal of Politics. J6 (February,
1964), 200-207.
So

Thomas R. Dye, Policv Ana1ysis. p. )8.
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1951.

81

EspeciaJ.ly evident is the decline in the explanatory power of

these three variables in the areas of welfare (from 45 percent in 1942
to 11 percent in 1951) and health (from 72 percent in 1942 to 44 percent
in 1951).

82

Although it can be suggested that this decline may be attri-

buted to the fact that some kind of threshold effect might be occurring,
Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris attribute the decline to the intervening
effect of federal grants-in-aid. 8 3

Federal grants (as forms of "outside

money") free state and local. government officiaJ.s from constraints imposed
by their own linli ted resources.

And, as Thomas Dye observed when he rep-

licated the Sachs and Harris study for the year 1970, the inclusion of
per capita federal grants-in-aid as independent variables greatly increases
the proportion of explained variance relative to that explained by income,
education, and urbanization.

84

For example, when federal aid is included

as an independent variable in explaining state variations in welfare policies, the proportion of explained variance increases from 17 to 48 percent.85

For all other fnnctions, however, "per capita income remains the

most important detenninant of expenditures even after the federal aid
variables are added. " 86

As a fom of fnnding which supplements the resources

available to the states, federal aid mirrors the commonly held conceptualization of an economic variable, not a "political factor" as offered by

81

.

See, Infra., p. 32.
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·Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Detenninants of State and
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds, " op. cit.
83
-Ibid.
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Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, pp. 284-288.
85 Ibid., p. 288.
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Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Detenninants of State and
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," p. 207.

some.
Other studies during 1967 also attempted to examine the relationship
between environmental factors, political conditions, and policy outputs.
In one such study, Ira Sha:rkansky tested the assumption that the amount
of money spent in any one locality is a true measure of the nature of the
services provided. 87 Sha:rkansky hypothesized that three measures most
likely to have an influence on public services are (1) combined state and
local government expenditures per $1,000 of personal income, (2) combined
state and local government expenditures per capita, and (3) combined state
and local expenditures for each major function as a percentage of total
expenditures.

His initial reasoning was that "if the level of government

spending actually reflects the quality and quantity of. public services,
then each of these spending measures should show a positive relationship
with service indicators."88 His findings, however, ran contrary to previous expectations: "government spending does not exert a pervasive influence upon the nature of public services." 89
Now, drawing from another context, Sharkansky made the following
distinction between public policy, policy outputs, and policy impacts:
In brief, public policy represents actions taken by government;
policy outputs represent the service levels which are affected
by these. actions; and policy im~8ts represent the effect which
the service has on a population.9

87 "Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American
States," American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 1066-1077.
88 Ibid., p. 1067.
89 Ibid., p. 1074.
90 Ira. Sharkansky, "Environment, Policy, Output and Impact: Problems of 'Iheory and Method in the Analysis of Public Policy," p. 6).
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For example, state governments pursue a number of activities in the areas
of education, public welfare, public safety, and transportation, among
others.

Each activity is allocated a certain level of funding and the

perfonnance of each activity is assessed in tenns of some quantitative or
qualitative criterion.

Since it is often argued that most policies fail

to attain their objectives due to insufficient funding, Shatkansky sought

to test the hypothesis that government spending is positively associated
with policy achievement.

However, the discovery that the level of govern-

ment spending does not reflect the quality or quantity of public services
carries with it substantial implications for consideration by policymakers.

Indeed, if govenunent expenditures do not affect the u1 timate

success or failure of government policies, then a program's performance
must be measured in texms of its overall effectiveness, not in tenns of
its initial budget allocations.

'!be general finding that increased spending

in the field of education does not noticeably improve the quality of education in the city (as measured by such factors as teacher-pupil ratio, examination scores, median education levels, percent graduating secondary
schools, and percent receiving college credits), recommends that increased
attention be given to the activities of those administrators responsible
for implementing the policies formulated by elected public officials.

For,

indeed, our contention is not only that program effectiveness depends
upon the willingness and capacity of administrators and bureaucrats but
that, collectively, administrators and career bureaucmts have greater
influence over the policy-making process and in determining the ultimate
outcome of public policies than any other single class of individuals, including elected public officials and economic elites.
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It would thus appear that by 1967 no definitive word had yet been
spoken.

In most studies, the amount of variance left unexplained by the

arsenal of environmental and political variables thus far considered greatly surpassed that which was explained.

Further, although there have been

moments when various factors have proven significant in explaining variations in state policies, they have also proven rather unstable both across
policy categories and from one time period to another.

And thirdly, the

studies thus far considered have been of limited utility to those responsible for policy making and to those interested in bringing about social
change.

Indeed, prescriptive concerns have rarely been evident in the

determinants literatu:re.

Perhaps this deficiency flows from the na tu:re

of the explanatory or independent variables included in determinants analysis, or from the way such variables are hypothesized to relate to state
and community policies, or perhaps even from the pessimism which naturally
emanates from the sterility of the find.ings.9 1 This is especially evident
in political science - primarily because the influence of political variables have proven less important than economic resources in explaining
policy variations among states.

However, as far as most political scien-

tists were concerned, the debate was far from over.
For example, although the greater proportion of determinants :research has noted the paucity of the relationship between political system
characteristics and state and local policy outputs, a study undertaken by
Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler in 1967 suggested that political

9l For a most insightful critique of determinants analysis following
the general argument developed here, see: George W. Downs, Jr., Bureaucracy,
Innovation, and Public Policy, pp. 9-13.
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refonn can change the complexion of city taxing and spending patterns, as
well as the very responsiveness of city government.92 In an analysis of
200 American cities of 50, 000 or more, the authors found that refonned
cities (i.e., cities with manager governments and at-large, non-partisan
elections) tend to tax and spend less than unreformed cities (i.e., cities
with mayor-council governments and ward constituencies).

Of particular

importance to political scientists was the finding of the greater responsiveness of refonned cities to the socioeconomic composition of their
populations.

That is, refonned cities were found to pursue policies in

the interests of the community, rather than biased toward select economic
and social elites.

Reformism was thus seen as the means Qy which to re-

move the spoils system and its Qy-products from the policy process.
In measuring responsiveness, Lineberry and Fowler divided their sample cities on the basis of three criteria: government type, election type,
and constituency type.

These variables were further subdivided into types

of governance (mayor-council, manager, and commission); types of elections
(partisan and non-partisan); and constituency types (district and at-large).
They then proceeded to make a comparison of the means and standard deviations of socioeconomic characteristics of reformed and unreformed cities.
The independent variables used in the analysis were population, class composition, and the homogeneity of the city.

And, finally, each independent

variable was similarly subdivided into several indicators of the phenomenon,
with statistical operations perfonned on each relationship.

2
9
Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public
Policies in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 61 (Sept.,
1967), 701-716.
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Interpretation of their data indicates that many significant correlations exist between taxing and spending policies and income, educational, occupational, religious, and ethnic characteristics of the population of unreformed cities, whereas no such relationship holds true for
reformed cities.

If not careful, one can easily misconstrue their findings.

What Lineberry and Fowler detected was that unreformed cities are more
responsive to various socioeconomic factors and to the enduring conflicts
of political life than are reformed cities.

Our first inclination would

probably be to suggest that governments should be responsive to such factors.

However, as Lineberry and Fowler observe, unreformed cities are

responding to "artificial" cleavages (e.g., race, religion, and ethnicity),
and not to the overall policy needs of the city.

Reformed cities, on the

other hand, are relatively immunized from social conflicts.
cleavages are not reflected in public policy.

Thus, social

As they conclude, "nonpar-

tisan elections, at-large constituencies, and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts
of political life."9J
Encouraged by the findings of such research, Richard I. Hofferbert
and Ira Shaikansky continued their efforts into the latter years of the
1960s, each time testing new hypotheses and utilizing new techniques and
alternative indicators of the variables under question.

In 1968 Hofferbert

again tested the relationship between economic resources, political factors,
and public policies - this time examining the period

1890-1960. 9~ Echoing

93 Ibid., P• 715.
9~ "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States, 1890-1960,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (August, 1968), 401-~18.
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the findings of previous research, Hofferbert's study indicated that a
long-term analysis of public policies reveal.s a pattern whereby economic
resources are initially the strongest determinant of the types of policies
initiated by the states, but that the relationship lessens in importance
with the passage of time.

This much was already known.

As communi ties

develop economically, they gradually come to free themselves from the constraints imposed

b,y

the initial shortages of economic resources.

Able to

muster the funds necessary to carry out a number of separate activities,
policy-makers are better able to loose themselves from some of the initial
problems of choice, and can initiate new policies and programs in other
areas.

However, choices still must be made concerning the degree of change

to enact in previous programs, as well as what new issues will receive a
place on the policy agenda.

The implication of Hofferbert' s analysis is

that once economic development reaches the point that limited resources
no longer pose a crippling constraint the attitudes and behavior of policymakers take on new significance in explaining the variance in state policies and spending patterns.
In another context, (again reflecting the professional and ideological predisposition of political scientists), Ira Shatkansky and Richard I.
Hofferbert suggested that political system characteristics have not proven
significant in determining state and local public policies because of problems inherent in the conceptualization and measurement of the central variables.95

By

locating other multiple measures of the independent variables,

95 Ira Shatkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State
Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, 63 (September, 1969), 867-880.
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they reasoned that:
Because we deal with factors and not isolated variables, we can
speak with improved precision of which dimensions of policy respond to what dimensions of politics and economics. Our findings
show that different social and economic characteristics have different relevance for policies, and their relevance varies between
substantive areas of policy. Furthennore, central. features of
state politics are important for sgme policies, even when socioeconomic variation is controlled. 9
,
Now, although Sha.rkansky and Hofferbert are indeed warranted in asserting that no single, unidimensional independent variable is sufficient
in explaining policy variations among particular governmental units, and
in noting that the detennining factors vary according to the particularity
of the policy area, they still fail to capture the significance of bureaucrats and bureaucratic variables on the policy-making process.

It is now

well known that many key policy decisions are made by bureaucrats rather
than by legislators or other elected officials.

Since the comparative

state policy literature has thus far neglected to include bureaucratic or
organizational factors as major independent variables, it should come as
no great surprise that political variables often fail to have a significant
independent effect on state and local policy.
Further, although the greater percentage of studies concerned with
the detenninants of policy outputs have been undertaken at the state level,
several have sought to analyze the relationship between political system
characteristics, socioeconomic conditions, and policy outputs, measured as
an aggregate of state and local activities.
ficult to assert with complete certainty

tha~

It has been and is most difall hypothesized relation-

ships are equally true for both state and local environments.

96 w..a..,' p. 867.

However,
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Amos Hawley's study of the association between urban renewal policies and
socioeconomic cha.ra.cteristics of cities and Maurice Pina:rd's study conearning flouridated water supplies, suggest that socioeconomic conditions
constrain the policy initiatives of both state and city governments. 97
Similarly, the relationship between political system characteristics
and state and local policy-making has also received the attention of those
researchers interested in the policy choices of urban decision-makers.
For example, Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian have suggested that
local governments ordinarily assume one or more of the following roles:
(1) promoting economic growth; (2) providing or securing life's amenities;
(3) maintaining (only) traditional services; and (4) arbitrating among

competing interests. 98

They then

P~ceeded

to analyze the effect

diffe~

ent governmental types have on the specific role or function assumed by
policy-makers.

In particular, they found that policies of economic growth

and a.meni ties are generaJ.ly supported by middle and upper class communi ties
and opposed by low-income individua.l,s.

Caretaker policies (i.e., those

intended to provide minimal public services and low tax burdens), on the
other hand, are preferred by low-income citizens, small cities serving
ruraJ. areas, and by working class communities.

Furthennore (a) nonparti-

sanship reduces the working class vote and the forces supportive of caretaker government; (b) by increasing the aggregate effect of low-income
voters, ward elections strengthen caretaker government; (c) to the extent

97 Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Services," American Journal of Sociology (January, 1963), 422-431; Maurice Pinard, "Structural Attachments and Political Support in Urban Politics: The Case of
Flouridation," American Journal o:f Sociology (March, 1963), 513-526.
98 "Community Types and Policy Differences," in James Q. Wilson
(ed.), City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968).
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that cohesive ethnic blocks strengthen the worldng class vote, caretaker
government is likewise strengthened; and (d) professional city managers
support values associated with economic growth.

And, finally, it was

found that the economic climate of the city is insufficient in itself in
determining the direction of civic policies.

All in all, the policy

choices of urban society are dependent upon the value orientations of
decision-makers. 99
Although we have not considered any of the studies in great length,
and though we have presented but a small kernel of the studies acknowledged
as major contributions to the policy literature, enough has been noted indicating that this research area is in a relative state of
word has been spoken.

nux.

No systematic body of knowledge exists.

No final
What has

thus far been established, however, is the beginning of a policy science.
As Thomas R. Dye rightly observed:
Policy research is still very exploratory; no body of literature
can be thought of as the final word in understanding public policy.
But systematic policy research to date is sufficiently challenging
to the traditional professional concerns of political science, and
to the long standing assumptions of democratic pluralist ideology,
to warrant a serious reconsideration of the traditional assumptions
of our discipline.lOO
However much we assent to Dye's pronouncement that "policy research
is still very exploratory," and that the literature of policy determination

99 Ibid., p. 36. Also, see: Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City
Councils and Policy Outcomes: Developmental Profiles," in Wilson (ed.),
City Politics and Public Policy, pp. 37-65; Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone,
"Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes," American Political Science Review, 62 (March, 1968), pp. 124-144; Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt,
Labyr~nths of Democrac : Ada tations Link
es Re resentation and Policies
in Urban Politics New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973 ; Robert Eyestone, The
Threads of Public Policy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971).
100
Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 55.
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challenges the tradi tiona.l concerns of political science and the assumptions of democratic pluralist ideology, we cannot help but be somewhat
cynical of the utility of the research findings to date.

The suggestion

that public policies are influenced b,y the economic resources available
to decision-makers is analogous to saying that an individual's spending
decisions are also a function of his or her available resources.
response to each is the same - "So

What~"

And the

Of greater theoretical interest

is the observed variations between policy outputs of cities with similar
socioeconomic characteristics.

Through ordinary observation we can note

two equally affluent or "poor" cities which may easily differ in terms of
street conditions, lighting, protected crossings, paik facilities, sidewalks, museums, libraries, as well as other physical traits, readily observed with but scant examination.

Why would we expect cities with sim-

ilar socioeconomic characteristics to differ in policy responses to similar
community needs?
Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau addressed their research endeavors
to the very conditions noted above. 101 In an analysis of 88 cities in the
San Francisco Bay region, the authors suggested that differences in meeting
common environmental challenges are due to the fact that different cities
are in different stages of urban policy development.

By computing an ag-

gregate measure of each city's "policy profile," with the medians for planning and amenities expenditures used as determining factors, Eyestone and
Eulau constructed a typology of policy development consisting of five
stages: retarded, emet=@nt, tra.psjtiona1, maturing, and advanced. 102 To
101

"City Councils and Policy Outcomes: DevelopmentaJ. Profiles," in
Wilson (ed.), Cjty paJi+ics and Public policy, pp. 37-65.
102
Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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control for the effects of economic resources on policy orientations, the
88 cities were further subdivided into two groups, "using the median of
per capita assessed valuation for all cities as the dividing line between
high and low resource capability. ,.lOJ And, finally, )04 councilmen were
interviewed and questionaires compiled to determine the value orientations
of policy-makers.

Among the many significant findings were:

Policy orientations of policy-makers concerning development and scope
of government activities are not related to city size, growth, or resource capability.
The more favorable the policy-makers' orientation toward development,
the more developed the city is likely to be.
Regardless of size, growth, or resource capability, the more favorable the policy-makers' orientations toward development, the more
developed the city is likely to be.l04
We are thus informed that "the relationships we have been able to demonstrate will help restore the political scientist's belief in the importance
of politicians in the policy process."l05
In a similar fashion, in I.al:)yrj nths

of

Demo era C¥, Heinz Eulau and

Kenneth Prewitt reported that their comparative analysis of 82 city councils in the San Francisco Bay region uncovered significant relationships
between the goals, perceptions, and policy orientations of city councilmen
. expen d•t
. the1.r
. c1.•t•1.es f or pJ.annl.ng
,
.
and publ l.C
1. ures m
and amen1.•t•1.es. 106 I n
particular, it was found that councilmen enter public office with established attitudes concerning the past and present policy orientations of

lOJ Ibid., p. 47.
104
Ibid., PP• 52-5J.
105 Ibid., p. 65.
lo6 Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy; AdB.l;)tations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. passim.

the city's governmental. structure.

Such attitudes may be either "factual"

expressions of what the city had in fact accomplished or attempted, or
they may be more or less "normative" assessments of how well the city had
confronted the problems {as they see them).

These attitudes, in turn, are

transmitted with the private person when he/she assumes his/her public
role as a member of the city cot.mcil.

Individuals thus assume public of-

fice with_various policy preferences and perceptions concerning the future
role of government.

Now, although these personal preferences may be some-

what modified during the course of his/her interactions with other members
of the council, each council ultimately develops a recognized policy orientation agreeable to the greater proportion of councilmen.

These "images"
ultimately determine the types of policies pursued by the city. 107

.

Since previous research noted significant variations both between
states and between communities, first, in terms of the policies pursued
by different states and communities, and, secondly, in terms of the degree
of commitment exhibited b.Y policy-makers of different states and communities
within substantive policy areas (as measured b.Y expenditure levels), the
relationships uncovered b.Y Eulau and Prewitt are certainly important contributions to the policy literature.

This is especially evident when we

take into consideration the great amount of variance left unexplained b.Y
the economic and political system variables traditionally employed in determinants research.

Unfortunately, the independent effect of council-

manic attitudes on city policies is far from certain.

This is so because

the authors also found significant relationships between councilmanic

l07 Ibid., especially Chapter 27, "Policy Maps: II.
Positions, "W:.549.

Images and
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attitudes and characteristics of city populations and between population
characteristics and policy decisions.

Without testing the proposition

that councilmanic attitudes independently affect city policies we cannot
infer that political ideologies are, in fact, important policy determinants.
However, in The Threads of Public Policy, Robert Eyestone systematically compared councilmanic attitudes, images, and ideologies with certain
environmental variables (e.g., population density, growth rate, per capita
expenditures, assessed property value, city size, tax rate, and revenues
from property taxes, among others) to gauge their relative impact on public policy •108 When councilmanic attitudes on .. development problems,"
nzoning problems," and "amenities improvements" are utilized in the same
multiple regression problem on amenities with density, property value,
city size, and growth xate, population density proves to be the best predieter of city policies.

In fact, whereas population density explains

72%, ;13%, and 72% of the variation in amenities expenditures in "Core
Cities," "Suburbs," and "Fringe Cities," respectively, the combined total
variance e:Jg>lained by councilmanic attitudes on zoning problems, development problems, and amenities improvements for the three groups is 2.9%,
8.1%, and 6.6%, respectively. 109 Councilmanic attitudes regarding the
"future role of government," on the other hand, were found to be independently related to planning expenditures in "Core Cities" and "Suburbs"

108 Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public Policy, especially,
pp. 146-149, Tables 6-1 to 6-J.
l09 Ibid., p. 146-147, esp., Table 6-1. The three elements of the
urban realm typology are defined as follows: "Core Cities" - 'traditional
core and preautomotive industrial cities, prairie cities and noncentric
cities; "Suburbs" - railroad suburban cities and noncentric residential
cities; and "Fringe Areas" -urbanizing cities and nonmetro cities" (p.133).
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(explaining 12.3% and 46.0% of the total variance, respectively), and
councilmanic attitudes on zoning problems were found to be independently
related to planning expenditures in "Fringe Cities" (explaining 67.• 6%
110
of the total variance).
Although it can be argued that "councilmanic attitudes seldom stray
far from the constraints placed upon them by the environment, ,lll it would
appear that the policy preferences of decision-makers may very well be of
determining influence on public policy.

This is especially evident when

we consider the fact that the constraints posed

b,y

limited economic re-

sources have been shown to diminish over time, thus making it possible for
city policy-makers to increase their efforts in some substantive policyareas and to begin new activities in areas previously neglected.

All other

things being equal, policy-makers come to have greater latitude in choosing
from among alternative policy areas and from among competing strategies of
action.

And, ultimately, the goals, perceptions, and policy positions of

policy-makers play an integral role in the decision-making process.
Whether or not councilmanic attitudes independently affect public
policy is, of course, an empirical issue.

And, although available evidence

does not clearly demonstrate the independent impact of attitudes on policy
decisions, it must be remembered that the San Francisco Bay region project
(of which these studies were a part) was carried out during a limited time
dimension: 1966-1967.

Councilmanic attitudes were thus correlated with

public policies and environmentaJ. conditions at a single point in time.

110
111

Ibid., pp. 148-149; especially Table 6-2.
Thomas R. Dye, Policy Analysis, p. 76.
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No effort was made to measure the impact of changes over time.

It cannot

be denied that many attitudes are influenced by environmental conditions
and that as the environment changes so do attitudes, but what is the relationship between councilmanic attitudes and public policy when important
environmental factors (such as the level of economic development) remain
relatively static?

What thus appears necessary are longitudinal, compara-

tive analyses of the relationship between the_goals, perceptions and policy
orientations of policy-makers and public policy, and not research designs
confined by a limited (two-year) time dimension.
Even taking into consideration the possible shortcomings of the San
Francisco Bay region project, the significance of its findings (by Eulau
and Prewitt and by Eyestone, in particular), at least for our present purpose, is the reported importance of the value orientations of policy-makers
in detennining the form and content of public policy.

They thus equally

allude to the importance of understanding the linkages between power configurations in American society and the types of policies pursued by decision-makers.

However true this may be, (as our analysis will suggest)

studies of community power structures have not sufficiently distinguished
between overt and implicit (covert) exercises of power, nor have they ade~uately

analyzed the power relations which ensue after the initial formu-

lation of the policy.

The major point of contention is that the growth

and resources of bureaucracy (on all levels of government), and the power
inherent in processes of policy implementation, have placed administrators
and career bureaucrats in the limelight of. the policy process - a role
greatly underestimated in contemporary policy research.

This criticism

applies to both the determinants research thus far considered, as well as
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to community power studies - to which we now turn.

CONCLUSION

Within the past twenty-five years, social scientists, policy analysts,
and publicists have shown a relentless interest in accounting for the significant variations which purportedly exist in state and community policies.
This research has progressed from the initial atheoretical efforts of a few
economists - who operated without a clearly defined model of the policy
process - to the complex multivariate designs of later economists, political scientists, and sociologists.

However, even when guided by useful

models and previous research, most researchers have been constrained by the
professional and ideological predispositions of their discipline, even
though such disciplinary blinders have been shown to result in rather
sterile and limited findings.

Whereas economists have shown an inordinate

inclination toward documenting the independent influence of economic variables on state and community policies, political scientists have been inclined toward political system characteristics and sociologists toward enviromnental and sociological factors in their analyses of variations in
state and community policies.

Each discipline has thus been concerned

with demonstrating the determining influence of its disciplinary interests
on the policy choices of decision-makers.
However, when such disciplinary biases are controlled, it is evident
that most researchers have reported the greater explanatory power of state
and community economic conditions over that of political system variables
in determining the policy activities of decision-makers.

And, although

6l
some political process variables appear significant in at least some policy
areas, their effect often appears to be a by-product of economic resources.
Political scientists have, however, found at least some consolation in the
knowledge that the goals, perceptions, and attitudes of policy-makers may
very well be important determinants of such policy areas as development
and amenities expenditures.

Unfortunately, however, their independent ef-

fect is far from certain.
It is equally difficult to gauge the ultimate significance of what
we do know about policy variations among states and communities when we
consider the fact that almost two-thirds of the variance is yet unexplained.
This is not to suggest that the policy literature should be soundly criticized for failing to explain all of the variance - indeed, to do so would
be impossible without a research design employing an insurmountable number
of factors, and even then the study would suffer from both theoretical and
conceptual insignificance - but rather to suggest that researchers (especially political scientists) have failed to consider a number of variables
which may have a significant and independent effect on governmental policies.
For example, there is an extensive body of literature emphasizing
the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy decisions are being
made by public bureaucracies; and, yet, bureaucratic or organizational
variables are grossly underrepresented (if not nonexistent) in most detenn.inants research.

Although a number of reasons may be suggested for

this omission, it would seem that most omissions can be attributed to problems of cost and time, the inability to quantify all bureaucratic variables
in the same manner as is done with per capita income, tax receipts, levels
of federal aid, voter participation, party competition, and the number of
state and local employees, as well as the researcher's unfamiliarity with
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most areas being addressed.

A1 though these factors all possess at least

some merit, an even more significant reason for this neglect appears to
be

the t;aditionaJ. concerns of political scientists with the legislative

and/or policy-making process.

This has led to a disproportionate analy-

sis of fonnaJ. bodies of decision-making and a resultant neglect for the
ways in which bureaucracies influence the policy process.
Why this has occurred is not so easy to answer.

In a preliminary

fashion, however, let it be suggested that the once held politics-administration distinction still appears to hold some persuasive power.

According

to this view, politics is the concern of elected public officiaJ.s who are
entrusted with responsibility for formulating public policies, and processes of administration reside within the province of bureaucracies that
implement those policy decisions.

If this is so, bureaucracies do not de-

termine the policy decisions of state and communities - instead, they merely
carry out those decisions.

Quite elementary.

Too elementary in fact.

The

rigid politics-administration distinction has long ago been eroded by the
broad delegations of authority to bureaucracies which allow for administrative decision-making.

This being so, administrators now possess a degree

of power in structuring the agendas and in defining the alternatives for
elected officiaJ.s unrecorded by determinants research.

Their influence

has not been linked to policy decisions in determinants research by means
of testable hypotheses.
Of even greater importance is the fact that bureaucracies not only

possess "advisory" significance, but do in fact ultimately determine what
actually becomes of policy decisions as formulated by formal institutions
of government.

Thus, even if omitted in analyses of the determinants of
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policy decisions, bureaucracies cannot be ignored in considerations of
policy pe:rfomance - in studies of what did or did not take place after
the policy was promulgated.
This is not meant as a singular criticism directed at political
scientists bent on analyzing the courses of action selected b,y decisionmakers, but also as a charge against organization theorists who at one
time note the importance of bureaucracies and yet neglect to clearly specify what dimensions of administrative activity are important.

Researchers

are thus not only left illlguided, but recent detei.lllinants research is left
unchallenged.

Their research does not establish any reasonable guide for

those responsible for formulating policies who must ensure the workability
of their programs.
Our point of contention is thus four-fold: (1) a great degree of
variance left illlexplained by determinants research may be an artifact of
the professional and ideological predispositions of researchers; (2) an
even greater percentage of unexplained variance may be attributed to the
neglect of the explanatory power of bureaucratic variables; (3) although
interesting, b,y examining those factors hypothetically related to public
policies, determinants research has thus far suffered from an inability
to guide policy-makers through the complex maze of policy-making to the
ultimate achievement of policy objectives; and (4) bureaucracies continue

to be the unexplored variable in policy analysis.

This last criticism

applies equally well to studies of community power - to which we now turn.

CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURE OF POL !TICAL POWER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
As the emphasis on public policy readily accentuates, the study of
American politics involves an examination of how scarce resources within
a community are distributed within the social system.

The systematic anal-

ysis of policy outputs previously cited in Cnapter II give substantial
credence to the general observation that not all people share equally in
resource allocations, or in the decision-making process
allocations are made.

Since the decisions

b,y

b,y

which such

which allocations are made

receive fo:rmulation in the political arena, we may wish to know what factors, if any, have a predominant influence on the fonn and content of
policy responses to community needs; but, in so doing, care should be
taken to examine the value orientations of individual decision-makers.
If all decision-makers shared the same interests, reacted to similar pressures, were held accountable

b,y

identical elements, received primacy sup-

port from the same sources, and supported a single conception of the role
of government, then the question as to who makes policy would be largely
irrelevant.

However, this hardly being the case, one must give special

consideration to the very structure of political power - for it is within
the context of the exercise of power that politics takes place.
Similarly evident in the literature of the policy process is the
basic assumption that there exists in the community a particular power
structure or structures that make decisions binding upon the public.
are, however, marked disagreements as to the specific actors and/or
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There

institutions contained within a city's power structure.

Equally evident

is the fact that there does not exist a universally accepted conceptualization of the phenomenon of power, or a single method by which it is
measured.

This is unfortunate for the validity and reliability of re-

search endeavors is, at the very least, dependent upon the appropriateness of the conceptualization and empirical operationalization of the
concept being explored.

Indeed, we contend that methodological and ideo-

logical differences account for the varying conclusions as to the location
of community power.
As a preliminary to our analysis of the literature of community
power and of the relative power of public bureaucracies in processes of
policy implementation, it is important that we have an appreciation for
the ways in which "power" has been variously conceptualized and for the
ways in which its location has been ascertained.

To facilitate this ob-

jective, let us review the spectrum of definitions presently advanced.
Goldhammer and Shils:

Weber:

Bierstedt:
Dahl:

1

1

A person has power "to the extent that he influences the behavior of others in accordance
with his own intentions."
Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position
to carry out his own will, despite resistances,
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.
Power is latent force.

! has power

over~ to the extent that he can
get ~ to do something that he would not otherwise do.

As summarized by Paul E. Mott, "Power, Authority, and Influence,"
in Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott (eds.), The Structure of Community Power
(New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 3-16; at p. 3.
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Blau:

Lasswell and Kaplan:

Power is the ability of persons or groups to
impose their will on others despite resistance
through deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the
form of punishment, inasmuch as the former as
well as the latter constitute, in effect, a
negative sanction.
Power is "participation in the making of decisions. n2

The one common element present in these definitions is the notion
that power, to use G. David Garson's terminology, entails the exercise of
command- as the ability to successfully impose one's will on others.3
Does an individual, however, have to directly participate in the decisionmaking process in order for one to say that he has power, as Lasswell and
Kaplan suggest?
it?

In other words, what constitutes power and who possesses

According to some, power is the possession of elected decision-makers,

for others it signifies the possession of valued resources, while for others
Every individual has his own qUa.ntum of power - physical, persuasive,
etc. - and every group has some measure of social power. Groups are
centers of power. Some groups are centers of greater power than others, depending on the number of people, the degree of their organization, the relative level of their technology, the social value of resources they control and the degree of their control of them, the
transitiveness of their structural position, etc ••• 4

2

Herbert Goldhammer and Edward Shils, "Types of Power and Status,"
American Journal of Sociology, 45 (Sept. 1939), 171-182; at p. 173; Max
Weber, theory of Socia:! and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson
and T. Parsons (New Yo±k: OXford Univ. Press, 1947), p. 152; Robert Bierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American Sociological Review, 15
(Dec. 1950), 730-738; at p. 733; Robert A. Dahl, "Tfie Concept of Power,"
Behavioral Science, 2 (July 1957), 201-215; Peter M. Blau, Exchange and
Power in Social Life (NY: Wiley, 1964), p. 117; H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan,
Power and SOc~ety (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 74.
3 G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1977), p. 5.
4
Paul E. Matt, "Power, Authority, and Influence," p. 8. For a
similar analysis, see Carol A. Greenwald, Group Power (NY: Praeger, 1977).
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Power is thus dependent upon a. number of factors or resources, any
one of which alone ma.y not be sufficient to bring about the successful imposition of one's will over that of others.

Although the primary objective

of this chapter is to indicate those resources and events which have functioned to thrust the

pu~ic

bureaucracy into central prominence in the

policy process, it is imperative that we first review a number of the most
significant studies to date and delineate their methodological and ideological assumptions and deficiencies.
WHO GOVERNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY?
Researchers interested in the nature of community power structures
have been influenced b,y a body of literature which suggests that all societies are controlled b,y a small ruling class which reigns supreme over the
nonruling ma.jority.5 For example, writing in the mid-nineteenth century,
Gaetano Mosca asserted that:
In all societies - from societies that are very meagerly developed
and have barely attained the dawning of civilization, down to the
most advanced and powerful societies - two classes of people appear a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous performs all political functions, monopolizes
power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second,
the more numerous class, is directed and controlled qy the first, in
a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary
and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are
essential to the vitality of the political organism.6

5 For example, Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1935); Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGrawHill, 1939); Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, The Comparative Study of
Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19.52); C. Wright Mills, ~
Power Elite (New Yo:rk: Oxford, 19.56); Robert Michels, Political, Parties
(New Yo:rk: Free Press, 1962; originally published in 1915).
6
Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 50·
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And, in a similar fashion, a contemporary social scientist, Robert Lynd,
has expressed the opinion that'
It is the necessity in each society - if it is to be a society, not
a rabble - to order the relations of men and their institutional ways
of achieving needed ends ••• Organized power exists- always and everywhere, in societies large or small, primitive or modern - because it
perfoms the necessary function of establishing and maintaining the
version of order qy which a given society in a given time and place
lives. 7
,
This sentiment was once again echoed in no uncertain tems

qy Harold Lass-

well and Daniel Lerner: "The discovery that in all large-scale societies
the decisions at any time are typically in the hands of a small number of
people," pays homage to a long-held belief: "Government is always government

qy the few, whether in the name of the few, the one, or the many." S
Much of this elitist thinking was confirmed by Robert and Helen Lynd

in their two studies of community power relations in "Middletown" (Muncie,
Indiana).9

What they found was a monolithic power structure- one in which

all facets of community life (religious, political, economic, and social.)
were controlled by a single family.

They further found that the source of

this family's power rested upon their control of the economy through the
labor ma.:z:ket and the extension of credit.

The extent of this family's power

is cryptically captured in the following comment by a Middletown man in 1935:
If I'm out of work, I go to the X plant; if I need money I go to the
X bank, and if they don't like me I don't get it; my children go to

7 Robert Lynd, "Power in American Society, " in Authur Kornhauser
(ed.), Problems of Power in American Society (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957), pp. J-4.

8 Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, The Comparative Study of

Elites, p. 7.
9 Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1937); and Middletown in Transition (New Yo:rk: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937).
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the X college; when I get sick I go to the X hospital.; I buy a
building lot or house in the X subdivision; my wife goes downtown to buy X milk; I drink X beer, vote for X political parties,
and get help from X charities; my boy goes to the X YMCA and my
girl to their YWCA; I listen to the Word of God in a X subsidized church; if I'm a Mason, I go to the X Masonic temple; I read
the news from the X mornin~ papers; and, if I'm rich enough, I
travel via the X airport.l
Unfortunately, however, the Lynds did not specify the methods by which
the "X" family was identified as the center of Middletown's political
arena.

Thus they did not provide a specific methodology through which

future studies could find direction, nor did they provide a sufficient account of the indicators used as their measures of community power.
Lloyd W. Warner undertook a similar analysis of the power structure
of Morris, Illinois (which he called Jonesville) in the 1940s and encountered a monolithic structure paralleling that documented by the Lynds.in
11
Muncie •

These findings were confirmed by August B. Hollingshead in his

1949 analysis of the S8llle town (which he preferred to call Elmtown) •

12

.In brief, as these early studies report, the elitist interpretation
of American politics contends that it is the few who have power in society,
and that it is the preferences and values of the few that determine the
1
nature of public policy. 3

The following ideas are contained in elitist

thinking about community power:
1. Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who
do not. Only a small number of persons allocate values for society;

10

Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown in Transition, p. 74.

11

Lloyd W. Warner, et. al., Democracy in Jonesville (New York:
Harper, 1949) •
12
August B. Hollingshead, Elmtpwn's Iouth (NY: Wiley and Sons, 1949).
l3 Elite theory is explained at length in Thomas R. Dye and Harmon
Zeigler, The Iron~ of Democracy, 3rd Ed. (Belmont, Calif:. Wadsworth, 1975).
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the masses do not decide public policy.
2. The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are drawn disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society.

J.

The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and
continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only nonelites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted
to governing circles.

4. Elites share consensus in behalf of the basic values of the
social system and the preservation of the system. In America, the
bases of elite consensus are the sanctity of private property, limited government, and individual liberty.

5. Public policy does not reflect demands of masses but rather the
prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be
incremental rather than revolutionary.

6. Active elites are subject
from apathetic ~sses.
fluence elites.l

to relatively little direct influence
Elites influence masses more than masses in-

The contention that only a small proportion of the population ever
attains a position in society whereb,y political power may be exercised is
particularly unsettling in a democratic society which professes an unwavering attachment to mass participation in the governmental process.
Whereas elitism contends that the masses have but an indirect influence
over the decision-making behavior of elites, an alternative perspective often labeled "pluralism" -maintains that although it is undoubtedly true
that an elite few, rather than the masses, directly govern the affairs in
America, the essentially democratic character of American society is preserved through a number of alternative channels:
While individuals do not participate directly in decision-making,
they can join organized groups and make their influence felt through

1.

14 Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, )rd Ed., p. 26.
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group participation.
2. There is competition between leadership groups that help protect the individual - countervailing centers of power, which check
each other and guard against abuse of power.
).

Individuals can choose between competing groups in elections.

4. Leadership groups are not closed; new groups can be fonned and
gain access to the political system.

5. There are multiple leadership groups in society - "polyarchy."
Leaders who exercise power over some kinds of decisions do not necessarily exercise power over other kinds of decisions.
6. Public policy may not be majority preference, but it is the rough
equilibri1.ml of group influence and therefore a reasonable approximation of societyis preferences.15
As outlined above, modern pluralism does not refer to a commitment
to "pure democracy" in the Aristotelian sense involving direct participation by citizens in decision-making.

Rather, the modern pluralist is con-

scious of the impracticality of renewing the town-meeting type of pure democracy in a highly urbanized and industrialized society.

It is also rec-

ognized that American society has witnessed a great rise in giant industrial,
financial, and commercial organizations which pose a threat to individual·
liberty.

At the same time, however, it is hoped that various "counter-

vailing" centers of power will help diminish the net power of corporations
and safeguard the interests of the individual.

Competition among business,

labor, and government, the fragmentation of authority, the fluidity of citizens in organized activity, the influence of elected public officials, publie opinion, and periodic elections are all perceived by pluralists as important detenninants of public policy and as checks on the dominant economic

l5 Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America: Institutional Leadership
in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1976), p. 10.
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interests.
Pluralists thus contend that no single interest or group dominates
the life of a community.

Rather, "different small groups or interested

and active citizens in different issue-areas with some overlap, if any,
by public officials, and occasional intervention by a larger number of
16
people at the polls, " rules in the community •

Although elected public

officials hold formal positions of power in the community, actual leadership includes those interested individuals and groups that concentrate
their efforts on one or two issue-areas.

Community power is thus fluid -

changing hands in accordance with .the issue being considered.
As is readily apparent, the elitist and pluralist schools of thought
contain quite divergent assumptions concerning politics and power in American society.

Even more perplexing is the fact that there exists varying
\

descriptions of who the power-holders really are even within each perspective.

Thus, we are informed by some that power is held by "the power elite,"

or by "the ruling class," or by "economic notables," or by "elected decision-makers," or by "the liberal establishment," or by "the mili ta.ry-industrial complex," or by "those of reputation."

And there are those who

contend that power is not an attribute of individuals, but of institutions
and organized interests.

Further, just as there are a multi tude of inter-

ests in society there are an equal number of power-holders.
Now, however interesting such notions may be, they are further proof
of the literature's inability to arrive at a systematic definition of who

16

Aaron Wildavsky, Leadership in a Small Town (Totowa, New Jersey:
Bedminster Press, 1964), p. 8.
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the power-holders are, how they can be identified, how they came to power,
and how their power is ultimately exercised or neglected.

Herbert Kaufman

and Victor Jones have credited the very elusiveness of the concept for this
development:
There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost
ghostly qu.a.li ty. It seems to be all around us, yet this is "sensed"
with some sixth means of reception rather than with the. five ordinary senses. We "know" what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in trying to define it. We can "tell" whether one person
or group is more powerful than another, yet we cannot me~ure power.
It is as abstract as time yet as real as a firing squad. 7
An even more graphic reason for the present state of confusion, however, lies in the fact that not only do these perspectives differ in terms
of conceptual and theoretical underpinnings and in terms of preferred research strategies and methodologies, but that such differences have been
elevated to the point of becoming ideological in nature.

18

The implica-

tions of each school are at such great odds with those of the other that
research very often appears to be carried out more for the sake of defending a particular point of view than for purposes of scholarship and the pursuit of new knowledge.

Thus, after having examined this literature and the

recent attacks and counterattacks among proponents of each school, Thomas
J. Anton observed that "the point has now been reached where studies are no
longer undertaken to 'discover' and 'understand' the nature of political
systems; they are undertaken to 'disprove' another man's theories, not in

17 Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public
Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), p. 205; quoted in Thomas R. Dye,
Who' s Running Amer1.ca, p. 11.

lB Stephen P. Hencley, "The Study of Community Politics and Power,"
in Marilyn Gi ttell and Alan G. Hevesi ( eds.), The Politics of Urban Education (New York: Praeger, 1969), 21-34; at p. 21.
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a scientific sense, but in an ideological and political sense." 1 9
The fact that each school differentially defines power and employs
rather conflicting strategies in locating its source brings into question
what must occur for one to say that power exists at any particular time and
place.

The definitions of power previously cited emphasize those situations

in which there exists a confrontation between power-holder a:nd person influenced; whereby the former compels the latter to behave in some manner
he would not otherwise behave, and that to successfully control the activities of others the power-holder may activate his control of both positive
and negative reinforcement schedules.

Power relations of this sort are

overt and thus directly observable.
However, there are power relations of the implicit variety in which
there does not exist a direct confrontation between power-holder and person
influenced.

Altmugh the overt exercise of power may be observed when one

individual compels another to do something he would not otherwise do, what
do we make of those instances when the party influenced freely cooperates
with the will of the power holder?

Individuals may very well comply with

the will of others simply because they have been more or less indoctrinated
to either desire or accept the norms, goals, and ideals of the power-holder.
When power is viewed as the "production of intended effects," 20 both categories of relations would involve a power-holder and a follower.

Thus, as

19
Thomas J. Anton, "Rejoinder," Administrative Science Quarterly,
8 (September, 1963), p. 268; quoted in Hencley, The Study of Community Politics and Power, p. 21; also, see: T. J. Anton, "Power, Pluralism, and LOcal
Politics," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7 (March, 1963), 425-457.
20
Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1938), p. 35.
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G. David Garson apUy noted, " ••• there is no clear line between overt
power (in which the one influenced does what he or she would not otherwise

do) and implicit power (in which the will of the power-holder is fulfilled
because the one influenced has been indoctrinated, trained, or socialized
21 This being
to desire or accept the same goals as the power-holder) • "
so, power may be present even though it is not overUy exercised.

Indeed,

it can be argued that the full weight of power is wielded and felt when it
no longer needs to be overUy exercised because "the socialization into
22
obedience is complete. "
Unlike overt power relations, which some contend can be studied directly through a decision-making approach (which seeks to locate the parties actively engaged in formulating public policies and who thus exercise
a degree of power within the social system), the study of implicit power
relies upon indirect measurements of power relations.

Indirect measures,

it is argued, tap the net effect of both overt and implicit power relations,
reflects the effect of power over a multitude of decisions and social interactions, considers the exercise of power in the private sector, and, in
sum, locates the "power behind the scenes."

Further, it rests on the as-

sumption that power-holders can be identified by (1) their reputations, and
by (2) their institutional positions within the social, political, and eco-

nomic systems.
As will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, these three
approaches differ not only methodologically, but ideologically as well.

21 G. David Garson, Power and Politics in the United States, p. 9.
22 Ibid., p. 9.
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Similarly, each approach em"ba.:rks upon its own "self-fulfilling prophecy."
That is, each school (1) begins with the assumption that an identifiable
power structure (or structures) exists in American society, (2) defines
the specific configuration of the structure(s), and (3) establishes a
methodology for identifying the power-holders consistent with its theoretical undeJ:l>innings.

It will be noted that those who perceive an elitist

power structure in American society employ a methodological strategy naturally biased toward their theoretical commitments.

Methodologically,

this noma.lly consists of indirect measures of power relations.

Likewise,

those ideologically committed to democratic pluralism utilize research
strategies which are methodologically biased toward finding multiple power
sources.

This normally consists of identifying those elected decision-

makers and interested individuals and groups with at least some voice in
decision-making.
Tb this end, the sections which follow will look first at two perspectives and methodologies supportive of the elitist interpretation of
politics and power in the United States (the reputational and the insti tutional) and one which finds evidence favoring democratic pluralism (the
"power as decision-making" approach).

The ultimate objective is to demon-

strate how all such strategies are not only ideologically and methodologically biased but how each fails to analyze significant power relations in
the governmental system.

Especially evident is their failure to arrive at

a measure of bureaucra.tic influence.
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A.

The Elitist Perspective
The Positional Approach

1.

Prior to 195J and the publication of Floyd Hunter's Community Power
Structure,

2

3 the positional approach was the most widely used technique

for identifying community power-holders.

24

In essence, when.employing

this approach, researchers assume that those making key decisions directly or indirectly affecting the lives of most community residents are persons occupying important offices or positions in the community; elected
political leaders, business executives, higher civil servants, officials
of voluntary associations, heads of religious groups, leaders of labor
unions, and others in positions of social prominence are all perceived
as holders of some degree of power in community political affairs.

Meth-

odologically, the typical procedure has been to gather extensive lists
of fonnaJ. positions of office, assign numerical values to each position
(as a weighted value of the degree of authority possessed b,y each), assign
the names of individuals holding each position, and compute the sum power
score of each individual representing the number of times his or her name
appears on the list and the level of authority of each position.

Top

(Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of N. Carolina Press,

1953).

24 Though Hunter's research added a new spaik to the power literature,

positional assumptions have continued to receive extensive investigation.
For example, see: Robert 0. Schulze and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The Determinants of Local Power Elites," American Journal of Sociology, 63 (Nov.
1957), 290-296; Charles Freeman and Selz C. Mayo, "Decision Makers in Rural
Community Action," §ocial forc~s, 35 (May, 1957), 319-322; Robert 0.
Schulze, "The Role of Economic Dominants in Community Power Structures,"
American Sociological Review, 23 (Feb., 19~), J-9; M. Kent Jennings, "Public Administrators and Community Decision-Making," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 8 (June, 1963), No. 1, 18-43; and Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running
America: Institutional Leadership in the ·United States, passim.
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leaders are then assumed to be those with the highest scores.
The institutional basis of power stems from the conviction that power
is not an individual act, but rather the potential for control in any society that is obtained by occupying various roles in the social system.

In

this sense, power is viewed as a particular relationship between two or
more persons in which one perceives the other as possessing the potential
for exercising some control over his conduct.

Thus one individual has

power only to the extent that he has the capacity to effect his will on
others, including the further requirement that such a capacity is perceived
by others as a real possibility.
"Institutionalists" thus propose that, within any social system, power
is simply the capacity of persons occupying certain roles to make decisions
affecting the lives of others.

Accordingly, Robert 0. Schultze has reasoned

that:
••• a few have emphasized that act as such rather than the potential
to act is the crucial aspect or-pQwer.--rt seems far more soc~olog
ically sound to accept a Weberian definition which stresses the potential to act. Power may thus be conceived as an inherently-linked
property, an attribute of social statuses rather than of individual
persons. • • Accordingly, power will denote the capa.ci ty or pgtential
of persons in certain statuses to set conditions, make decisions,
andlor take actions which are dete~native for the existence of
others within a given social system. 5
Now, it is one thing to say that power-holders are those occupying
certain roles and enjoying a certain status in the social system and quite
another to specify the types of roles and statuses conducive to the exercise of power.

2

Everyone occupies some type of role in society and each

5 Robert 0. Schultze, "The Bifurcation of Power in a Satellite
City," in Morris Janowitz, ed. , Connnuni ty Political Systems (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1961), 19-80; at p. 20.
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person has a certain status relative to the rest of the community, but not
everyone is in a position to make decisions affecting the lives of others.
For these reasons, institutionalists contend that power is an attribute of
social organizations, and that power-holders are those individuals occupying positions of authority in society's large institutions.

And, although

not all power is institutionalized in the manner we have come to regard
the actions of such institutions as Congress, the Presidency, labor unions,
civic associations, religious organizations, private clubs, and the like,
C. Wright Mills has informed us that the truly significant power-roles are
found only in institutional positions.
No one ••• can be truly powerful unless he has access to the command of major institutions, for it is over these institutional
means of ~wer that the truly powerful are, in the first instance,
powerful.
And, as Mills furthered reasoned, it is the position itself which makes a
man powerful, not any personal quality, ability or motivational characteristic of the individual; remove the person from the position and his power
is lost:
If we took the one hundred most powerful men in America, the one
hundred wealthiest, and the one hundred most celebrated away from
the institutional positions they now occupy, away from their resources of men and women and money, away from the media of mass
communication ••• then they would be powerless and poor and uncelebra.ted. For power is not of a man. Wealth does not center in the
person of the wealthy. Celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power, requires
access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men
occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold
these valued experiences.2r
In support of this perspective for understanding community power,
26

C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1956), p. 9.
2
7 Mills, The Power Elite, p. 9.
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and recognizing that institutional leadership is as inherent in the corporate and public interest sectors as it is in the

gover~ental

sector, Thomas

R. Dye has proposed three separate indicators of national power-holders. 28
Operationally, elites representing each of the sectors are defined as follows:
Corporate Sector:

Public Interest Sector:

Governmental Sector:

those individuals who occupy formal positions of authority in institutions that
control over half of the nation's corporate assets.
those individuals who occupy formal positions of authority in the mass media, the
prestigious law firms, the major philanthropic foundations, the leading universities, and the recognized national civic and
cultural organizations.
those individuals who occupy formal positions of authority in the major civilian
and militar:Y bureaucracies of the national
government. Z9
•

An across-the-board analysis of institutional leadership in both the
private and public sector examines potential sources of power within the
whole of the social system.

Dye's three-tier operationalization of power

thus presents a more theoretically interesting and valid conceptualization
than that of earlier studies which focused primarily on governmental structures.

Researchers employing the institutional approach thus start with

the basic assumption that key decisions affecting the lives of community
residents are made by persons in positions of authority outside the formal
political structure.
Strict adherence to the institutional approach is not without its

28
Thomas R. Dye, Who's Rurmi America? Institutional Leadershi
in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, ew Jersey, 19
29
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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critics.

First, efforts to operationa.lize a concept as elusive as an

insti tutiona.l elite have generated discussions "over the inclusion or
exclusion of specific actors, institutions, or positions • .,30

The selec-

tion of units and elements of analysis often appear to be detennined by
the availability of data, apriori reasoning concerning the link between
institutional leadership and community decision-making, and subjective
judgments about the importance of some institutions, positions, and sectors over that of others.

Secondly, the validity and utility of the posi-

tional approach has been criticized because of the variation in tenninology
1
employed by different associations in designating similar offices.3

In

order to generalize their findings across institutional boundaries researchers must concentrate on the responsibUi ties of each member of the
organization, rather than on the specific ti Ues given to top ranking members.

When such is the case, misclassification becomes a real possibility.

And, thirdly, when the relationship between institutional leadership and
decision-making is tested as a hypothesis, rather than treated as an
apriqri assumption, research findings to date are at best inconclusive.32
Whereas some studies appear to support the relationship, others contradict
it.

For these reasons, the institutional approach works best when used in

30 Dye, Who's Running America, p. 13.
3l James E. White, "Theory and Method for Research in Community
Leadership," American Sociological Review, 15 (February, 1950), 50-6o.
2
3
Support for the relationship is offered by James E. White, .2.£!.
_ill; Robert A. Iahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1901);
Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, 196o) • Clearly contradicting this theory is Charles
M. Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement,"
American Journal of Sociology, 68 (May, 1963), 672-681; Robert Presthus,
Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964).

82
conjunction with the approaches discussed below.
For example, whereas the institutional approach concentrates on a
person's capacity to exercise power because of the institutional position
he or she occupies in the private or public sector of society, another
approach, often termed the "sociology of leadership" approach, focuses
instead on the social status of institutional leaders.

A1 though both ap-

proaches start with assumptions relating position and power, the former
concerns itself with the institutional position itself, while the latter
concerns itself with the socioeconomic status of governing officials.
Each, however, supports an elitist interpretation of politics and power
in American communi ties.
Underlying the sociology of leadership approach is the assumption
that the overt and implicit aspects of power can both best be indicated
by the manner in which top office-holders are relatively concentrated or
dispersed within institutional arrangements on the basis of social class.
If power is concentrated in the hands of the upper class, as indicated by
the number of socioeconomic notables within the political

institutior~

framework, then the distribution of power may be viewed as elitist.

If,

however, no such relationship is found between official governmental position and social class, then the power distribution more closely follows
the pluralist model.

Thus the precise configuration of power structures

is determined by the social characteristics of decision-makers.
Although the ordinary citizen would most likely suggest that American
politics in general and his city's political structure in particular is
fully dominated by upper-class influentials, such opinions may result from
a perception of an inequitable distribution of government benefits to a

8J
minority of citizens or from a belief in the numerical superiority of publie officiaJ..s from the upper socioeconomic strata.

The sociology of leader-

ship approach, as an indirect measure of the location of political power
in American society, seeks to find empirical support for its theoretical
(if not ideological) commitments by first identifying the members of the
upper class, and, secondly, by locating their positions in the political,
economic, and social hierarchy.
A1 though various studies by David Stanley, Dean Mann, and .Jameson
Doig, JJ Thomas R. Dye, 34 and Robert PresthusJ5 have shown that it is the
upper-middle, as opposed to the upper, class that is disproportionately
represented in the formal positions of government, the institutional structure is nonetheless unrepresentative of American society at large.

In ad-

dition, though these studies took some of the spaxk out of the elitist
contention that upper class persons fully dominate the American political
system, researchers have still been able to use a hybrid of the sociology
of leadership approach to support the elitist argument.

This is most evi-

dent when researchers focus not on the social position of those holding
political office, but on the relationship between class origin and political recruiting patterns.

C. Wright Mills, for example, has questioned

the validity of the traditional image of the political career pattern
which maintains that top governing officials begin their political careers
on the local level and proceed through a number of

inte~ediate

positions

JJ Men Wh9 Govern (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967), pp. 78-79.

J4 Dye, Who's Running America, op. cit.
35 Presthus, Elites in the Policy Process (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1974).
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before obtaining national-level leadership •.36

Instead, Mills found that

top leaders ordinarily surface from business and upper-class backgrounds.
In fact, of the top fifty governmental leaders (president, vice-president,
cabinet members, major agency heads, and top presidential advisers) during
the -Eisenhower administration, only 6 percent were professional politicians.37

Of the remainder, clearly 75 percent of the political outsiders

were linked with the corporate sector.38 Elitists interpreted such findings as undisputable evidence of the relationship between social class and
the degree to which one shares in the distribution of political power.
Thus the higher the social class, the greater is one's ability to share
in and influence the making of governmental decisions.
This oft-cited link between social class and political power is not,
however, without its detra.ctors.J9

It may be suggested that the sociology

of leadership approach is too indirect an indica tor of power.
ly make a difference i f

uppe~class

Does it real-

persons hold a disproportionate number

of social, economic, and political leadership positions in terms of the
policy activities of local or national decision-makers?

Although top lead-

ers may be unrepresentative of the class structure of American society,
they may nonetheless formulate policies on the basis of societal needs,
rather than on the basis of personal attributes and preferences.

Noting

the inherent limitations of an approach he himself has practiced,

c. Wright

36 Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
37 ~., p. 232.
38
~39 For example, see: John Mollenkopf, "Theories of the State and
Power Structure Research," The Insurgent Sociologist, 5 (Spring, 197 5),
245-264.
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Mills has set forth with clarity the following precaution:
We cannot infer the direction of policy merely from the sociaJ. origins and careers of the policy-makers. The social and economic
backgrounds of the men of power do not tell us all that we need to
know in order to understand the distribution of social power. For:
(1) Men from high places may be ideological representatives of the
poor and hmnble. (2) Men of humble origin, brightly self-made, may
energetically serve the most vested and inherited interests. Moreover, (3) not all men who effectively represent the interests of a
stra. tum need in any way belong to it.
For the most important set of facts about a circle of men is the
criteria of admission, of praise, of honor, of promotion that prevails among them; if these are similar within a circle, then they
will tend as personalities to become similar. The circles that compose the power elite do tend to have such codes and criteria in common. The co-optation of the social types to which these common values lead is often more important than ~y statistic of common origin
and career that we might have at hand.
Thus, although the sociology of leadership approach sets forth evidence supportive of an elite theory of American politics, even practicing
proponents of this view (such as Mills) note the qualifications one must
be willing to make when social class is found to be related to decision-

making roles.

Even if it is true that top institutional positions are oc-

cupied by upper-class individuals, it cannot be inferred that the activities
of these institutions are class biased.
ther shown that

(1)

In order to do so, it must be fur-

public policy favors the upper-class minority, (2) class

is determinative of political beliefs and practices, and that (J) other
decision-makers are co-opted by upper-class influentials.

The sociology of

leadership approach does not provide evidence completely supporting any of
these propos1't'1ons. 41
Finally, the sociology of leadership approach fails to adequately

40 Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 280-281.
41 These criticisms are cryptically discussed in G. David Garson,
Power and Politics in the United States, p. 170.
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document an elite theory of American politics primarily because, although
numerous, upper-class influentials are a minority of top decision-makers.
Much more numerous are those upper-middle and middle-class professionals
(lawyers, administrators, career bureaucrats, and professional politicians)
who may or may not be co-opted or socialized representatives of a. social or
economic elite.

This is however an empirical question in need of systematic

analysis of how problems are perceived and defined, the manner in which
certain issues reach the policy agenda, who is involved in formulating the
policy response to the problem, what policy objectives are ultimately established, what individual or body of individuals are assigned the responsibili ty of program implementation, and how does the consequences of their a.cti vities square with that intended by the policy-makers?
Although socioeconomic notables have a greater likelihood of attaining
top levels of decision-making than any other class of individuals, (thereb,y
placing them in potentially powerful roles) this alone does not infer that
they are, in fact, the truly powerful.

Thus, Floyd Hunter, for one, has

prOposed an alternative methodological approach focusing not on institutional positions or social backgrounds, but rather on the reputations certain
persons acquire for having the capability of exercising control over the
policy process. 42 Although Hunter has come to conclusions consistent with
elitist interpretations of the institutional and sociology of leadership
approaches, the theoretical and methodological components of his reputational model have generated such debate between the elitist and pluralist
schools of thought that it warrants a. significantly more in-depth analysis.

42

Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).
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2.

The Reputa tiona.l Approach
Like so many other professionals and policy analysts in the late

1940's and early 1950's who had become greatly concerned with both the
inability of policy-makers to develop workable programs of civic improvement and with the great influx of "nonpolitical experts" in the decisionmaking process, Floyd Hunter began to reflect upon the much debated question: "who really runs our cities?"

Recognizing the inability of tra.di-

tional investigations of formal institutions and agencies of local government to account for the growing influence of political outsiders on policy
decisions affecting the lives of community residents, Hunter sought some
means by which the "power behind the scenes" could be identified.

A1 though

other researchers used a similar technique to study positions of status, 43
Hunter was the first to use the reputational approach in a study of communi ty power.

His analysis in turn did much to popularize the elite theory

of American politics.
Defining power as a word "used to describe the acts of men going
about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves
or in relation to organic or inorganic things," and as "the ability of men
to command the services of other men," Hunter proceeded to identify those
roles that were both salient and centrally involved in determining the policy
activities of "Regional City" (Atlanta, Geo:rgia).

44

Starting with the as-

sumption that the affairs of every city are in some way managed by a select

43 For example: August B. Hollingshead, Elmtown's Youth (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1949); and Lloyd W. Warner, et. al., .Q12· .ill·
44 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, pp. 2, 4.
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few who are perceived

~

others as capable of exercising power either

directly or indirectly within the community, Hunter hypothesized that
such individuals must eventually acquire a reputation for power.

One's

reputation thus becomes the identifying factor.
Although this approach has several variations, essentially it consists of asking certain informants to name and rank the

powe~holders

in

their community. 45 The informants may be a.n expert panel or a random sample of community residents, or they may be selected
to a.s the "snowbaJ.l" technique.

~

what is referred

The final list of reputed

powe~holders

then consists of those persons receiving the greatest number of nominations
or of all persons whose average ranking exceeds an arbitrarily set limit.
Methodologically, Hunter took it as axiomatic that "community life
is organized life, and that persons occupying 'offices' and public positions of trust would be involved in some manner in the power relations of
the community. " 46 Thus

~ interviewing the top leaders in major organize.-

tions Hunter was able to formulate a preliminary sketch of institutionalized power relations.

However, since this preliminary sketch neglected

the influence of persons outside the normal organizational chain of command, Hunter sought a. comprehensive list of reputed civic, governmental,
business, and status leaders in Regional City.
lists were provided

~

For this purpose, preliminary

the Community Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the

League of Women voters, newspaper editors, and civic leaders.

The Community

45 For a sample of studies that have employed the reputa.tional approach exclusively or in combination with another approach, see: Hunter,
Community Power Structure; Schulze and Blumberg, ~· _ill.; M. Kent Jennings,
..2.12 • ~ ; Freeman and Mayo, o..:e.: _ill.
Hunter, Community Power Structure, p. 263.
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Council provided preliminary lists of leaders in community affairs.

The

Chamber of Commerce provided lists of business leaders of establishments
employing more than 500 employees and of financial houses doing the largest
volume of clearances.

The League of Women Voters provided a list of local

political officials with at least major governmental committee chairmanship status.

And newspaper editors and other civic leaders provided in-

4

formation about society leaders and leaders of wealth. 7

In all,

175

potential leaders were identified by three preliminary lists.
In order to reduce the four preliminary lists to the top leaders in
each area, fourteen judges were employed to rank order the top ten leaders
in each category.

And, finally, a prepared interview schedule was admin-

istered to the twenty-three consenting persons of the list of forty.

48

One

of the objectives of the interviewing was to elicit from the 40 reputed
power-holders a final list of those persons (who may or may not have been
included in the list of 40) they perceived to be the true leaders in the
community.
Of the final list of 40, it was disclosed that eleven served in

top positions of private enterprise (such as owners, chairmen of the board,
or presidents in large commercial centers) , seven in banking and investment
finns, and five in industrial companies.

Hunter thus concluded that "the

dominant factor in political life is the personnel of economic interests."
And that, in fact, governmental departments are essentially subservient to
the combined interests of economic elites.

47 Hunter, Community Power Structure, especially pp. 262-271.
48

The properties of this schedule are presented in Hunter, £P.• cit.,
pp. 262-271.
---
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It is true that there is no formal tie between the economic interests and government, but the structure of policy-determining committees and their tie-in with the other powerful institutions and
o:rganiza tions of the community make government subservient to the
interests of these combined groups. The governmental departments
and their personnel are acutely aware of the power of key individuals and combinations of citizens' groups in the policy-making
realm, and they are loathe to act before consulting and "clearing"
with these interests •
• • • The structure is that of a dominant policy-making g:roup
using the machinery of,government as a bureaucracy for the attainment of certain goals.~
These are men and women of "dominance, prestige and influence," the decision-ma.kers for the total community, "able to enforce their decisions by
persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, force. ,50
By

examining the impression knowledgeable people have about the

power-holders in their community, the reputational approach seeks to uncover what many refer to as the "power behind the scenes."

That is, it

is designed to identify those individuals exercising power who are not
visible within the institutional and social class perspectives.

However,

like the institutional and sociology of leadership approaches, Hunter's
preferred methodology starts with the assumption that a certain elite dominates the total life of the community and then constructs a procedure
for identifying such persons methodologically biased toward "proving" the
initial assumption.

And even if one accepts his dictum that institutions

and formal associations play a "vital role in the execution of determined
policy," but that the "fomulation of policy often takes place outside
these formalized groupings, ,51 Hunter's methodology does not allow him to

49 Ibid., p. 102.
50 ~., p. 24.
51
p. 82.

~··
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infer any more than that those persons outside institutions and foDmal
associations are perceived by others as "powerful." Leadership and the
reputation for leadership may not at all times be synonymous.
Because this method of inquiry tends to support the belief that
elected representatives are dominated by the interests of an economic
superstructure, it runs counter to the traditional democratic pluralist
ideology.

In brief, pluralists have questioned the validity of the repu-

tational method on five specific points.
First, in employing the reputational methodology, Hunter takes for
granted precisely what he should have set out to prove, namely: Regional
City exhibits a monolithic power structure.

By asking people "what per-

sons dominate community affairs," "what are these people like," and "what
contacts do they have with each other," Hunter assumes that his initial
assumption of a ruling elite had already been established.
predetermined his findings and subsequent conclusions.52

This practice

Second, there is no assurance that persons will be nominated because
of their reputation for power, rather than for their publicized status in
the community.

There is no reason to suppose that power figures and status

figures are one and the same.
Third, since ordinary citizens are usually ill-equipped to speak with
complete knowledge about actual power systems in communities, their responses are problematic and may not represent "anything more than a report

52 Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," Public
Administration Review, 14 (Summer, 1954), No. ), 20.5-212; and Robert A.
Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science
Review, 52 (June, 19_58), 46)-469.

53 Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model;" and Raymond E.
Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological ~yiew, 25 (December, 1960), 636-644.
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of public opinion on politics."54 The relationship between perceptions
and actual. behavior must be empirically detennined, rather than presumed.
Fourth, even if we could reasonably assume a high correlation between
power and the reputation for power per se, the reputational approach may
not reliably identify leaders because of (1) the unreliability of respondents, (2) vaxying conceptions of power held

b,y

the interviewer and re-

spondent, and (J) the discretion accorded the researcher in establishing
the manner in which final rankings are tabulated and divided into power
and non-power holders.
may be omitted.

If the cut off point is set too high, many leaders

And if set too low, the final rank-ordered list may in-

clude followers as well as leaders.55
Fifth,

b,y

failing to "specify scopes in soliciting reputations for

influence," reputational researchers "assume that the power of their leadernominees is equal for all issues •.. 56

This is, however, an empirical ques-

tion which demands that analysts carefully examine a series of concrete
decisions and note (1) the actors involved in the decision-making process,
(2) the interactions among actors,. and (3) the constancy of participation
across issue boundaries. 51
Thus, although the reputational approach may identify a group that
possesses a high potential for control, a major contention of pluralists
is that it does not distinguish potential from actual power relations.

To

54 Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community
Power," p. 642.
55 Bonjean and Olson, .212· cit., at p. 205. For a discussion of
each of these criticisms see Wolfinger, ..2J2• cit.
56 Nelson W. Polsb,y, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Power,"
American Political Science Review, 24 (December, 1959), 796-803; at p. 797.
51 See Part B: The Pluralist Perspective - discussed at length below.
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do so requires that researchers concentrate on the manner in which coaJ.itions are formed and decisions actually made in the policy environment.
And finally, to the criticisms advanced b,y pluralists, students of
public administration have been quick to note that the reputational approach has seriously underestimated the role played by the bureaucratic
substructure.58

In particular, they have objected to Hunter's assertion

that once consensus is reached among the ruling elite concerning the direction of community activities, the struggle for control of policy development is complete.

Hunter thus mistakenly assumes that once programs

are established and passed along to administrators, what follows is a
simple process of abiding b,y directions.

However, our major point of con-

tention is that the power to implement policy is the power to make, or
otherwise modi.fy, policy.

One can further argue that since the innovating

ideas for many social welfare programs and community improvement projects
come from experts in national, state, and local bureaucracies, administrators and career bureaucrats are the invisible power-holders that even
reputationaJ.ists fail to uncover.

Thus, let us now turn to see i f plural-

ist assumptions and methodologies fair any better.

58 See, Kaufman and Jones, "The Mystery of Power," especially Part
III, pp. 209-210.
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B.

The Pluralist Perspective:
The "Decisional" or "Event Analysis" Approach
Nelson Polsby, in a powerful critique of the elitist theory of strat-

ification, has maintained that essentially five propositions characterize
such approaches to the study of power in American communities: (1) the upper class rules in the life of local communities; (2) political and civic
leaders are subordinate to upper class influentials; (3) a single "powerelite" rules in the community; (4) this upper class power elite rules in
its own interests; and (5) social conflict takes place between upper and
lower social classes.59

If one was to accept the institutional and socio-

logy of leadership approaches as empirically verifiable theories of communi ty power merely because the former links power with institutional resources and potentialities, and because the latter relates social class
origin to the numerical superiority of upper class professionals in top
leadership positions, they would be hard pressed to prove that institutional
position and class composition alone determine the distribution of government services and benefits.

Even if institutional position and social

class origin are regarded as potentially valuable resources of power, one
must be attuned to the distinction between the possession of a resource
and the actual exercise of that for which it is a resource, namely, power.
In a similar vein, Robert Dahl, in an attack which specifically objected to the methodology of Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills, has expressed
dissatisfaction with an approach that allows the researcher to "infinitely

59 Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).
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regress" in the face of empirical evidence to the cont::r:axy.

And

that:

whatever else it may be, a theory that cannot even in principle
be controverted b,y empirical evidence is not a scientific theory.
The least that we ean demand of any ruling elite theory that purports to be more than a metaphysicaJ. or polemical doctrine is,
first that the burden of proof be on the proponents of the theory
and not on its critics; and, second, that there bg a clear criteria
according to which the theory could be disproved. 0
The model of a ruling elite was thus criticized, first for failing to distinguish between resources of power (e.g. , institutional leadership, social class origins, and reputation) and power itself, and, secondly, for
neglecting to consider power in its situational aspects.
The aJ. ternative view by Dahl and others of the pluraJ.ist persuasion
is that aJ. though social and economic elites have greater influence over
city governmentaJ. decision-making than the average citizen, they do not
fully dominate city politics.

Rather, the community power structure is

essentially pluralistic, whereby power is widely dispersed among a number
of decision-makers, and in which economic elites,
far from being a ruling group, are simply one of the many groups out
of which individuals sporadically emerge to influence the policies
and acts of city officials. Almost anything one might say aoout the
influence of the Economic Notables could be said with equal justice
about a half dozen other groups in the community. Sometimes the
notables have their way and sometimes they do not.61
In his study of power relations in New Haven, Dahl employed what is
commonly referred to as the decisionaJ. approach.

Essentially this approach

involves tracing the actions of leaders in regard to decision-making within

60 Robert

A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," p. 463.
61 Robert A. Dahl, Who Govems? Democracy and Power in an American
City (New Haven: Yale Univers~ty Press, 1961), p. 72. AlthOugh this study
represents the classic example of the decisional approach, other equally
important statements of the pluralist perspective can be found in the various studies cited in FN # 62.

the context of

sp~ific issues. 62 Pluralists thus claim that only by

tracing the historical development of community decisions on political
issues (via extensive interviews, attendance at organizational and committee meetings, speeches, newspaper accounts, and so on) can one hope to
show evidence of a ruling elite.

Institutional leadership, social class

origin, and reputations do not guarantee control.

Consequently, Dahl and

other pluralists prefer methodologies designed to identify overt power
rather than power potential.
Underlying decisional analysis is the first and perhaps most fundamental presupposition of the pluralist perspective which states that "nothing categorical- can be assumed about power in the community. " 63 Instead
the stratification thesis (stating that some elite group necessarily dominates a community) is rejected and substituted with the assumption that
"at bottom nobody dominates in a town." 64 With the matter of whether or
not anyone at all dominates community affairs open to question, pluralists
attempt to study specific outcomes of community conflict (as evidenced in
particular patterns of decision-making), in order to determine whose will
actually prevails in community decision-making.
For example, in applying decisional analysis to power relations in

62
Studies employing this approach include: Dahl, ..Q.E• cit.; Elaine
Burgess, Ne ro Leadershi in a Southern Cit (Chapel Hill, N. C.: Universi ty of North Carolina Press, 1 0 ; Warner Bloomberg, Jr., and Morris
Sunshine, Suburban Power Structures and Public Education (Syracuse, New
York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1963); Robert Presthus, Men At the Top: A Study
in Community Power (New York: OXford University Press, 1964); and Benjamin
Walter, "Political Decision-Making in Arcadia," in F. Stuart Chapin, Jr.
and Shirley F. Weiss, eds., Urban Growth Dynamics (NY: Wiley, 1962), 141-87.
63 Nelson W. Polsby, "How To Study Community Power: The Pluralist
Alternative," Journal of Politics, 22 (August, 1960), 474-484; at p. 474.
64 Ibid., p. 475.

97
the New Haven community, Dahl reconstructed the historicaJ. development of
what he perceived to be the most significant decisions. 65 Included in his
analysis were eight major decisions in the New Haven Redevelopment program
(which was at that time the largest in the country when measured by outlay per capita), eight in the area of public education (which was the most
costly item on the city's budget), and the nominations by the two political
parties for seven elections.

After having gathered data via extensive in-

terviews, attendance at organizational and committee meetings, reconstruction of newspaper accounts, and on-the-spot analysis of individual behavior
(which was aided by the placement of intems in "strategic locations"),
Dahl found that power

was

widely dispersed throughout the community, with

no single group dominating each and every policy decision.

Instead, con-

trary to stratification theory's presumption that power relations are a
more or less permanent aspect of social structure, Dahl noted that power
relations in New Haven are tied to issues.

Since issues may be persistent

or ever-changing, power relations may easily change in their

pe~anency.

And, furthermore, Dahl found that even those notables exhibiting at least
some influence, did so in no more than a single issue area; no single social or economic notable proved so influential that his/her will dominated
different decision processes.

And of the persons who did appear to influ-

ence the whole of the policy process, not one was a social or economic
notable.

All such individuals were elected or appointed city officials.

A1 though it is comforting to learn that the stratification theory of

65 Dahl, Who Governs? Pemocra,cy and Power in an American

City,

~

sim. For a description of how particular issues are selected for study,
see: Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative, esp., pp. 474-484.
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elite dominance may not be aJ.l that vaJ.id, and that the policy process receives input from a varying number of groups and individuals, many contend
that much less can be derived from the study of community decisions in issue areas than "decisionaJ. anaJ.ysts" or pluralists suggest.

66 In fact, it

has been proposed that decisionaJ. methodologies are deficient in at least

. areas. 67
sJ.X
First, "pluralists misunderstand the way influence expresses itself
in the community. " 68 That is to say, a1 though the exercise of power can
be detected when competing groups struggle for acceptance of their particular views, the values and policy preferences of the elite are transmitted
to nonelites by a conscious and unconscious "mobilization of bias." 69

By

creating the faJ.se impression that they share the same values as other community residents, elites are able to block many issues from becoming public
problems in need of government action.

This particular exercise of power

will not then surface in the decision-making process.

66 For a cryptic anaJ.ysis of research critical of the decisionaJ. approach, see: Richard M. Merelman, "On the Nee-Elitist Critique of Community
Power, American Political Science Review, 62 (June, 1968), 451-60. Studies
representative of this perspective include: Peter Bachrach and Morton S.
Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review. :P (Dec.,
1962), 947- 52; Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An AnaJ.ytic Framework," American Political Science Review, 51 (September, 1963),
632-642, and Power and Poverty: Theo:;:y and Practice (New York: OXford University Press, 1970); E.E. Schattschneider, Tbe Semisoyereign Peo~e (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960); and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph
Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1960). These views will be discussed in greater length in the
conclusion to this chapter.
67 See, especially those sources cited in FN # 66; and Bonjean and
Olson, ..cp • ..ci:t., pp. 284-286.
68 Merelman, ..QP• cit., p. 4_52.
69 Schattschneider, ..Qll• ..cit., chapters i-iii, et. 12assim.

99
Second, "pluralists are most successful in assessing power when conflict is occurring •.,70 However, when individuals perceive that they have
little chance of winning a direct confrontation with the "powerful," they
will refrain from raising issues for consideration.
flict, no visible issue, and no decision."7l

Thus there is "no con-

Under these conditions, the

decisional method is of little or no utility.
Third, "pluralists unduly stress decisions made in the governmental
realm." 72 Even if issues are initiated, they may still be blocked from
reaching the stage of governmental decision-making.

And, even if issues

are decided upon, various administrative constraints may prevent the execution of the decision.

Power is as much a part of execution as it is of is-

sue initiation and policy formulation.

Unfortunately, decisional analysis

treats power relations as if confined solely to the policy-making process.
Fourth, given the fact that decisional analysts seek to identify
overt power relations (and thus confine their attention to stages of issue initiation and policy formulation), they are hard pressed to justify
the starting place for their investigation.

If they assume that power-

holders can be identified by observing committee meetings and sessions of
the executive council, they are, in effect, accepting the same relationship
between leadership positions and decision-making common to the institutional approach.

Since they have no way of determining in advance whether

or not decisions had been informally made prior to these formal meetings,
they cannot legitimately infer that organization members, councilmen, and

70 Merelman, .QE. cit., p. 452.
7l Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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0

ther participants are the real power-holders.

And, if interviews are

conducted to identify informal influences, decisional analysts are susceptible to the same criticisms levied against reputationalists.
Fifth, since no study can investigate the historical development of
all issues and decisions, or identify the actors in each issue and decision
area, decisional analysts must select specific cases for analysis.

Whereas

some single out what they consider to be the "most important" cases for
analysis, others follow the preference of reputationalists in eliciting
the judgment of community residents or "expert" informants.

A degree of

uncontrollable subjectivity is inherent in each.
And, sixth, decisional analysis may require a substantial time investment, or (as in the case of Dahl's New Haven) the assistance of a collaborator with access to "highly strategic locations." 73 The study of decision-making patterns may therefore be limited to single community case
studies, rather than comparative analyses across communities and issue
areas.

For these reasons, a multifaceted analysis encompassing aspects of

each of the alternative approaches are of greater utility than any one taken
alone.

And, then, if and only if researchers remove their professional

and ideological predispositions and their methodological blinders which
commit them to an almost unwavering attachment to power relations within
the policy-making process, and proceed to measure the influence of policy
administrators (who are normally considered outside the t:ra.di tional channels of policy-making) can even multiple approaches be of any avail.

73 Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, p. vi.
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CONCLUSION
Methods of Studying Community Power:
An Appraisal and Proposed Alternative
How does one

go

about reconciling the competing conclusions drawn by

the institutional, sociology of leadership (positional), and reputational
approaches, which tend to uncover an elite dominating community affairs,
and the decisional approach, which creates the impression of a pluralistic
power distribution?

Do the power structures of Regional City (Atlanta)

and New Haven differ as significantly as Hunter's and Dahl's analyses conelude, or are the research findings simply an artifact of the methodologies
employed?

Would findings be significantly different if both cities were

restudied using an aJ. ternative method of analysis.

Prol:ably so.

In fact,

research findings are often a function of the research design and mode of
instrumentation.

Whereas available evidence indicates that the institu-

tional approach tends to emphasize the power inherent in organized bodies
and the significant influence of persons of leadership status, a reputational
approach tends to identify a monolithic power structure composed of persons
of notoreity, a positional approach uncovers a presumed link between social
class and decision-making, and a decisional analysis ultimately leads to
the finding of a democratically pluralist community power structure.

How-

ever, as Robert Presthus demonstrated in his analysis of two cities in New
York, studies employing some combination of alternative strategies indicate
that each separate approach tends to locate the sources of power in a
relatively small number of persons. 74

4
7 Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), passim.
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It is clearly evident that studies employing the institutional appreach start with the assumption that power is an attribute os social institutions, and that power-holders are those persons occupying positions
of authority in society's large institutions.

Although it seems reasonable

to expect to find persons in roles of institutional leadership wielding a
significant degree of control over community decision-making, this is an
assumption to be tested rather than a statement of fact.

In fact, system-

atic analysis may very well uncover that institutional leaders are merely
carrying out the preferences of persons not normally included in formal
membership and leadership roles.
Equally deficient is the notion that social class representation is
an adequate indicator of community power.

What does it mean to say that

.

American politics is dominated by a ruling elite comprised primarily of
members of the upper class?

Is this upper class elite formulating policies

congruent with its own self-interest, or is it one that acts on the basis
of some utilitarian conception of the role of government? Are these elite
(or upper class) values transmitted to upper-middle and middle-class professionals, or is class and decision-making unrelated.

Since it is often

difficult to discover the intentions of this elite, it is relatively impossible to state with any degree of certainty that they are exercising power
or merely carrying out the will of the majority.

And, further, could it

not be suggested that an upper class elite assumes leadership on the basis
of merit, education, ability, and overall qualifications necessary for positions of authority, which may be taken as attributes of the upper strata
but not divided and controlled by considerations of social class.
It is equally clear that studies employing the reputa tional approach
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tend to select persons who are perceived b,y others as being influential
because of their wealth, prestige, position, and/or visibility in the community.

However, merely because an individual is a social or economic

notable does not necessarily imply that he/she is actually powerful in
settling conflicts or in allocating resources in the community.

It may

even be that the opposite holds true: social and economic notables may intentionally avoid political participation for the sake of personal and business-related interests.

The underlying reason why social and economic

notables often appear to be the centers of power in a community when influentials are identified b,y the reputational approach may simply reflect
the prestige we assign to persons of high status.
Although position, social class, and reputation may serve as indirect indicators of power, they are not equivalent to its possession.
These attributes may place persons in situations where they have the potential for control, but we cannot assume that the supposed connections necessarily hold true.

Instead, many researchers have advocated an approach

designed to identify those persons actively engaged in community decisionmaking.

However, this approach, too, is not without its limitations.

Although the decisional approach notes the distinction between actual
and potential power, it too fails to consider power in all of its manifestations.

Though correct in observing that a person may possess a great many

resources that could possibly place him/her in a position to exercise a
degree of potential power and yet still not demonstrate an outward expression of this resource, power may be exercised in a manner other than participation in the decision-making process.

Further, as Peter Bachrach and

Morton S. Bara.tz have suggested, the decisional methods of the pluralists
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concentrate solely on those instances in which they are able to select
significant decisional issue-areas for study, and thus neglect those situations in which decision-makers fail to get involved~75

Since the de-

cisional approach as employed qy Dahl sought to gauge the relative power
of political actors on the basis of their ability to initiate and veto
proposals, these critics cha.Ige that the power inherent in limiting the
scope of initiation was ignored.

Through the context of a "mobilization

of bias," decision-makers can thwart latent or manifest changes to the
status quo.

Thus qy utilizing an existing bias of the political system

(such as a precedent, a rule, a norm, or a procedure), it is possible for
power to be exercised in the fo:rm of "nondecision-ma.king."

Nondecision-

making, as an exercise of power to thwart change seekers, may be exercised
both overtly and covertly, ranging from force, to intimidation (i.e., potential deprivation of valued things), to co-option (i.e., potential rewards). 76

In order to account for this other "face of power," researchers

73 These views are expressed in three specific works. See, Peter
Bachrach and MortonS. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review, 56 (December, 1962), 947-52; Bachrach and Ba.ratz, "Decisions
and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," American Political Science Re~. 57 (September, 1963), 632-42; and Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). Also,
for a critique and defense of their views, see: Geoffrey Debnam, "Nondecisions and Power: ~he Two Faces of Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz," American Political
Science Review, 69 (September, 1975), No. 3, 889-99; Pater Bachrach and
Morton S. Ba.ra. tz, "Power and its Two Faces Revisited: A Reply to Geoffrey
Debnam," in the same issue, 900-04; and Geoffrey Debnam, "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz," in the same issue, 90 5-07.
76 Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz, "Power and its Two Faces Revisited," p. 900;
and Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, pp. 47-51.
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his
energies to creating-or reinforcing social and political-values and
institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process
to public consideration of only those issues which are compazatively
innocuous to A.
(See, Bachrach and Ba.ra.tz, "Two Faces of Power," p. 9..51.
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would need to employ a new approach to identifying community power structures:
Under this approach the researcher would begin - not, as does the
sociologist who asks, "Does anyone have power?" - but by investigating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution
under scrutiny. Then, having anaJ.yzed the dominant values, the
myths and the established political procedures and rules of the
game, he would make a careful inquiry in which persons or groups,
if any, gain from the existing bias and which, i f any, are handicapped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of nondecision-making, that is, he would examine the extent to which and the
manner in which the status quo oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those political institutions which
tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to safe issues.77
There is a further methodological problem inherent in the decisional
approach which goes beyond its failure to consider aspects of nondecisionmaking, and which can also be directed toward the other approaches thus
far examined.

As pointedly expressed by Nelson Polsby and repeatedly em-

phasized by Robert Dahl, the central question this approach addresses is
"How can one tell, after aJ.l, whether or not an actor is powerful unless
some sequence or event, completely observed, attests to his power?"7S

The

problem lies not so much with the question as it does with the boundaries
established for observation.

According to the pluralists, if we were to

look at the sequential pattern of issue identification and policy formulation, we would find that different persons have a stake in different conflicts and/or community issues.

It would thus appear that there does not

exist one unitary attentive public that

e~ges

in the making of policy

for each and every area, and that "virtually no one, and certainly no group

77 Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," p. 951.

78 Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, p. 60.
Also, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs, passim.
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of more than a few individuals, is entirely lacking in some influence resource."79 However, by focusing on conflict situations within the decisionmaking process, or on the reputations acquired by persons perceived to be
important in setting the political. agenda, or on the class composition of
members of top leadership, or on persons in roles of institutional. leadership, political. scientists have disproportionately examined the politics
of issue initiation and policy formulation at the expense of other aspects
of the policy process.

Research has thus tended to underestimate the power

resources of other actors in the process.
If "power-holders" or "community influential.s" are viewed simply as
those individuals directly engaged or perceived to be engaged in the process
of setting the political. agenda and in fomulating public policies, is power
no longer held and exercised after the initial. making of policy?

Are the

individuals authorized to implement the policy decisions of city governmental official.s simply carrying out the expressed will of the powerful and
therefore relatively powerless in and of themselves?
contend, must be made in the negative.

Both responses, we

Various foms of political. power

may be (and are) exercised as much, i f not more, after policies receive
their initial formulation as they are before and during their stages of
development.

And the administrative branch, we further contend, exercises

varying degrees of power during each developmental stage of policy formulation and program implementation.

By broadening the focus to include

those events and actors within the implementation process, the role of
the bureaucrat and his/her institutional. setting can be further appreciated.

79 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?, p. 228.
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As an initial step in such an analysis, the political, technical, and
organizational resources of public bureaucracies warrant a further note
of elaboration.

CHAPTER rl

BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLICY PERFOR1ANCE
In the two preceding chapters we sought to show, first, the overriding concern of political scientists in explicating the processes of
issue identification and policy formulation and, second, to propose that
the dominant approaches employed in the study of community power structures are both ideologically and methodologically biased and deficient
in drawing the needed distinction between policy outputs and policy performance.

They thus fail to detail adequately how policy decisions are

transformed into public services, and consequently neglect to consider
the potential and actual power resources of those actors responsible for
applying and implementing the policy objectives of urban governments.
Further, i f policy is defined in the narrow sense as a "projected
program of goal values and practices, ,.l it may be legitimate to focus on
how policies are formulated and on the actors engaged in the process of
establishing the objectives of government activities as a way of identifying the power-holders·in community affairs.

However, the question we pose

is whether the power-holders are solely those individuals who actively
participate in the struggle over the establishment of governmental priorities, as evidenced in the politics of policy formulation.

Or is it

more meaningful to speak of policy as a "purposive course of action or

1 Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1950), p. 71.
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or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem of concern."

2

If the latter conceptualization is adopted, as we think

it should be, then power must be broadened to include consideration of
those responsible for applying policy to a given situation, and who thereby influence the net impact (i.e., perfomance) of the policy on an intended target.

In applying or implementing the policy decisions of elected

officials, policy administrators substantially modify, elaborate upon,
or even negate the content of policy and its impact on those affected.
Since administrators do not always apply precisely what legislators or
other policy adopters decide, intentions and perfomance may be substantially dissimilar.

Since policy administrators can ultimately make policy

in the process of implementation, the policy process cannot be fully comprehended without considering the power capacity of public bureaucracies.
Although one would expect these views to be self-evident, determinants analyses and community power studies have essentially ignored the
so-called "administrative" functions of the bureaucrat in favor of the
"political" activities of elected officials.

These studies have thus

failed to take advantage of an extensive body of theoretical and casestudy material emphasizing the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of
policy decisions are being made by public bureaucracies.

In general,

elected officials frequently do not possess the time, information, interest,
or expertise necessary to deal with complex social, economic, or technical
issues.

2

And even when legislators do possess the necessary time, knowledge,

James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: Praeger Publishing Company, 1975), p. J.
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and technical. sophistication to rationally confront community issues, the
legislative body itself may be divided over the course of action to follow in resolving perceived problems.

Due to the degree of legislative

conflict present whenever competing interests seek to have particular
views ultimately adopted, agreement can be reached only by leaving some
matters essentially nebulous and unsettled.

Furthermore, many policy de-

cisions must be made that elected officials may consider politically unfeasible.

This is especially evident in issue areas where elected of-

ficials risk alienating a significant proportion of their constituencies
regardless of which al terna.tive strategy they select.

And some issues do

not receive the concentrated attention of elected officials because their
constituents are so indifferent to the outcome that there is no "political
payoff" to be gained from addressing the pm bl.em.

Under such conditions,

elected officials have been inclined to delegate substantial policy-making
responsibility to administrative agencies.J Unfortunately, this development has been slighted by most features of determinants analysis and studies
of community power structures.
Although some form of power is unmistakably exercised whenever policy
decisions are made by administrative bodies, it is evident that bureaucratic specialization grants ranking administrators a high degree of influence in structuring agendas and defining alternatives for elected officials.

What is not so evident, however, is that even when policy decisions

3 For example, see: Theodore J. Lowi, The End Of Liberalism (New
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Power in
National Politics, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1972); Rourke,
BUreaucracy, Politics and Public Polic , 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Company, 197 ; and Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, Jrd Ed. (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977).

111
are made by elected officials, administrators still possess the potential
for determining the operational content of those decisions through implementation process activities.
For example, common sense and experience both suggest that the mere
passage of an ordinance by the city council does not materially change the
object of its actions.

By alerting the citizenry of their awareness of

the problem and of their desire to activate needed change, the initial
formulation of a policy response by city councilmen contains an inherent
symbolic significance, but in and of itself does not alleviate community
problems.

The passage of an ordinance to pave a portion of a street, or

one that limits the speed of motor vehicles, or that defines regulations
for the construction of buildings, does not, in and of itself, change the
appearance of the street, regulate the speed of all drivers, or ensure
compliance by all builders.

Instead, as Carl A. McCandless suggests:

A part of the total political process was consummated when, probably
after a number of compromises were achieved, the council finally
passed an ordinance, but the total process is not complete until
some means is available to grade and pave the street, patrol the
streets and apprehend violators of the le~ limits, and make onsite inspections of construction projects.
Thus, although the legal authority to initiate binding city policies
resides within the executive and legislative departments of city government, nonelected city administrators and career bureaucrats can determine
their operational content.

Consequently, the ultimate success of govern-

mental programs very often depends upon the ability, willingness, policy
orientations, and other technical, economic, organizational, and political

4

Carl A. McCandless, Urban Government and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), p. 239.
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resources of bureaucracies.

The following two chapters a.re thus intended

first, to present a. portra.i t of the resources available to and inherent
within bureaucracies, a.nd second, to suggest a. conceptual framework for
increasing our understanding of those factors which ha.ve a. potentially significa.nt impact on the power capacity of bureaucrats during the implementa.tion process.
Bureaucratic Phenomenon:
Power and its Exercise

~he

We should note a.t the outset tha.t no policy system, no matter how
well-developed a.nd efficient, ca.n address each a.nd every community issue
demanding attention; nor ca.n a.ny system guarantee the ultimate and unqualified success of those policies which are created in response to pa.r· ticula.r problems.

At best, policy-makers ca.n only hope that they ha.ve a.c-

curately perceived the real nature of the problem, properly assessed the
relative weights of possible policy objectives, analyzed each a.nd every
alternative strategy for resolving the problem, selected tha.t strategy best
able to alleviate the problem and achieve the desired objectives with little or no residual effects, selected the most appropriate means of implementing the policy decision, and bestowed upon program administrators the
resources necessary for ensuring policy success.

Regreta.bly, but under-

standa.bly, these expectations are rarely, if ever, fully satisfied.

The

obstacles to rational policy-making are often insurmounta.ble.5

5 For an explanation of the obstacles to rational policy-making, see:
Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring, 1939), 79-88; David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963); Aaron Wildavsky,
The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964).
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Thus, in selecting a policy response to some perceived problem,
noms of rationality dictate that policy-makers must: (1) know all of
society's value preferences and their relative weights; (2) know all of
the policy alternatives available; (3) know all of the consequences of each
policy alternative; (4) calculate the ratio of achieved to sacrificed
societal values associated with each policy alternative; and (5) select
the most efficient policy alternative. 6 Due to problems of uncertainty,
however, elected officials may elect to either (a) take no action at all,
rather than risk program failure, or (b) delegate policy-making authority
to an agency they believe is better able to satisfy policy demands.

That

is to say, when confronted with an uncertain task environment in which
legislators may lack the necessary technical sophistication, organizational
ability, and/or political capacity to confront community needs, noms of.
rationality have operated to remove legislative bodies from their policymaking obligations.

And of the two possible courses of action or inaction,

delegations of authority to administrative agencies has led to the assumed but unexamined - dictum that power in modern society now centers in the
halls of public bureaucracies.
On the other hand, even when legislators do assume full policy-making
responsibility, the degree of uncertainty present is often such that policies tend to be formulated with incomplete knowledge of the totality of
the problem area and of the means by which community needs may best be satisfied.

Policies thus tend to be couched in tems of general outlays of

expenditures, with little or no explicit guidance as to the means b,y which

6 See, Yehezkel Dror, Public Policy-Making Re-examined (San Francisco: Chandler, 1968), Part IV.
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programs must be administered.

Hence, one way in which bureaucracies have

increased their overall strength in the policy process, though by no means
the only way, is through their interpretation and implementation of vague
and/or ambiguous policy guidelines.

In so doing, policies are modified,

if not actually made by administrators and bureaucrats.
It should be noted, however, that legislative inefficacy is not the
only, or the prime, reason for the advance of the administrative process.
Rather, many consider the administrative p:rocess to be the most capable
structure for fomulating policy responses to social, economic, envi:ronmental, and political complexities of modern-day government.

This argu-

ment stems from the general belief that only a specialized organization
possesses the necessary skills and expertise to make determinations conearning (1) what the desired outcomes of governmental activity should be,
and (2) cause/effect relationships.

In this sense, then, it is held

that administrators and career bureaucrats, who deal with specific societal p:ro blems on a day-to-day basis, enter the policy process with the
specialized knowledge necessary for making a rational assessment of the
problem and for deciding how the problem can best be resolved.

It is this

property of expertise that Max Weber saw as the attribute giving bureaucracy its dominant station in the policy process.
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization
has always been its purely technical superiority over any other

fonn of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism
compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with
the non-mechanical modes of production.
Under normal conditions, the power position of a fully developed
bureaucracy is always overpowering. The 'political master' finds
himself in a position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite the
'expert,' facing the trained offieial who stands within the management of administration.?

7 Excerpted in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1946), pp. 214, 232.
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Though it cannot be denied that fully developed bureaucratic organizations are technically superior to other fonns of organization, this
quality alone is not sufficient in accounting for the power potential of
bureaucracy.

Technical sophistication is a valuable resource, but it is

not a guarantee of power in decision-making.

Instead, Francis E. Rou:rlte,

in a most significant study of bureaucratic roles in policy-ma.k.ing, has
posited that the relative strength of an organization depends upon its
ability to achieve and maintain both internal and external sources of
power and support. 8 Internally, the ability of an agency to exercise a
degree of influence within the policy system depends upon its level of
expertise.

To this end, organization is itself one source of expertise.

Men and women joined in an organization are able to pool their resources,
their individual skills and experiences, and thereby achieve results
individuals acting alone could not hope to accomplish.

Consider a bureau-

cratic organization the size of an urban police force.

It cannot be de-

nied that the total resources of a police force in tenns of specialized
training, experiences, technology, and manpower places it in an advantageous position of specifying the needs and problems of the community
regarding law enforcement, thereby enhancing the probability that the advice given by its administrators to the city's elected representatives
will be adopted.

The same can be said regarding welfare agencies, public

works departments, sanitation departments, public housing bureaus, fire
departments, and highway departments, to name but a few.
Second, the urban bureaucracy is broken down into hundreds of units,

8 Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy,
Chapters I, II, et. passim.
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each of which is responsible for implementing decisions, recommending
governmental actions, and even fo%mulating policies in specific areas.
Bureaucrats can thus give concentrated attention to specific community
problems.

Able to study a problem on a day-to-day basis, bureaucrats

achieve a degree of technical sophistication and acquire a worlting knowledge of particular affairs which can only come from experience.

Third,

unlike elected public officials, bureaucrats enjoy a continuity in office
which makes it possible for this acquired knowledge to be put to public
service on a continuous basis.

There should thus develop continuity in

public policy which, as Peter Woll has emphasized, is a major factor for
the continuing support given the administrative branch. 9 And fourth,
the accumulation of specific knowledge, continuity in office, and concantrated attention to specific matters places administrators in the advantageous position of having a monopolistic or near monopolistic control of
the "facts."

Most often the facts gathered by administrators are not sub-

ject to independent verification or disproof.

Control of the facts thus

significantly increases the power of bureaucracies in the policy process.
We must ask, however, what specifically is this animal we call
bureaucracy?

That is, what requirements must an organization satisfy to

be considered a bureaucracy?

In response to this query, Max Weber offers

the following defining characteristics of the

bu:re~ucratic

structure:

1.

"The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way as official duties."
2. "A Specified sphere of competence ••• has been ma:r:Xed off as part
of a systematic division of labor ••• "

9 Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy, 2nd Ed. (New Yorlt: W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1977), p. 27.
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3. The official. is "subject to strict and systematic discipline
and control in the conduct of his office."
4. All operations are govemed by a "consistent system of abstract rules ••• and consist in the application of these rules
to particular cases."
5. "The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one."
6. Officials are "subject to authority only with respect to their
impersonal obligations."
7. "Candidates for bureaucratic positions are selected on the
basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this
is tested by examinations, or guaranteed by diplomas certifying
technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected."
8. Being a bureaucratic official "constitutes a career. There is
a system of promotions according to seniority or to achievement,
or both ...10
It was Weber's contention that if an organization is arranged on the basis
of specialization and hierarchical contml, and i f its members look upon
their employment as a career (thereby separating the private from the public aspects of their lives), organization, planning, and achievement of
11
organizational objectives will proceed in the most efficient manner.
However, to say that administrative agencies are efficient and to
say that they have an unequivocal hold on political power in urban society
are not synonymous declarations.

When we say that the public bureaucracy

is part of the community power structure we are, in effect, emphasizing
its ability to have its will successfully prevail.

Each department with-

in the bureaucratic network has interests it seeks to have supported by
the urban political system.
10

To the extent that the goals of administrators

Max Weber, Essays in Sociolos;y (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1946), 196-204; and Weber, The Tbeory of Social and Economic Or~izgtion
(NY: Free Press, 1947), 329-336. Summary reprinted in Peter M. Blau, ..T,be
Dvnamics of Burea.ucra.cy (Chgo: Univ. of Chgo. Press, 1955), pp. 1-2.
11
It should be noted that organizational principles of hierarchy
and specialization often results in the separ,ation of power from knowledge
(in the superordinate-subordinate relationship). This must be taken into
consideration in any discussion of the rationality of administrative decision-making.
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are accepted by or otherwise imposed upon city policy-makers, we can suggest that they have been influential.

To the extent that the goals of

administrators prevail over the will of others, and to the extent that
their activities have a direct impact on the performance and outcome of
urban policies, we can suggest that they have the potential to exercise
a significant degree of power in the community.

Thus, on the one hand,

administrators may influence the policy-making process by advising policymakers of al terna tive program strategies and policy objectives, and, on
the other ha.nd, may exercise its own style of power by (1) interpreting
vague and/or ambiguous policy statements in accordance with their own
specific policy orientations, (2) exercising its discretion in applying
policies in specific instances, and (3) substituting the initial objectives
of policy-makers with their own through processes of implementation.
Externally, the power of city administrators and career bureaucrats
depends upon their ability to mobilize political support from either (a)
the outside community, (b) the legislature, and/or (c) the executive
branch. 12 The greater the degree of public support for an agency's scope
of activities, the greater is the likelihood that it will exercise a significant degree of influence in the policy process.

Furthermore, the

delegation of legislative authority to administrative agencies has shifted
the general group struggle from the legislative to the administrative
arena.

While outside interests seek to influence agency action (and thereby

substantially affect the direction and impact of public policies), the
agency itself can benefit by the support of attentive groups.

This is

12
Rourke, BHreaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, Chapter II,
"The Mobilization of Political Support, 11 pp. 42::So, et. passim.
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especially evident in aJ.l instances in which city agencies are empowered
to bestow benefits, in the form of city contracts, to outside interests.
For example, city programs designed to improve the streets and highways, or park facilities, or to renovate existing structures, are not only
sought by the director of the department responsible for carrying out the
project but also by the outside construction firms, landscapers, cement
companies, land developers, among others, who_ stand to benefit via city
contracts.

These same parties seek to influence the policy process via

lobbying, campaign contributions, personal favors, and of course, through
graft.

Their part in the policy process serves to enhance the power of

the administrator responsible for the particular project.
From the foregoing discussion, we ca.n propose that the political
power of city administrators and career bureaucrats resides in their ability to determine the operational content of urban policies.

First, since

the public bureaucracy is considered expert in the area of its general
jurisdiction, and have almost complete control of the facts, the advice
and proposals of administrators are usuaJ.ly quite influential as the basis
for decisions made by elected officials.

Second, city administrators a.nd

career bureaucrats use outside group activity to impose their will on
city governors via lobbying, collective bargaining, public relations, and
even through threatened and actuaJ. strikes.

Third, and of even greater

significance, is the fact that since city administrators and public bureaucrats are delegated the authority to make decisions regarding the implementation of policies and programs, they have invariable opportunities
for (1) fixing their details and setting the boundaries of their appiication, and (2) reshaping all or portions of those policies they personally

120
disapprove of, thus making policy via selective enforcement or modified
implementation. 13
This power of discretion, i.e. , the ability of a public officer to
choose from among alternative courses of action or inaction, is the most
far-reaching and controversial source of administrative power, and the
one which has received the most attention from political scientists, in
generaJ., and administrative law theorists, in particular.

14

An adminis-

trator's potential for discretion results from the fact that city policies
and programs, as set forth in charter provisions, legislation, or executive
orders, are presented in the most general tenns and/or susceptible to
varying interpretations.

Thus those who implement city policy decisions

have continual opportunities for shaping the operational content of the
policy in accordance with their own

~erception

of what the program should

accomplish.
Remembering Weber's "ideal type," organizational behavior is guided
and constrained by a formal body of rules and regulations.

In actual prac-

tice, however, city administrators are often free to select not only from
among desired outcomes but also from among al terna tive means.

The ability

to exercise discretion in those instances in which such activity is not
strictly prohibited via clearly defined charters, legislative mandates,
or executive orders, or restrained by fonnal checks and "codes of conduct,"
has led to the assertion that "discretion is the very lifeblood of admin-

lJ Demetrios Cara.ley, City Governments and Urban Problems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 249.
14
See, Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Prelimin
Inquiry (Urbana, Ul: Uni v. of Ul. Press, 9
, et. ·p:t ssim •
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istra.tion. ,.l5 Although it is not sufficientiy clear whether the a.dm.inistra.tive process could function effectively without such powers, the im.pact of discretion on the scope and nature of bureaucratic power and on
intended policy objectives cannot be disputed.
The impact of administrative discretion can be seen in both the
everyday decisions of government agencies as well as in the major unprecedented, innovative, trend-setting activities of organizational life.
Herbert Simon has classified these two types of administrative decisions
as "programmed" and "non-programmed," respectively.
Decisions are pDOgrammed to the extent that they are repetitive and
routine, to the extent that a definite procedure has been wo:tKed
out for handling them so that they don't have to be treated de novo
each time they occur ••• Decisions are non-programmed ta the extent
that they are novel, unstructured, and consequential.l6
And elsewhere, James G. March and Herbert Simon have specified three va.rieties of the former and one of the latter type of discretionary decision.
First, when a program involves search activities, the actual course
of action depends on what is found. We may regard the choice of a
course of action after search as discretionary.
Second, when a program describes a strategy, application of the
strategy to specific circumstances requires forecasts or other estimates of data. We may regard the application of the strategy to
select a course of action as discretionary.
Third, a program may exist in the memory of the individual who is
to apply it, having arrived there either as a result of extraorganizational training (e.g., professional training or apprenticeship),
or as a product of learning from experiences rather than as a result

l5 See, Marshall E. Dimock, "The Role of Discretion in Modern Administration," inJohnM. Gaus, Leonard. D. White, andMarshallE. Dimock,
eds •. , The Frontiers of Public Administration (Chicago: University of Chgo.
Press, 1936), p. 59.
16 Herbert A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decisions (New
Yom: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. :.S:6.
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of fonna.l instructions. Under these circumstances we often regard
him as behaving in a discretionary fashion.l7
In each of these cases the decision

proce~s

may be regarded as highly

"routinized" and yet discretionary in tenns of the fonn of the performance
program or the source from which it was acquired.

As such, they must be

distinguished from the fourth meaning of discretionary:
A program may specify only general goals, and leave unspecified the
exact activities to be used in reaching them. Moreover, knowledge
of the means-ends connections may be sufficiently incomplete and inexact that these cannot be very well specified in advance. Then discretion refers to the development and modification of th~ performance
program through problem-solving and learning processes.l~
As Michael Lipsky has discussed with reference to "street level bureaucrats," the most routine, everyday decisions of government agencies
are representative of the discretionary potential of programmed acti vities. l9

Although it c~n be argued that the rank and file members of city

bureaucracies are constrained in their activities by rules and regulations
of the organization and that administrators of specialized departments
can exercise a significant degree of discretion in interpreting urban
policies and programs, Lipsky holds that, for the average citizen, the
activities of street level bureaucrats constitute the actual performance
of American government.

These are the people that citizens turn to for

help, and they are the people perceived to be the formal channels of
government.
To the average citizen, then, public policy is neither equivalent

17 James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations ( New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 148.
18
Ibid. ' p. 148-149.
l9 Michael Lipsky, "Stre~t Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of
Urban Reform," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6(June, 1971), 391-409.
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to what elected officiaJ.s say it is (i.e.", the verbaJ. or written declarations of intent as set forth in city charters, legislative mandates, or
executive orders), nor is it simply the proposed course of action with
its corresponding mobilization of resources.

Rather, policy manifests

itself through a series of actions or inactions and particular patterns
of behavior through which governing bodies seek to obtain particular objectives within a specified target population.

Consequently, from the

point of view of the citizen, who is in some way affected dally by the
activities of governing officiaJ.s, and even from the perspective of the
policy anaJ.yst concerned with a policy's impact on the environment, the
most important questions are not of policy fo:rmulation, but of policy
perfo:rmance.

Thus, when the focus of analysis shifts from the politics

of policy-making to an examination of actual and perceived policy outcomes,
attention naturally centers on those individuals and organizations that
can directly affect policy perfo:rmance through their chosen patterns of
behavior.

According to Lipsky (and this writer), it is the activities

of bureaucrats that have the greatest potential for dete:rmining the nature
of community life.
To be sure, the manner in which policies are implemented by administrators and career bureauc::ra.ts dete:rmines in large part their ope::ra.tionaJ. content and their ultimate consequence.

One of the basic problems

inherent in contempo::ra.ry studies of community power structures is that in
locating sources of community power they disregard the events following
the fo:rmulation and adoption phase of the policy process.

They thus

neglect to account for the dete:rmining impact of bureaucracy on the whole
of the policy process.

For example, consider the opportunities accorded
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street-level bureaucrats to make choices of significant importance:
1. Inspectorial personnel of different departments (e.g., health,
fire, buildings, ma:r::kets). Their largely unsupervisable failure to
enforce regulations against violators either because of laziness, inefficiency, or corruption leads to highly uneven burdens of compliance
among regulatees. If widespread enough, that failure of enforcement
negates regulatory policies adopted~ city government altogether.
(It may also be that various inspectors do not agree with the policy
as promulgated; that is, they may consider the offense minor, the
penalty too stiff, etc., and thus select to ignore the violation and,
in the process, formulate their own conception of what the policy
should actually promote).
2. Welfare casewo:r::kers. Their idiosyncratic leanings of openhandedness or t!gbt-fistedness can determine whether particular individuals will be accepted as welfare beneficiaries, what level of payments they will receive, and whether various special grants will be
awarded or denied.
3. Public school teachers, especially those in the lower grades
in slum ghetto schOols. Their attitudes, friendliness, energy, devotion, preparation, and effort will have a large impact on whether
the students in their classes will come to look at schools as places
of learning or as semipunitive custodial institutions.
4. Police officers. Their day-to-day discretionary acts decide
not only such insignificant events as which from a massive number of
traffic offenders actually will have to answer for their violations.
They also determine more weighty matters: the extent and openness of
illegal prostitution, drug-peddling, and gambling in various neighborhoods; the unnecessary "stopping and friskings" and excessive physical
force to which various parts of the citizenry, especially in slum
areas, will be subjected; and whether, in the process of police investigations of subjects, making arrests, or controlling mass demonstrations, various initial "incidents" will escalate into more serious
disruptions including riots.20

In all such cases, bureaucrats are undoubtedly making policy and exerting
substantial influence on community affairs through their various actions
and/or inactions.
This recognition of the relative power of bureaucrats to shape the
day-to-day operations of city governmental agencies and thus to directly

20

Michael Lipsky, "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of
Urban Reform," 391-409; Caraley, .QJ2.. cit., p. 252-253. For a more in-depth
analysis of police discretion, see: James Q. Wilson, varieties of Police
Behavior (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968); and Kenneth
Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, p. 8, et. passim.
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affect the performance of urban policies strikes at the ver.y center of our
present a.na.l.ysis.

Thl::oughout this paper we have suggested that the loca-

tion of political power in urba.n society cannot simply be viewed as a constellation of actors directly engaged in the formulation and adoption
phase of the policy process, or that it can be oompletely accounted for
merely b.y attempting to discover those factors hypothesized to be determinants of policy decisions.

Research devoted to discovering those social,

economic, demographic, and political factors responsible for particular
policy outputs and for explaining variations among states and communi ties
in terms of the types of policies promulgated, does not take into consideration variations within communities, or the idiosyncratic tendencies of
individual decision-makers.

Research endeavors of this type thus fail

to isolate initial factors from ultimate and determinative considerations.
Further, Lipsky's analysis of the discretionary potential of administrative actions raises serious questions about both elitist and pluralist
models of community power.

The conclusions of both perspectives suggest

that, first, the number of significant decision-makers is small, and that,
second, the potential influence of these participants derives from either
their social status in the community or from their positions of institutional leadership.

However, the failure of both approaches to examine the

set of actors involved in and the consequences of policy implementation
has led to a general neglect of the substantial institutional changes that
have occurred within the governmental process and of the rising significance
of functionally organized bureaucracies.

Unable or unwilling to fonnulate

and carr.y out specific policies for each and every community issue, city
policy-makers have transferred what amounts to legislative, executive, and
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judicial powers to administrative agencies, which a.re created, maintained,
and distinguished from others on the basis of functional responsibilities.
Each such agency (e.g., public housing, public wol.'ks, highways and street
departments, heal. th and hospi taJ. boards, police, fire, and sanitation departments), are bequeathed with significant degrees of governing authority
in its own functional sphere of expertise.

At the same time, each agency

develops its own organization, identifies its own vested interests, and
ultimately forms close ties with those special interest groups most affected by its actions.
This development has led many to reflect upon the implications of
. d emocrat"J.C socJ.e
" t"J.es. 21 J ohn J • Harrigan ' s "funca dmJ.. ni s t ra t"J. ve power J.n
22
2
tiona.l fiefdoms, "
and Theodore J. Lowi' s "functional feudali ties" J a.re
tezms which have been coined to describe the ties between city
cies and their related interest groups.

bureauc~

The contention is that cities are

now divided both geographically and functionally, that public bureaucracies
are near feudal lords in controlling policy decisions affecting their particular vested interests, and that these bodies a.re unaccountable to the
community and unaffected by electoral votes.

According to Lowi, they have

become the "new machines" in the urba.n political system:
The new Machines are machines because they are relatively irresponsible structures of power. That is, each agency shapes important

21

For example, see: Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society," in Roscoe C. Martin, ed., Public Administration and Democracy
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), 205-226.
22
John J. Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis (Boston:
Li tUe, Brown and Company, 1976), Chapter V.
2
3 Theodore J. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New Yol.'k: Free
Press, 1964), esp. , Chapter VII; and ''Machine Poll. tics - old and New."
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public policies, yet the leadership of each is relatively selfperpetuating and not readily subject to the controls of any higher
authority.
The New Machines are machines in that the power of each, while
resting ultimately upon services rendered to the community, depends
upon its cohesiveness as a smf?-1 minority in the midst of the vast
dispersion of the multitude.2
If the public bureaucracy is as important in the power st:ructure of

the community as many suggest, why does it not appear as such in the
elitist and pluralist models of community power?

The answer, we believe,

lies in the predisposition of political scientists to focus on the more
overt expressions of power, as demonstrated in the conflicts inherent in
the formulation and adoption phases of the policy process, at the expense
of the more complex process of implementation.

Prior to implementation,

the role of the bureaucrat in policy-making is relatively invisible to
the general public.

Unlike elected public officials, whose activities

are usually attended by news reports and public debate, the role of the
bureaucrat usually takes the less noticeable form of advising formal city
officers.

However, once public agencies are ent:rusted with full respon-

sibility for undertaking the means necessary to achieve policy objectives,
if not even for determining both the ends and means of governmental activity, the power of bureaucracies can no longer be underestimated or b:rushed
aside as a temporary aberration.

In order to state with any degree of

certainty the extent of such powers, it is necessary that we transfer the
present focus of the discipline to factors operating within processes of
policy implementation.

24 Lowi, "Machine Politics - Old and New,"~· cit., p. 86.

CHAPTER V
FROM POLICY OBJECTIVES 'IQ POLICY PERFOR1ANCE:
BUREAUCRATS AND THE IMPIEMENTA TION PROCESS

Despite the growing awareness of the influence of public bureaucracies in the American policy process, systematic research attempting
to link the activities of bureaucrats to the final outcomes of policy de-

cisions has only recently gained predominant interest.

Except for those

studies specifically concerned with bureaucm tic organization and behavior,
few attempts have been made to critically and systematically analyze the
implementation links between the initial formulation of policy objectives
and a policy's ultimate outcomes (perfomance).

Though many studies

(such as those reported in Chapter IV) have alluded to the potentially
significant power of program administrators and career bureaucrats in
determining the operational content of policy decisions, many analysts of
public policy seemingly support the rather naive assumption that a particular policy (P) implies or leads to specific and desired outcomes (0),
almost as if policies are themselves self-executing and their consequences
unfailingly predictable. 1 As Erwin Hargrove, however, aptly noted, policies do not themselves lead anywhere; instead they must be applied to the
problem area for which they are formulated. 2 Implementation, the process
1 This assumption is amply supported by the overriding concern given
to the identification of those elements and actors having either direct or
indirect influence on the policy-making process, as if once policies are
formula ted predictable consequences will naturally ensue.
2 Erwin Hargrove, The Missing Link: The Study of the Implementation
of Social Policy (Washington: The Urban Institute, l975), p. iv.
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through which ini tia.l policy decisions are tra.nsfo:cned into specific
government programs, is thus the missing link between policies and outcomes.
This being so, we should expect to find a rather detailed body of
literature devoted specifically to delineating how bureaucrats have a
deteminative impact on the policy outputs of decision-making bodies.
However, by divorcing processes of policy fonnulation from that of policy
implementation, researchers have thus far failed in their initial objective of formulating a positive theory of policy fomation.

By neglecting

to consider how bureaucrats and policy implementers may ultimately set the
policy agenda. as well as carry out programs in accordance with their own
personal policy predispositions, policy analysts have failed to bridge the
gap between policy objectives and policy performance.

Such considera. tions

are not to be found in the litera. ture of determinants analysis precisely
because both economists and political scientists have been unnecessarily
bounded by the professional and ideological predispositions of their disciplines.

Economists, for their part, initially set out to examine the

policy process guided not by a theoretical framewoxk but by a. conviction
that economic development ultimately determines the course of governmental
actions.

So strong was this conviction that most researchers did not find

cause to examine why the explanatory power of economic factors have a differential impact across expenditure categories or why the importance of
economic variables seem to decrease over time.
Political scientists, on ·the other hand, with their initial preoccupation with process characteristics, did not fully capture the significance
of socioeconomic conditions; and even when they did, almost two-thirds of
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the variation in outputs within and between policy areas remained unexplained.

For the most part, then, researchers interested in discovering

why certain policies are pursued by some governmental bodies but not by
others and why the degree of commitment varies even when they do decide
upon similar actions have thus far neglected to identify the nature of
the linkage between the environment and policy outputs, have not specified
the time span in which environmental constraints are operative, and have
not fully addressed the considerable amount of variation left unexplained
by the environmental, political, and few organizational variables utilized

to date)
One may suggest that part of the explanation for the dominance of
economic variables over the past two decades of dete:z:minants analysis by
both economists and poli tica.l scientists is attributable more to the default of the latter than to the theoretical insight of the fo:z:mer.

That

is, regardless of their theoretical significance, political scientists
have almost wholly relied upon such political factors as interparty competi tion, voter turnout, degree of refo:z:m possessed by govemmental structures, and party affiliation of decision-makers in measuring the extent to
which political characteristics influence the nature of policy outputs.
Conspicuously and unfortunately underrepresented in dete:z:minants analysis
are indicators of bureaucratic and organizational influences on the policy
process.

Thus, although it is well recognized that ever-increasing delega-

tions of authority to public bureaucracies have undeniably t:ransfo:z:med the
nature of American politics, the ever-expanding power of bureaucrats in

3 See, George W. Downs, Jr., Bureaucracy, Innovation, and Public
Policy, pp.

7-9.
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both the formulation and implementation of policy decisions is almost
wholly absent in the policy literature.

4

On the other hand, determinants analysis has succeeded in bringing
to light the determinative influence of the idiosyncratic value predispositions of decision-makers on the policy making process.5

Having dis-

covered that there does not exist one single determinant of all policy
decisions, researchers have had cause to propose that governments undertake policy activities in line with the individual policy positions and
value orienta tiona of those persons perceived to be influential in the
policy-making process.

This assumption has been at the root of a lengthy

body of li tara ture devoted to discovering the power-holders in community,

state, and national decision-making.

Underlying such research is the

belief that a so-called "power-class," consisting of individuals a,.nd
interests capable of having their will prevail in the policy process,
ultimately determines the very nature of governmental activity.

Method-

ologically, such influentials have been identified by either their

(1)

reputations for power, (2) social class, (J) institutional position, or
by their ( 4) direct participation in the fonnal decision-making process.
Power has thus been equated only with those parties perceived to be of
some influence in establishing governmental priori ties in the initial
processes of policy-making.

In this sense, the exercise of power is no

longer considered once the preliminary conflicts governing the selection
of particular policy positions are resolved.

And, accordingly, policy

4 For example, see Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, passim.

5 See, Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, Labyrinths of Democracy:
Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Pol1c1es in Urban Politics.
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implementation is perceived as a relatively simple process of carrying
out rather mundane decisions consistent with a policy's original objectives.
Thus, in neither the literature of dete:minants analysis nor in
analyses of political power structures do we find what can be considered
a legitimate attempt to link activities in the policy-making process with
what ultimately transpires once administrators assume responsibilities
of implementation.

Although we would expect policy implementers to be

of theoretical significance to both determinants research and power analyses, they are not included in the methodological designs of either concern.

This is especially troublesome when we consider that an extensive

and well-developed body of theoretical and case study material has repeatedly emphasized the fact that an ever-increasing proportion of policy
decisions are being made by bureaucrats.

The literature of administrative

law and organization theory has info:med us that extensive delegations
of authority to administrative agencies have created a situation in which
bureaucracies structure policy agendas, define the alternatives for
elected officials, exercise a significant degree of discretion in the
initial interpretation and ultimate application of statutory objectives,
and ultimately wield great autonomy in administrative decision-making.
Despite this g:rowing body of li tara ture cognizant of the ever-increasing power of the bureaucracy, determinants research severely underrepresents bureaucratic or organizational variables in its analysis and
political power studies fail to examine how power is exercised most effectively qy those parties engaged in processes of implementation.

And

though we continue to be told that the wo:ddngs of administrators are
important, implementation still remains the lost and neglected element in
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the policy p:rocess.

As Jeffrey Pressman and A.a:ron Wildavsky recently

lamented, considering the fact that everything in public policy ultimately revolves around processes of implementation, the absence of an
implementation literature lies as an unsolved mystery in policy research. 6
Their bewilderment was expressed in no uncertain terms:
There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementation in the social sciences - or so we have been told by numerous people. None of them can come up with specific citations to
this literature, but they are certain it must exist ••• It must
be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a
kind of semantic illusion at wol:k here because virtually everything ever done in public policy or public administration must,
in the nature of things, have some bearing on implementation.
Analytical study (as opposed to mere mention) of implementation
seems so eminently reasonable that few can imagine it does not
exist. Nevertheless, except for the few pieces mentioned in the
body of this book, we have been unable to find any significant
analytic woik dealing with implementation.?
To a certain extent one cannot help but shar9 Pressman and Wildavsky's dissatisfaction over the direction policy studies have taken to
date and of the secondary status accorded the actors engaged in administe:ring policy decisions.

However, several factors other than short-

sightedness have accounted for this development.

First, researchers have

been inclined to support the general assumption that the greatest political conflicts concern the manner in which particular issues are selected
out of the host of demands for government attention.

In this sense, then,

researchers have been most interested in those conflicts inherent in (1)
the selection of policy alternatives, (2) the specification of resource

6
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Beikeley:
Univemi ty of California Press, 1973). Contained herein is a masterful
treatment of implementation within an analytic framework combined with an
in-depth case-study.
7 Ibid.' p. 267.
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commitments, and (3) the delineation of policy objectives.

Studies fol-

lowing this perspective have further assumed that once such conflicts
are resolved the resulting policy will be implemented as directed and
that the ultimate outcomes will be near those anticipated by the policymakers.

In holding that most of the significant conflicts ha.ve been re-

solved with the adoption of a particular policy, researchers have been
inclined to view implementation as a series of rather simple and mundane
decisions consistent with statutory directives.

Political scientists,

especially, have tra.di tionally confined their analyses to conflicts inherent in the making of policy, thereby ignoring the shift of conflict
to the administrative arena in the process of implementation.
Second, the general call for a scientific analysis of political
phenomenon has led to a ra.dicaJ. proliferation of studies in which researchers can employ statistical methods of contemporary social science.
This has created an enonnous wealth of research devoted to finding correlational, if not even causal (which many determinants analysts mistakenly
assume is statistically possible) relationships between quantitative
indicators of economic, political, and social variables and quantifiable
policy outputs (thereby ignoring qualitative assessments of policy outputs).
And where concepts are employed where operationalization is especially
difficult (e.g., power and influence), researchers have used indirect
indicators (e.g., an individual's reputation, institutional position, or
social class) or measures which do not adequately envelop every possible
manifestation of the concept (e.g., direct participation in the decisionmaking process).

Implementation analysis, on the other hand, raises

serious methodological obstacles.

The actors engaged in administering

1)5

policy decisions are difficult to identify, their decisions impossible
to isolate, and the time dimension of their activities beyond boundary
specification.

Unable to clearly measure, if not identify, the signifi-

cant bureaucratic and organizational ingredients of the administrative
process, researchers have been unable to apply contemporary methodologies
to implementation analysis.
And, third, policy implementation has proven to be of greater
interest to policy-makers, who are concerned about the successful application of their programs, than to policy analysts, who have evidenced a
greater concern for the processes of policy formulation.

This latter

concern has created a general desire to analyze the worldngs of and interactions between formal institutions of government.

By focusing on the

activities of formal governmental bodies 1 policy analysts have unwittingly
deemphasized the role of public bureaucracies in transforming initial objectives into meaningful policy outcomes.

So conceived, implementation

is treated as an administrative, rather than as a significantly political,
concern.

Such analytic frameworks have failed to capture the dynamic

nature of the policy process, and have thereby tended to maintain the
long disputed constitutional and normative "politics-administration"
dichotomy.
However important these three factors may once have been in deterring policy analysts from systematically considering the politics of
implementation as an independent variable related to the ultimate performance of public policies, a review of the literature reveals that implementation studies are not only on the upswing, but also that efforts
outside the immediate realm of public policy contain bits and pieces of

1J6
the multi tude of factors necessary for an understanding of policy impl.ementation.

For the most part, however, this literature owes its emergence

not to some general desire to increase one's understanding of the :role of
bureaucrats in the policy process, but rather to a demand for greater efficiency in the initial making of policy.

Tha. t is, starting with the

assumption that policies fail to achieve specified objectives due to
problems inherent in processes of administration, implementation analysis
has recently emerged as a useful tool for policy-makers.
For example, prior to the massive social refonn programs of the
Johnson Administration and the accompanying decline in expectations of
even -the most optimistic refonners, the systematic study of implementation had been relatively neglected in most a.na.lyses of public policy.
In fact, until most recently implementation had been totally ignored by

some, briefly mentioned by others, and defined but not analytically
specified by still others,

However, the actual or presumed failure of

various policies in the mid-1960s and early 1970s have set in motion a
number of efforts addressing the general question of why programs fail ·
to achieve their desired objectives in such fields as education,

8

8

health

Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education
Administers a Law (Syracuse: Symcuse University Press, 1968); David K.
Cohen, "Politics and Research: Evaluation of Social Action Programs in
Education," Review of Educational Research, 40 (April 1970), 213-238;
Jerome Murphy, "Ti Ue I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal
Education Refonn," Harvard Educational Review, 41 (February 1971), 3..563; Jerome Murphy, State Education Agencies and Discretionary Funds
(Lexington, Mass: Lex~ngtOn BOoks, 1974); Milbrey W. McLaughlin, Evaluation and Refonn: The Elementa
d Se
da
Educatio Act of 1 6
Title I Cambridge, Mass: Lexington Ballinger Pub., 1975 ; Milbrey W.
McLaughlin, "Implementation of ESEA Ti tJ.e I: A Problem of Compliance,"
Teachers College Record, 77 (February 1976), 397-415; Paul Be:rman,
"Implementation of Educational Innovation," The Educational Forum, 40
(March, 1976), 347-370.

137
care, 9 economic development, 10 environmental protection, 11 civil rights, 12
and income redistribution. 13 Attempts have thus surfaced which seek to
account for the too frequent radical gap between the intentions of policymakers and the actual perfonnance of adopted programs.

This has pre-

cipitated a consequent shift from addressing how policies are fonnulated
to how they are implemented (as i f programs fail merely because of inefficiencies and decay in the implementation process).
This shift also evidences a recent reawakening to the oft-noted
belief that the words of a statute do not in and of themselves resolve
conflict or precipitate change.

Rather, statutory constructions set in

motion the process whereby initial goals are tra.nsfonned into explicit
policy decisions (outputs) which are, in turn, modified and applied to a
particular set of conditions having certain consequences (outcomes).
Kenneth Dolbeare and Phillip Hammond have noted this pattem of activity
in no uncertain tenns:

9 Eugene Ba.rdach, The Skill Factor in Politics: Re eali
the Mental
Commitment Laws in California Berkeley: University of Calif Press, 1972).

10 Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wild.a.vsky; op. cit.; Carl Van Hom,
"Implementing CETA: The Federal Role, .. Policy Aiialysis, 4 (Spring 1978),
159-183.
11 A. Myrick Freeman, III and Robert H. Haveman, "Clear Rhetoric and
Dirty Water," The Public Interest (Summer 1972), 51-65; Henry Jacoby and
John Steinbruner, Cleam.ng the AJ.r (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1973); Charles
Jones, Clean Air (PJ.ttsburg: Pittsburg University Press, 1975); Paul Downing
and Gordon Brady, "Implementing the Clean Air Act: A Case Study of Oxidant
Control in Los Angeles," Natural Resources Journal, 18 (April 1978), 237-

284.
12 Fred Wirt, The Politics of Southe:rn Equality (Chicago: Aldine, 1970);
Harrel Rodgers and charles BUllock, Coercion
Lexington Books, 1976).

to

COmpliance (Lexington, Mass:

13
For example, see: Gilbert Y. Steiner, The State of Welfare (Washington, D.C: Brookings, 1971); Theodore R. Marmor, ed., Poverty Policy
(New York: Aldine/Atherton, Inc., 1971).
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Very litUe may really be decided by the words of a decision or a
statute: the enunciation of such na.tionaJ. policy may be just the
beginning of the decisive process detemining what will happen to
whom, and undeJ:Standing this further stage is essential to a full
undeJ:Standing of politics .14
For the most part this concern had initially prompted a number of
atheoretical case studies identifying the factors threatening successful
implementation in specific policy areas: education, health care, economic
development, urban planning, environmental protection, civil rights and
poverty.

Al trough such studies have increased our general understanding

of the implementation process in particular areas, their claims to genel:'ali ty are questionable because (1) the cases cannot easily be compared;
(2) they apply to a specific set of circumstances; and (.3) they use tenns
peculiar to the context and in the jargon of specific policy sectors.
Further, most studies of implementation consider problems endemic within
one level of a policy sector or, at most, between two levels.

Such

analyses thus fail to document and examine the whole of the complex
chain from policy input to outcomes.

And, finally, far too little at-

tention had been given to the breadth of power exercised by public bureaucracies in determining the operational content of policy decisions and
thus the ultimate outcomes of government activity.
In a sense, although it may be argued that one can construct an
integrated model of the implementation process illuminating the significant
role played by bureaucracies by drawing bits and pieces from the studies
of implementation in unrelated areas, such efforts have proven info:rmative

14

Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, The School Prayer
Decisions: From Court Poli@ to Local Practice (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, l971), p. 1 •
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yet inadequate.

To date, attempts at integrating the findings of rather

dispa.ra.te case studies of implementation have focused on a variety of
factors that may either aid or hinder successful implementation, some of
which may be manipulated by the policy framers.

The argument posed by

such conceptual framewol:ks is that in order to ensuxe achievement of policy
objectives, policy makers must be cognizant of the multi tude of elements
affecting the application of their policy to a particular set of circumstances.

Policies cannot then be fomulated in a manner insulated from

problems of implementation.

Instead, various characteristics of the in-

terna.l and external environment of im.plementa tion must be made a part of
the initial discussion concerning the setting of goals and commitment of
resources.

The output of such efforts has been the presentation of

various recipes useful in gauging the potential realization of policy
objectives.
Thus far, eight major efforts have sought to provide such conceptual
integration to the analysis of policy implementation and to thereby place
individual and unrelated case studies within their wider sectoral context.
In one of the initial attempts, Thomas B. Smith offered what one can define as a st:rategizing model of the implementation process.

In so doing,

Smith pmmpted a number of competing models proclaiming specific strategies
for use by policy-makers in minimizing those disruptive tensions which can
result in a mismatch between policy outcomes and policy expectations.
Starting with the premise that policy implementation serves as a tension
generating fo roe in society, Smith reasoned that in applying policies
tensions are generated between and within four components of the implementation process: idealized policy, implementing organization, target

group, and environmental factors.

Any such tension in implementation

may result in various transaction pa. tterns (which may further crysta.J.~ize
into institutions) that may or may not ensure a perfect match between
policy expectations and policy outcomes.

And, finally, transaction pa. t-

terns and institutions may again generate tensions which, via feedback

to policy-makers and implementers, may support or reject further implementation of the policy. 15
A second effort to construct a model of policy implementation was
undertaken two years later by Donald Van Meter and Carl Van

Horn~ 16

Recog-

nizing the interrelationship between policy fomulation and policy implementation, they followed the pa.ttems set by Theodore J. Lowi 17 and Lewis
A. Fmman

18

in constructing a theoretical framework which takes into ac-

count the variable nature of the implementation process on the basis of
policy types.

They thus reasoned that policies can be classified by two

distinguishing characteristics: "the amount of change involved, and the
extent to which there is goal consensus among the participants in the

15

Thomas B. Smith, "The Policy Implementation Process," Policy
Sciences, 4 (1973), 197-209.
16
Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn, "The Policy Implements. tion
Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration and Society, 6(Feb. 1975),
No. 4, 445-488. A second version of the~r framework di'Opped the twovariable classification of policies (i.e., amount of change involved and
degree of goal-consensus). See Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Implementation of Intergovernmental Policy," in Charles 0. Jones and Robert Thomas
( eds.), Public Policy-Making in a Federal System, Vol. J (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 39-62. For an application of this model
to a specific policy area, see: Van Horn, "Implementing CETA: The FederaJ.
Role," Policy Analysis, 4 (Spring 1978), 159-18).
17 Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies,
and Political Theory, World Politics, 16 (July 1964), 667-715.
18
Lewis A. Froman, "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in
Austin Ranney ( ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Mai.'kha.m, 1968), 41-52.
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implementation process • .,l9

Having then fomulated a number of variable

relationships between policy type and the execution of public policy,
Van Meter and Van Horn set forth a systems model of the implementation
process oonsisting of six major factors affecting progmm perfonnance:
(l) policy standards and objectives; (2) policy resources (basically
funds but including other forms of incentive); (3) inter-organizational
communication and enforcement activities; (4) characteristics of the
implementing agencies; (5) economic and social conditions; and (6) the
disposition of implementers.

20

Third, unlike the first two efforts which outlined a fonn of

"strategizing behavior model" for policy makers, Walter Williams emba.rlted upon an alternate route focusing on the role of the policy
. the anal ys1s
. and assessment o f 1mp
. l ementat"1on. 21
a na.lys t 1n

In so

doing Williams presented a somewhat idealized six stage process characterizing what ought to occur when major social policy decisions are
made or when a large and complex social experiment is undertaken.
First, decision-makers should move from preliminary specification to

(2) identification of policy alternatives to (3) explicit policy decisions.

Implementation, the stage between policy decisions and

ultimate operations, then starts with the development of ( 4) program
guidelines or design specifications; moves to (5) what may be a lengthy
stage of field implementation involving the worldng through of a myriad

l9
p.

Van Meter and Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process,"

4.58.
20

21

~-, pp. 462-478.

Walter Williams, "Implementation Analysis and Assessment,"
Policy Analysis, I (Summer 1975), 531-566.
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of technical, administrative, staff,and institutional problems that face
a new activity; and (6) ends when the specific experiment is ready to
test or when the nonexperimental activity is judged fully opera. tional.

22

Once having ouUined an admittedly abstract model of the sequence
from policy fomulation to field operations, Williams presented four
questions decision-makers must address when considering major program
innovations: what is the likelihood that an innovation "1) will produce
positive outcomes?; (2) will be accepted by higher-level decision-makers?;

(J) can be put in place properly with available resources?; and (4) will
be accepted by those in the field who must either implement or operate

2
the innovation?" J
~dentifying

The function of implementation analysis then involves

those elements affecting decision-makers' responses to

questions (.J) and (4).

That is, implementation analysis "should investi-

gate (1) the technical capacity to implement, (2) political feasibility,
and (.J) the technical and political strategies for implementation. "

24

Implementation assessment, on the other hand, attempts to measure the
change in the actual outputs of orga.niza tions after the introduction of
an innovation. 2 5 In all cases analysis and assessment must be undertaken
throughout the policy process rather than after policy decisions are implemented.
Fourth, Martin Rein and Francine F. Rabinovitz have offered a
theoretical framework of implementation emphasizing three potentially

22
lli£·' PP • 5.32-5.37.
2.3 Ibid., p. 551ff.
24
~., p. 5.58·
25
p. 560.
Ibid.'
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conflicting imperatives confronting program administrators: "the legal
imperative to do what is legally required; the rationaJ.-burea.ucratic
impemtive to do what is rationally defensible; a.nd the consensual imperative to do what ca.n establish agreement among contending influential
parties woo have a. stake in the outcome. "

26 They thus suggest tha.t the

politics of implementation ca.n be best understood a.s an attempt to resolve conflicts among these impera.ti ves •

The manner in which such

conflicts are resolved is a. function of the purposes (their clarity,
saliency, and consistency), the resources (kind, level, and timing),
and the complexity of the administrative process of implementation. " 27
Fifth, somewha. t akin to Rein a.nd Rabinovitz's cla.ssifica. tion of
conflicting imperatives besetting implementers, Paul Beman has focused
on the rational-bureaucratic and consensual imperatives in describing
how the problem of policy failure ca.n be understood only by distinguishing
between macro- and micro-implementation.

28

In so doing, Berman started

with the assumption that implementation problems stem primarily from
the interaction of a. policy with its institutional. setting.

Since federal

policy takes shape in a. highly interactive setting in which many actors
compete for controlling voice in detennining the benefactors of government
policy, and since policy tends to become transmuted by successive levels
of implementing operations, local deliverers, rather than fede:ra.l

26 Martin Rein and Francine

F. Rabinovitz, "Implementa. tion: A
Theoretical Perspective," in Walter Dean Burnham a.nd M. W. Weinberg (EDS)
American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge: MIT, 1978), 307-335; at 308.
27
.
Ibid., p. 333.

28-

Paul Beman, "The Study of Macro- and Mic:ro-Implementa tion,"
Public Policy, 26 (Spring 1978), 157-184.
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administrators, tend to possess the power to dete:rmine policy outcomes.
Within the local system, on the other hand, implementation consists of
the mutual adaptation of the local policy and local organizational
characteristics.

This adaptation inevitably leads to uncertainty in

how policies will be implemented.

In both instances, policy is repeatedly

adjusted by federal bureaucracies resistant to change and by local service
deli very organizations sensitive to their political environments.
Sixth, Eugene Ba:rda.ch, concentrating on the strategizing behavior
of various actors within the implementation process, likened implementation
to a series of games in which program administrators and policy-makers

compete for ultimate control of program elements necessary for realizing
specific outcomes. 29

And, in accounting for the failure of most policies

to achieve statutory objectives, Bardach listed: (l) dive:rsion of resources
•
to private actors or bureaucratic empire-building; (2) deflection of
program goals overtime; ( 3) inability of program managers to assemble
the necessary support because of resistance, lack of qualified personnel,
etc., and (4) the general dissapation of energies as actors seek to protect
turf, avoid responsibility, and enhance their reputations.J0
Seventh, though not an explicit conceptualization of the implementation process, Richard F. Elmore has noted the futility of present efforts
designed to explain policy failures by focusing on the process by which
policies are translated into administrative action via implementation
wi trout a working knowledge of how organizations work. 3t
29

Instead of

The Implementation Game (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977).

30 ~·, Chpts 3-6; especially pp. 51-57.
3t Richard F. Elmore, "Organizational Models of Social Program
Implementation," Public Policy, 26 (Spring 1978), 185-228.
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constructing a single analytic model of the implementation pzocess, the
present body of organizational theory contains four distinct models, each
of which maintains an alternative view of implementation and bureaucratic
behavior.
The systems management model treats organizations as value-maximizing units and views implementation as an ordered, goal-directed
activity. The bureaucratic process model emphasizes the roles of
discretion and routine in organizational behavior and views implementation as a process of continually controlling discretion and
changing routine. The organizational development model treats the
need of individuals for participation and commitment as paramount
and views implementation as a process in which implementers shape
policies and claim them as their own. The conflict and bargaining
model treats organizations as arenas of conflict and views implementation as a bargaining process in which the participants converge on tempomry solutions but no stable result is ever reached. 32
And, finally, Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian are presenUy
wo:ddng on what thus far appears to be the most comprehensive and analytical treatment of the implementation process, especially in tenns of how
various implementation problems affect regulatory policy objectives.33
Starting with the basic proposition that the goal of implementation
analysis is to identify the factors affecting the achievement of statutory
objectives throughout the policy process, Sabatier and Mazmanian have
identified three major independent variables opemting within the stages
of implementation: (1) the tractability of the problem(s) being addXessed
by the statute; (2) the ability of the statute to favorably structure

the implementation process; and (3) the net affect of a variety of

4

'political' variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives.3

32 Ibid., pp. 185-186.

33 ~ Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian, "Toward A More Adequate Conceptualization of the Implementation Process --- With Special Reference
to Regulatory Policy," MS (July, 1978).
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Collectively and singularly these variables affect one or more of the
five stages of the implementation process:

(a) policy outputs of imple-

menting agencies; (b) compliance with policy outputs by taxget groups;
(c) actual impacts of policy outputs; (d) pe:rcei ved impacts of policy
outputs; and (e) major revision in statute.J5
Unlike previous frameworks which focused almost exclusively on the
individual st:ra.tegizing behavior of major actors in the policy process,
Sa.batier and Mazmanian have offered a more analytic specification of
variables affecting successful implementation.

Although also concemed

with providing basic strategies for improving program perfo:mance, they

rejected earlier models which divorce individual st:ra.tegizing behavior
from both socio-economic conditions and statutory variables which ultimately dete:mine what, if any, actions are taken by policy implementers.
And of the two, the manner in which statutes structure the implementation
process by (1) the number of veto/clearance points; (2) the fo:mal access
of various actors to the implementation process; and to some extent, (3)
the policy predispositions of implementing officials, is most important
for understanding the politics of implementation.
Collectively, antecedent case studies and these efforts at conceptual
integration provide a reasonably sufficient overview of how policy decisions
are t:ra.nsfo:med irito explicit program outputs and of the variety of factors
that can either assure or impede successful implementation.

Along the

way researchers have (1) identified implementation problems in specific
policy-areas; (2) suggested how various social, economic, political,

35 Ibid., especially Figure I, page 7.
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historical, and cultu:ra.l factors affect the behavior of policy-makers and
policy implementers; (3) identified the role of the policy analyst in
determining the causes of policy failure and for suggesting ways in which
policy-makers can improve policy perfomance; ( 4) offered blue-print
formulas for increasing and improving individual strategizing behavior
of actors engaged in various stages of the policy process; and (5)
critically assessed the organizational models of social program implementation.
Now although such efforts have looked at implementation from a
number of alternative perspectives and have concentrated on a number of
dissimilar variables, they nonetheless seem to converge on three areas of
gene:ra.l agreement:

(1) There seems to be a commonly held conception of

the meaning of implementation and the nature of the implementation problem.
(2) Researchers seem to agree that a policy's implementation problems
derive not from its design, but rather from its :relationship to its institutional setting.

(3) Most :researchers consider the study of the imple-

mentation process as a process, essential for identifying key policy

6

levers in the social policy arena. 3

For the most part, however, analyses of the politics of implementation tend to digress to the point of providing strategic portfolios for
policy-makers, rather than analytic discussions of the interrelationship
between policy-making and policy implementation.

In addition, they a:re

guided (at least implicitly) by a model of the policy process which can
no longer be accepted unequivocably.

In general, studies of policy imple-

mentation have focused almost exclusively on factors threatening achievement

6
3 Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation," p. 159.
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of policy objectives and in so doing have d.escri bed a myriad of factors
that must be considered, and even controlled and manipulated by policymakers in the process of policy development.

In addition, implementation

problems have ordinarily been classified as problems of coordination and
control, or of bargaining among a number of competing interests.

Thus,

rather than describing the manner in which implemente:rs ultimately determine the operational content of policy decisions and thereby exercise a
degree of power in the policy process which may ~ beyond the control and
manipulation of policy-makers, present conceptualizations of the implementation process assume that a number of variables affecting bw:eaucmtic
behavior can be manipulated by policy-makers.

The P9li tical, organiza-

tional, technical, and personal powers of bureaucracies have thus been
either totally neglected (as being unverifiable or subject to change),
simply denied, or conceived as a tempo:ra.ry aberration.
One possible reason for the continual neglect of bureaucmcies by
policy analysts has been the assumption of hierarchy in organizations.
That is to say, integral to all past discussions of implementation has
been the assumption that the closer individuals and governmental units
are to policy formulation, the greater is their influence on policy development and thus on the outcomes of political activity.

And, from the other

extreme, the closer they are to applying policy, the less is their direct
influence on policy.

When policy is made and implemented within a single

organization, researchers have asstUiled that policy is set by actors at
the top of the agency who then delegate responsibility for implementing
their policy decisions to subordinates.

And, when policy is made by

elected bodies (e.g. , city councils) and then passed on to the head of
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some particular department functionally related to the policy area being
addressed, it has been assumed that (1) policy makers establish the objectives and manner of government action, (2) department heads follow
faithfully the directives of policy-makers, and (3) members of the implementing agency carry out specific p::rogra.ms in a manner consistent with
the objectives established by superiors.
For heuristic purposes, the assumption of hierarchy has worked
quite well in bringing a sense of order to a rather complex and p::roblematic p::rocess.

If one accepts the classic Weberian contention that the

ideal relationship between superiors and subordinates is one where policies are made by top level officials and then passed on to and faithfully implemented by subordinates whose discretion is acutely limited,
then policy analysts may then have been justified in addressing their
attention to questions of coordination, control, and compliance in implementing agencies.

However, several studies have shown that the re-

lationship between policy objectives of elected officials and actions of
implementing agencies and between top level officials and actions of the
bodies they direct are at best problematic.

It is often the case that

the intentions of policy-makers do not guide the behavior of policy-implemente:rs.

Thus when the assumption of hierarchy breaks down, no clear

line can be drawn between policy-makers and policy-implementers; operationally, they become one and the same.
For example, studies have recorded the extraordinary power of such
"lower-participant" g::roups as attendants in mental hospitals, maintenance

37 T.J. Scheff, "Cont::rol Over Policy By Attendants in a Mental
Hospital," Journal of Health and Human Behavior, 2(1961), 93-105.
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worl:.ers in factories, 38 forest rangers, 39 patrolmen, 40 school teachers, 41
and social worl:.ers

42

in pursuing courses of action inconsistent with or

in direct opposition to the policy directives of superiors that it can
no longer be assumed that the intentions of policy declarers are always
authoritative.

Indeed, if it is true that different actors in the policy

process not only have a degxee of authority over some aspect of the policy
environment but also differing sets of objectives, then it cannot be
assumed that there is one single objective governing behavior.

When ob-

jectives are hard to identify, as they so often are when different participants dominate different stages from policy development to policy implementation, analyses based solely on comparisons between policy outcomes
and initial (and somewha.t ideal) expectations tend merely to lend gxea ter
confusion to an already complex and muddied process.
These criticisms notwithstanding, present efforts at conceptualization treat policy-making by lower-participants as deviations fiDm the
general pattern.

They thus posit as the norm a pattern of policy activity

whereby elected officials or individuals highest in the fonnal chain of
command in organizations establish policy objectives and ultimately end
with an inventory of factors accounting for the gap between intentions
and outcomes as realized by implementing agencies.

38 M. Crozier, The Bureaucra. tic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1964).
39 Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1960).
40 James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968).
41 Richard Weatherley and Michael Lipsky, "Street-Level Bureaucrats
and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Refonn,"
Harvard Educational Review, 47, No. 2 (May, 1977), 171-197.
42 T.H. Marshall, Social Policy in the 20th Century (London:
t.T,+,.n-iT'IC>I'"\-n TTT'I-i~r..,,..l',dt.v Librarv. 1965).
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Integral to so many case studies of the relationship between

supe~

iors and subordinates (or between policy-makers and policy-implementers)
has been the general conclusion that the gap between intentions and outcomes cannot be empirically supported as a departure from some presumed
nonn.

Instead, many students of complex organizations view

policy-making as manifestations of a general pattern.
for one, has suggested that

lowe~participants

lowe~level

David Mechanic,

(by acquiring control over

pe:rsons, resources, communication channels and info:rma.tion flow, and
instrumentalities) can wield a significant degree of power in determining
the operational content of policy decisions that is not ordinarily associated with their fonnal positions. 43

In fact, when the full breadth of

administrative power is considered we find that organizations "are
continuously at the mercy of their lower participants. "
These studies of

lowe~participant

44

group activity thus infonn us

that we should not expect to find a perfect fit between one's position
in an organization's hierarchical chain of command and the amount of
power an individual possesses within the policy process.

Recognizing

this apparent mismatch, Lawrence Baum has proposed that "instead of viewing
any power possessed by lower participants as aberrant, we may begin with
the assumption that they alone will determine the content of the policies

4

they execute." 5 Thus, rather than starting with the basic assumption
that the superior-subordinate relationship is such that implementing

43 David Mechanic, "Sources of Power of wwer Participants in
Complex Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly,7(Dec. 1962), 349-64.
44
Ibid., p. 351.

~nee Baum., "An Organizational Theory of Judicial Impact." Ohio
State Uni ve:rsi ty (mimeo); quoted in Van Meter and Van Hom, "The Policy
Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," p. 4_56.
45
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agencies are guided by explicit directives from policy-makers and that
they will consequently act in a manner consistent with policy objectivesr
we should instead "discover the forces which counteract autonomy :rather
than taking them for granted. "

46

One cannot then understand the politics of implementation without
first recognizing that there are many instances when those charged with
carrying out policy are accorded substantial latitude.

This is especially

evident in areas :where public employees (such as social worlters, teachers,
police officers, inspectors, judges, parole officers, and the like) are
oftentimes required to use discretion in their inte:ractions with citizens.
Such ind.ivi duals effectively mci.ke policy ehenever they are free to choose
not only from among alternative means but even from among alternative ends.
Thus, it is their behavior, and not that of the policy-developer, that
should set the focal point in understanding the problematic nature of the
implementation process.
When it is finally admitted that many implementers (or lower participant groups) do indeed ultimately make policy, then it only seems na.tu:ral
for implementation analysts to focus on those who are charged with administering policy :rather than on those who are said to fo:rmally make and
convey it.

Or, as Michael Lipsky has cryptically proposed, implementers

often enjoy such substantial latitude that "studies of implementation
should be turned on their heads. " 47

Instead of focusing on how policy-

46 Ibid.
47 ~el Lipsky, "Standing the Study of Public Policy Implementation on its Head, " in Walter Dean Burnham and Martha. Weinberg ( eds.) ,
American Politics and Public Policy (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1978),
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makers can achieve their initial objectives, policy analysts should focus
on how the processes of implementation are experienced by policy deliverers.
Thus, "rather than considering them at the end of a policy chain, the
policy deliverers would instead be seen as primary actors. ,4a
This is not meant to suggest that those who carry out policy are in
all instances free to deviate from the path prescribed by their superiors,
but rather that there are numerous conditions when both inter- and extra.organizational control mechanisms are so weak that assumptions of hierarchy and authority cannot be· taken for granted.

This would seem to be

the case when policy implementers (1) operate under conditions of wide
discretion; (2) operate within a context of multiple objectives and the
policy in question is not salient enough to warrant strict monitoring by
superiors; and (J) confront proposed shifts in ongoing practices to which
they have formed particular preferences.49

When any of these conditions

prevail, policy implementers will be found to wield substantial power in
both blocking realization of intentions of policy-makers and in deciding
what should actually transpire based upon their own policy predispositions.
Given this extensive and well-developed body of theoretical and
case study material devoted to analyses of bureaucratic decision-making
containing repeated documentation of the increasing power of bureauc:racies
in processes of policy implementation, policy analysts have nonetheless
failed to capitalize on such findings in contemporary detenninants research.

That is to say, given the recognized power of bureaucracies in

determining the operational content of public policies and thus in determining the ultimate outcomes of policy decisions, we should expect to find

48 Ibid., p. J98.
49

~· ,

p. 399-LK>O.

the systematic inclusion of bureaucratic or organizational variables in
deteminants research.

Wi trout such consid.era tions, deteminants re-

search can neither hope to analytically specify the nature of the impact
bureaucrats have come to realize on the policy process nor improve upon
its less than successful attempts to fashion a powerful positive theory
of policy formation.

Only by escaping from its previously held theoreti-

cal and metmdological commitments can deteminants research improve
upon the present instability of its findings, increase the explanatory
power of its research designs, and formulate an analytic model of policy
fom.a.tion without the prescriptive sterility of past efforts.

This can

be accomplished only by incorporating elements of bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior in future modelling efforts.
If the influence of bureaucrats in the policy process is as great

as we believe it is, then why have bureaucratic or organizational variables been consistently underrepresented in deteminants research?

Surely

part of the blame must be placed on the researchers, themselves, for
slavishly following the theoretical and methodological predispositions
of their disciplines, even though traditional methods have failed to tell
us very much about the ultimate determinants of policy outcomes.
determinants analysts need not shoulder the entire blame.

However,

Organiza tionaJ.

theorists, for their part, although willing to extol the importance of
bureaucracy, have been reluctant to identify the dimensions of bureaucracy and bureaucratic behavior that may be respmsible for observed
variations in policy outputs.
age?

Is the size of bureaucracy important?

Its degree of centralization?

Complexity?

Autonomy?

Formalization?

Its

Professionalization?

By failing to specify those aspects of bureaucracy
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most likely to affect policy outputs, organizational theorists have given
little or no significant guidance to determinants researchers.
If researchers are to improve the explanatory power of available
modelling efforts and simultaneously correct for their past theoretical
and prescriptive sterility, both theoretical and methodological changes
are in order.

Now although some such changes require at most minor

modifications in present definitions of a policy determinant or somewhat
more complex causal modelling of the policy process which links initial
policy decisions with that policy's ultimate performance, the explanatory
strength of most modelling efforts can only be improved by (1) reexamining
the empirical foundation of those underlying assumptions regarding the
hiemrchical arrangement of actors in the policy process, (2) expanding
the definition of a power-holder to include those individuaJ.s capable of
deciding a policy's opemtiona.l content via processes of implementation,
and (3) including variables hypothetically related to each phase of the
policy process within methodological designs.
On the one hand, although major modelling efforts have taken root
within a large body of determinants research, most studies continue to
suffer from an unmistakable lack of theoretical significance.

Though re-

searchers have long sought to identify those factors responsible for
specific policy outputs, they have succeeded neither in systematically
specifying the nature of the linkages among variables nor in explaining
the ultimate outcomes of governmental activities.

Within narrowly

dmwn disciplinary boundaries, economists and political scientists alike
have attempted to measure the influence of various factors on the policy
choices of decision-makers and to predict a community's policy position
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given its particular level of economic and political development without
first specifying the exact manner in which variables interact.

The ovel."-

riding emphasis on prediction ra. ther than explana. tion has precluded
systematic causal modelling and had even encouraged many to make rather
serious inferences on the basis of spurious :relationships.
When it is further taken into considers. tion that the possibility of
environmental determinism suggested

qy

most researchers has yet to explain

almost an average of two-thirds of the variance in most output categories,
we begin to question not only the appropriateness of present :research
designs but even the manner in which many variables are li tera.lly thrown
into the analysis with no thought to their theoretical significance.

Also

questionable is the reluctance of most political scientists to include
bureaucratic or organizationaJ. variables in their determinants :research.
Rather than abiding by the belief that socioeconomic conditions set the
policy agenda of governmental units, :researchers should have at least
considered the possibility that although the level of economic development
supplies the re.sources necessary to a1 ter present levels of policy outputs,
such political and bureaucratic variables as partisanship and professionalism may provide the initial motivation.

Though such factors may lack

an independent and direct impact on policy outputs, they could nonetheless
serve a contributing function.50

Their inclusion in determinants research

could only then increase the explanatory power of most modelling efforts.
Secondly, :researchers must divorce themselves from assumptions of
hierarchy and authority in organizations which are not empirically supported

50 See, Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation ~n Organizations," American Political Science Review, 64 (1969)? 111-126.
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with direct reference to the policy process.

The ina.bili ty of environ-

mental conditions to explain all of the observed variation in and between
output categories and the tendency of communities with dissimilar political structures to pursue different policy options had naturally urged
many researchers to extol the importance of politics on things political
and to consequently include cha:racteristics of fonnal decision-making
bodies in detennina.nts research.

Although there may exist many situations

when environmental conditions are so compelling that decision-makers are
not free to choose from am.ong assorted policy a1 terna. ti ves, :few policies
receive formulation in complete isolation from the political climate.
This being so, differences in political characteristics may explain some
degree of variation in policy outputs.

But such differences are not those

which are commonly included in most modelling efforts.
Determinants researchers, and here we are referring primarily to
political scientists, have concentrated major attention on policy conflicts
inherent in legislative bodies.

Recognizing that every policy has both

its supporters as well as its det:ractors, researchers have sought to
measure the impact of specific legislative characteristics and political
conditions on the policy-making process.

With the underlying assl.Ullption

that policy decisions grow out of conflict and bargaining within fomal
decision-making bodies, researchers have given inordinate conside:ration
to elected public officials and characteristics of the electoral process.
In so doing, they have assl.Ulled that elected officials occupy positions of
highest authority in the policy process.

It is held that once policy is

made and its exact output level detemined, legislators delegate mundane
administ:ra ti ve details to public bureauc:racies.

Thus, in te:ons of the
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setting of initial policy outputs, characteristics of administrative
bodies as well as administrators, themselves, are considered relatively
unimportant.
Now although it is true that bureaucrats do not maintain fomal
positions of policy-making authority, ever-increasing delega. tions of power
from legislators to administrative bodies has given bureaucrats such an
independent voice in deciding the ultimate conduct of political activity
that administrative policy-making can no longer be viewed as some sort
of deviation from the general pattern.

Indeed, there now appears to be

no question that for public bureaucracies the task of policy-making has
assumed parity with that of policy implementation.

Modelling efforts

based on assumptions of hierarchy are theoretically suspect and when devoid of variables representative of bureaucratic organization and behavior
they are equally methodologically deficient.
Third, even if researchers investigating the detenninants of policy
outputs suddenly picked up the clew that bureaucrats do have an impact
on policy decisions and proceed to include bureaucratic or organizational
variables in their analyses, present models would still be unable to expl~in

a significant degree of output variation without expanding the

usual definition of deteminant.

For the most part, when measuring the

impact of certain political characteristics on the policy process, researchers have only considered features of govermnental units that can
be measured independently from an output attribute.

For example, the

impact of such governmental characteristics as party dominance, electoral
activity, reformism, and legislative structure have been investigated in
a manner unrelated to the given outputs.

Researchers have assumed that
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characteristics of the governmental unit are important without specifying
the nature of the relationship.

Only after strong correlations are found

do researchers hypothesize a.s to why certain relationships exist.

Most

often the same pattern develops when environmental conditions are given
the hypothetically independent status.
Now, given these considerations, suppose researchers interested in
explaining inter-state variations in welfare benefits find that output
levels increase in direct proportion to increases in the state's level
of economic development when controlling for both characteristics of the
governmental unit and for attributes of bureaucratic organization.

A

strong case would then no doubt be made for the independent impact of
economic conditions on the level of state welfare benefits.

In fact, the

same conclusion would be d:ra.wn for any one of the three assumed independent
variables if a. strong correlation was found between one and some output
level when controlling for the other two.

Certainly few would quarrel

with conclusions proposed by such a study.

Let us suppose, however, that

output levels were found to differ even in states with similar economic,
political, and bureaucra. tic characteristics •

In such an instance, the

usual definition of determinant would be found wanting.
Under such conditions researchers would see the need to expand the
usual definition of determinant to include not only characteristics of
the economic environment, governmental unit and bureaucratic orga.niza. tion,
but also characteristics of the choice si tua.tion.

Such variables a.s "need"

and "output uncertainty" fall into this ca. tegory since they characterize
the relationship that may exist between a given governmental unit and
policy output, and thus proVide referents outside the governmental or
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economic unit.

Characteristics of the choice si tua.tion should especially

be included as potential determinants in all cases whe:re certain geographic
regions with like governmental and socioeconomic conditions pursue quite
dissimilar policy options.
Finally, and even more gennane to the issue presently at hand,
determinants researchers may very well be investigating a series of
questions that are both theoretically and prescriptively sterile.

Though

detenninants analyses have increased our understanding of the policymaking process by alerting us to those factors which may ultimately determine both the initial setting of policy objectives and the establishing
of specific output levels, they have not focused attention on what really
seems to matter to both policy-makers ansi policy affectees, namely, did
the policy achieve its initial objectives, and, if so, at what cost?

The

answer to these questions is dependent on one's a.na.lysis of policy outcomes rather than policy outputs.

When the focal point is changed in

this fashion, identification of key policy detenninants must necessarily
center on the administrative rather than the governmental or socioeconomic
unit.

By failing to broaden their definition of policy determinant to

include characteristics of the administrative organization, detenninants
analysts have been unable to fonnulate a truly functional model of the
policy process able to account for sizeable output variations within and
between specific policy areas and governmental units.
Though it may be asserted that detenninants anaJ.ysis has not specifically focused on individuaJ. power resources, per se, and thus should not
be too critically reviewed for failing to document the significant power
potential of bureaucrats in determining policy outcomes, the contention
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tha.t bureaucrats are ultimately the holders and

exercise~

national, state, and community affairs has not received
necessary to support the charge even by those studies
cerned with community power structures.

of power in

~

documentation

spe~ifically

con-

theoretical

Instead., various

and methodological constraints have also operated within ..,-the power studies
litera tu:re contributing to rather questionable portfolios
power holders.

Indeed, either a large and growing body

0

of community

-.:f theoretical

and case study literature supportive of our claim is seri<::JOUSly mistaken,
or community power studies have approached their research - project from a
rather shaky foundation.

In order for the power studies :::;::literature to

balance its findings with what organization theorists

ha.~

concerning the power capacity of bureaucrats, several

c~es

fully documented
must be

made in the manner in which "power" is conceptualized and ..;. ultimately
operationalized in present studies of community power strr-=uctures.
Though exceptions do exist, most studies concerned .- with locating
the source of political power in American society can be • categorized in
one of two principal theoretical perspectives, each of wh~,t:tich is dependent
upon distinct methodological approaches.

On the one hand,.a are studies that

start with the premise that there exists in all societies s a small class
of individuals that can ultimately be identified as the "••true powerholders" because of their dominant voice in making decisi.,..Lons affecting
and binding upon the general public.

This "elitist"

view~

of American

society holds that power is held by the few woose will p::('"';X"9vails over that
of the many.

Opposing this perspective is the opinion th.(:lB. t though it may

be the few who actually make policy decisions, the exact

this "power class" varies from one issue area to another. _

composition of
Those holding
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this view are appropriately temed pluralists because they see power as
a resource that is dispersed among a broad range of groups that exercise
a certain degree of influence in specific policy areas.
Though each perspective has a number of proponents that employ differing methodological strategies, both are led by individuals who strongly
voice one particular approach for identifying conununi ty power-holders.
For example, as noted in Chapter III, paving the way for most elitist
interpretations of American political life is the reputational approach
as developed by Floyd Hunter.

Researchers following this particular ap-

proach have been led by the growing knowledge that an eve:r.-increasing
proportion of political activity is perfonned by "political outsiders"
and tha.t such individuals inevitably exercise significant power over
policy decisions affecting the political, economic, and social life of
area residents.

In recognizing the inability of the traditional focus

on political institutions and elected officials to account for the growing
influence of political outsiders, Hunter and others sought some means by
which the true "power" behind the "scenes" could be identified.

In so

doing, these researchers posited the opinion tha.t the affairs of every
city are in some way managed by a select few woo are perceived by others
as capable of exercising power either directly or indirectly within the
community.

And, furthermore, their ultimate degree of influence is so

great that they inevitably acquire a certain reputation for power.

It ha.s

thus been asserted that an individual's reputation can be used as the
identifying factor in gauging the location of political power in any one
particular community.
Though it cannot be denied that such an approach differs markedly
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from studies centered on sociaJ. class, public office, and institutional
position, and in so doing uncovers a body of power-holders significantly
different from those identified by earlier approaches, its theoreticaJ.
and methodological foundations are such tha.t the power potential of
public bureaucracies have not been adequately identified.

First, by

starting with the assumption tha.t a power class does in fact exist and
tha.t it can be identified by the reputations of its members, reputationalists ha.ve taken for granted that which they should have instead sought

to prove.

Secondly, the precise location of political power is an

empirical problem and thus one that must be approached by examining
particular actions and/or inactions tha. t affect the policy process,
rather than by acquiring a subjective measure of one's degree of power
by rank-ordering individuals in certain "high-power,low-power" categories
on the basis of individual perceptions •
cannot be treated as if synonymous.

"Real power" and "reputed power"

Thirdly, and more importantly, the

power studies literature, in gene::ral, and reputationalists, in particular,
assume tha.t once consensus is reached among the ruling group conceming
the direction of community activities, the struggle for control of policy
development is complete.

Though the reputationa.l approach may identify

individuals who are publicized as key personnel in the policy-making
process, in so doing it is methodologically suspect because it treats
consensus-building in policy formulation as the end rather than the beginning of the process.

The fact that public bureaucracies not only

provide many of the innovating ideas in American government but also most
often have the ability to modify, if not make, policy in the p:rocess of
implementation and program administration and thereby determine a policy's
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operational. content, goes unnoticed in studies employing the reputationa.l
approach.

Since their activities are not ordinarily publicized and their

positions not subject to public election and accountability, bureaucrats
fail to gain the reputation for power accorded elected officials and
individuaJ.s of highly publicized status.
This is not to suggest that the leading methodology of the elitist
perspective is wholly inadequate, but rather that certain key elements are
missing from its design.

First, increasing delegations of policy-making

authority to public bureaucracies has shattered the myth tha. t administrators merely follow faithfu:J.ly the directives of elected officials.
Since the power they do hold almost invariably goes unnoticed or is seen
as directly related to specific policy instructions of others, or even
as a temporary aberration, they do not attain the sort of reputation
that others can perceive.

Thus, when using the reputationa.l approach,

researchers must be careful not to equate power as reputedly exercised in
the making of policy with that which ultimately arises when policy is
administered.

Secondly, reputationa.lists cannot assume that an individual's

power potential is constant across all policy sectors.

Thus, i f the re-

searcher asks a number of knowledgeable people to name the power-holders
in their cqmmunity, how can one be sure that they are identifying persons
with power in all policy areas, in some, or in a single, highly publicized
instance?

An effort must be made to determine the degree of power exer-

cised by certain individuals in specified policy areas.

And, thirdly,

due to the unpublicized nature of most administrative .activities, researchers need to employ their specific methodology with key members of
the bureaucracy.

This can be accomplished by (1) distributing the

questionaire to all public bureaucrats who are in a position to identify
key power-holders within their specified area of expertise, and by (2)
segregating policy activity into specific issue-related categories and
then proceeding to question both key community influentials and administrators responsible for implementing policies in those issue-areas.

How-

ever, even when researchers do proceed that one step further and consider
the reputations of key policy administrators, there still exists the
danger that so-called "power-holders" may only be perceived as such because of their leadership position within the administrative body and
not because of their deteminative role in policy development and per...
fo:rma.nce.

Thus the relationship between one person's behavior and

another's perception of that behavior must be empirically determined.
This can only be accomplished by examining the total political activity
of public bureaucrats, i.e., their advise-giving functions, interpretations
of policy decisions, and ultimate application of policy directives.
The suggestion that researchers employing the reputationaJ. approach
expand their list of respondents to include members of bureaucracy and to
then attest to the validity of their findings by considering the specific
policy behavior of reputed power-holders in the policy environment has
received at least partial consideration in the type of decisional analysis undertaken by members of the pluralist persuasion.

In brief, plural-

ists have sought to show that the specific make-up of individuals and
coalitions committed to and directly involved in particular policy decisions
varies from one issue area to another, and in so doing, have demonstrated
that power very often appears to be dispersed among a broad range of
individuals, groups, and institutions.

Starting with the belief that the
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exercise of power must be examined in its insti tutiona.l setting, pluralists
have sought to identify power-holders by tracing the historical development of particular policy decisions from the setting of the political
agenda to the specification of policy output levels.

In so doing, they

have attempted to identify those individuals most prominent in the decisionmaking process.
Though decisional analysis has allowed researchers to identify those
individuals actively engaged in processes of agenda-setting, decisionmaking, and output specification, like the reputationa.l methodology, it
has treated policy formulation as the end rather than the beginning of

policy development.

Bureaucrats have not been identified as key policy

levers even by decisional analysts because they, too, have been constrained
by a rather limited definition of their subject, power.

Since researchers

are most often inte-rested in conflicts inherent in the formulation of
policy decisions they have failed to consider the ways power is exercised
by those individuals and institutions responsible for applying policy

and therefore for bringing about initial objectives.

Even when policies

have been enacted, various administrative constraints may prevent execution of the decision in the manner prescribed by policy-makers.

If re-

searchers are to fully address the nature of power relations in the
American governmental process, they will need to trace the total sequence
of the policy process from issue specification to policy outcomes.

Only

by examining the activities of bureaucrats can researchers begin to under-

stand the full power capa.ci ty of policy administrators in translating
initial policy decisions into explicit and meaningful outcomes.

And,

since governments are most often judged by what they deliver rather than
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by what they promise, the increasing :role of public bureaucracies must
take on a.d.d.ed significance in studies of the American policy process.
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